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Introduction
In many policy debates, flexibility of labor markets is postulated as a solution to high unem-
ployment and low growth. An important task for academic research therefore is to analyze
and understand the drivers and consequences, impediments and boundaries of job mobility.
In this thesis, I examine jobmobility from various angles with a particular focus on the role of
network structures in determiningworker transitions. While individual utilitymaximization
is the predominant paradigm in most economic models, many decisions of economic agents
are influenced by connections to other individuals, by social norms, and by larger groups. My
dissertation aims to help understanding the impact of social interactions between firms and
workers on economic outcomes and decisions such as job mobility.
In the first chapter, I explicitly analyze and model the formation of economic connections
between firms as a stochastic process. I exploit observedworker transitions in order to identify
the boundaries of job mobility and, hence, the boundaries of labor markets. To this aim,
I propose a novel network-based method that allows to determine separate and largely self-
contained labor markets.
In the second chapter, I examine how firm-level practices in taxation influence the behavior
of individuals. In this context, worker flows between firms serve as a mechanism of informa-
tion transmission and reduce information frictions. Notably, workers learn about incentives
inherent in the tax system by switching to firms with a high knowledge of the system.
Informational uncertainties are also at the heart of the third chapter. In the context of
hiring relations between firms, I show how learning processes through repeated interaction
between firms can help to mitigate uncertainty about worker quality. This mechanism can
lead to increased labormarket efficiencyby improving thequality ofmatches betweenworkers
and firms.
In the fourth chapter, I contribute to the range of econometric methods that deal with
dependency structures in the data. The prevalence of inter-dependencies between observa-
tion invalidates standard independence assumptions and requires bootstrapmethods that ex-
plicitly allow for correlation between error terms. I adjust the scheme for drawing bootstrap
resamples in order to accommodate the specific dependence structure in the data.
Although the context of these studies is diverse, they share important common ground in
their methodology. First, the empirical analysis in all chapters is based on detailed large-scale
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matched employer-employee data. Second, all studies extensively rely on the informational
content embedded inworker flows. In recent years, labor economists increasingly explore the
information embedded in worker flows between firms. The main idea is that job transitions
between different employers reveal unobserved preferences that cause the job switch. At the
same time, a job transition represents an expert assessment of the employer regarding the
match of the worker to the skills required at the specific target firm. In the previous literature,
worker mobility has predominantly been used to study unobserved worker and firm quality.
In this thesis, I extend the range of applications that exploit the informational content of
job mobility. Furthermore, I extend the methodology to analyze the data by incorporating
methods from network analysis and machine learning. In the following, I provide a short
introduction into the four different chapters of my thesis.
LaborMarkets
In the first chapter, I develop a novel method that allows to determine the size and scope of
labor markets within countries. A specific definition of labor markets within a country is a
prerequisite for many applications in labor economics and related fields. Important studies
in the current literature exploit variation across separate labor markets in order to answer key
economic questions such as to identify the effect of global trade shocks, immigration, or tech-
nological change. For simplicity, most studies approximate labor markets by geographical
regions and administrative boundaries. These geographically separated local labor markets,
however, are subject to a number of important drawbacks. First, empirical researchers have
little guidance which is the geographical entity that forms the relevant reference group for
firms and workers. Second, administrative boundaries are relatively stable over time while
modern technology such as online job search has vastly increased the potential size of the rel-
evant labor market for job seekers. Moreover, workers are heterogeneous in their preferences
for mobility and face large differences in the local availability of jobs in their profession.
In order to address these issues, I use modeling techniques from the literature on commu-
nity detection in complex networks to identify groups of firms that form endogenous labor
markets. Unlike existing definitions, the novel concept does not rely on predefined geograph-
ical boundaries. Instead, labor markets are revealed by common patterns in observed jobmo-
bility flows across firms. In particular, firms are classified in the samemarket if they have simi-
lar probabilities of job flows to other firms. Based on large-scale matched employer-employee
data from Austria, I show that the resulting labor markets are spatially clustered but deviate
from administrative boundaries in various aspects. Notably, the approach reveals several sepa-
ratemarkets within geographical areas as well as some labormarkets that are scattered around
the entire country. Moreover, the structure of labor markets changes over time as increasing
mobility widens the geographical scope of labor markets.
2
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The flexibility of this data-driven determination of labormarkets allows for a range of new
economic insights. I demonstrate that employment spillovers following a large local labor de-
mand shock are not necessarily a local phenomenonbut also affect distant firms from the same
estimated labor market. Notably, the breakdown of the Austrian steel industry at the end of
the 1980s caused spillovers on employment in distant non-steel related firms from the same
endogenous labor market but left employment in other labor markets unaffected. Further, I
show thatworker reallocation in response to global trade shocks takes place across regions and
industries but within endogenous labor markets. Summarizing the evidence, I find that en-
dogenous labor markets capture the relevant reference group for estimating spillover effects
and mobility responses to local labor supply and demand shocks.
Behavioral Responses to Taxation
The second chapter is based on joined work with Albrecht Bohne. In this chapter, I examine
how individuals respond dynamically to incentives provided by the tax system. Most impor-
tantly, I analyze howand fromwhomworkers learn about opportunities to avoid paying taxes
as they gain experience in the formal tax system. Specifically, I document the important role
of firms and job mobility in transmitting information about the tax system.
Most countries deploy a progressive schedule of personal income taxes where the tax rate
jumps discretely upwards for income above certain thresholds. The standard theory of labor
supply examines the trade-off between labor and leisure and predicts that some individuals
adjust their income to values just below these kinks in the tax schedule. The empirical evi-
dence for such bunching responses to income taxation, however, is limited. On the one hand,
this can be due to adjustment frictions as wage contracts offered by firms are not flexible to
be adjusted to personal needs. On the other hand, it can be due to information frictions as
individuals might not be aware of the incentive structure and tax avoidance opportunities.
I analyze the information channel in a particularly well suited setting in Ecuador. Like
many developing countries, Ecuador is in the transition from an informal to a more formal
economy. The government provides a broad range of incentives and tax rebates to induce
workers to switch into the formal tax system. In particular, the Ecuadorian tax law enables in-
dividuals to deduct personal expenses for housing, clothing, education, health and nutrition
on a very large scale.
Based on unusually rich data that covers tax return data on the universe of tax payers in
Ecuador and matched socio-demographic data from the civil registry and the firm registry, I
examine how taxpayers increasingly exploit possibilities to avoid taxes with growing experi-
ence in the tax system. Following individuals over time, I show a strong increase in the prob-
ability to report earnings in the vicinity of the first kink in the Ecuadorian tax schedule. This
bunching behavior is predominantly driven by the use of the generous deduction opportuni-
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ties.
A closer look on the determinants of the increase in bunching reveals the importance of
job mobility for the transmission of knowledge about tax avoidance opportunities. Work-
ers learn about tax incentives and the possibility to avoid tax payments by switching to firms
with a high share of bunchers. Consistent with a story of learning and memory, workers con-
tinue to bunchwhen switching to firmswith lower levels of bunching. In contrast, individual
workers entering a new firmhave little influence on tax avoidance behavior of their incumbent
co-workers. In conclusion, the firm is the relevant reference group that shapes individual re-
sponses to income taxation. Learning about the system is mainly driven by movements to
specific firms that provide workers with information about tax avoidance.
Sourcing, Learning, andMatching in LaborMarkets
In the third chapter, which is joint work with Albrecht Glitz, Virginia Minni, and Andrea
Weber, I analyze hiring relations between firms as an important determinant of job mobility.
For firms, it is an important task to hire the right, i.e., highly productive, workers. This is
emphasized by the huge effort most firms undergo when deciding whom to hire. In many di-
mensions, however, worker quality is unobserved and can be screened only imperfectly. Hir-
ing decisions are therefore accompanied by high levels of uncertainty. In order tomitigate this
problem, firms can rely on various types of networks that help to reduce uncertainty around
worker quality. While the literature has started to explore the role of personal relations in re-
ducing uncertainty through referrals (for instance by former co-workers or individuals from
the same ethnic group), there has been much less focus on the role of networks among firms
directly. In particular, firms gain experience from repeated interaction with each other and
might be able to learn about the match quality of workers from particular firms.
I document a range of empirical facts that emphasize the importance of experience of hir-
ing firms with specific source firms for hiring decisions. First, I show that older firms tend
to poach their workers from a narrower set of source firms. As the age of a firm increases, its
hiring gets more concentrated and new hires come from a smaller number of selected firms
when conditioning on firm size and growth. This result is robust when controlling for other
firm characteristics, industry classes and geographical factors. Second, I show that a firm’s
acquired experience in hiring from a specific source firm leads to higher starting wages and
longer tenure of workers hired from that particular firm. Having gained experience from pre-
vious interactions with the same source reduces uncertainty and therefore results in better
matches. With increasing tenure, however, the information advantage disappears and work-
ers that are hired from sources with no previous experience catch up.
To substantiate these empirical findings, I build a search and matching model with het-
erogeneous workers, on-the-job search and match-quality as a pure experience good. In the
4
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model framework, a firm learns over time about the average quality of workers from differ-
ent source firms. If a firm repeatedly proves to be a good source of highly productivematches,
hiring firms are more willing to employ workers from this particular source. As a result, new
workers hired from themost appropriate source firms are, on average, bettermatched to their
firm than workers hired from other firms. Hence, they earn higher starting wages and have
lower separation rates. However, as workers and firms learn about their idiosyncratic match-
specific productivity, low quality matches are terminated and the wage and turnover advan-
tage dissipates over time.
Clustered Standard Errors
The fourth chapter grew out of my Diploma Thesis at the Albert-Ludwigs University of
Freiburg and is joint work with Bernd Fitzenberger. In this chapter, I propose a novel boot-
strap method to deal with dependency structures in the error term of linear regression mod-
els when there is only a small number of clusters. It is well understood that few clusters
cause problems in the convergence of standard variance estimators since asymptotic results are
based on the assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Bootstrap approaches
are a common solution to this problem. It is however less known that few clusters also cause
problems if the data set contains cluster-invariant binary variables. In this case, the proba-
bility that certain bootstrap resamples contain only zeros or ones is relatively high and leads
to perfect multicollinearity. Standard software packages simply ignore this problem and re-
port unreliable results. Amodified bootstrap scheme that guarantees that each resample con-
tains every cluster in the data set but attaches randomly generated weights to these clusters
overcomes this issue. I provide extensive simulation evidence for the favorable performance
of the weighted bootstrap method. Drawing weights from a uniform distribution and cor-
recting the estimator for the variance of this distribution leads to a minimal but persistent
asymptotic refinement on standard pairs cluster bootstrap methods.
5

Chapter 1
JobMobility Networks and Endogenous Labor
Markets
1.1 Introduction
Large parts of the current literature in labor economics rely on the concept of separate and
largely self-contained local labor markets. Recent examples include studies that use variation
between local labor markets to identify the impact of global trade shocks (Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson, 2013) or immigration (Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2016) on wages and em-
ployment. Boundaries of localmarkets are also important to determine treatment and control
groups in the evaluation of local policies and shocks (e.g., Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller,
2015) and in the analysis of spillover effects (Crepon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora,
2013; Ferracci, Jolivet, and van den Berg, 2014). Furthermore, the definition of local markets
is crucial for the explanation of disparities in regional economic activity within countries, ag-
glomeration economies, and the estimation of spatial equilibrium models (for an overview
see Moretti, 2011).
From an empirical perspective, however, it is unclear how to determine the boundaries of
local markets. More generally, it is unclear whether geographical borders of labormarkets can
be identified at all. The predominant approach in the literature uses predefined, geographi-
cally separated regional entities such as states, metropolitan statistical areas, or counties to
approximate labor markets. In a more elaborate concept, commuting zones pool smaller ar-
eas that are connected through high commuter flows. These concepts however are subject to
a number of important drawbacks. First, empirical researchers have little guidance on which
specific geographical unit to consider.1 Second, secular trends in the geographical mobility of
1For instance, Moretti (2011) provides a discussion of human capital spillovers on wages within local labor
markets. He argues that differences in the evidence for spillovers on the state level (Acemoglu andAngrist, 2000)
and theMetropolitan Statistical Area level (Moretti, 2004) could be partly explained by the rate of spatial decline
in the importance of proximity to college for spillovers.
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workers cannot be captured by the fixed boundaries of local areas. This is connected to de-
creasing search costs triggered by the availability of modern technologies. Online job search
potentially enlarges labor markets as workers can search for distant jobs at very low cost. Fi-
nally, geographical areas are identical for any type of worker while the local availability of
jobs and preferences towards jobmobility can be very heterogeneous across subgroups of the
working force.
In this paper, I propose a new and flexible approach to endogenously determine the size
and shape of labor markets. Rather than depending on predefined geographical boundaries,
endogenous labor markets are revealed by common patterns in the observed worker flows
between firms. The approach is based on a network view of the labor market, where firms
are linked to each other through worker transitions. Building on the universe of job-to-job
transitions in the economy, I construct a job mobility network that reflects actual market in-
teractions between firms. In particular, the firms in the economy constitute the nodes in the
network and are connected by job-to-job transitions which generate directed and weighted
links.2 I partition this jobmobility network into separate markets adapting a model from the
literature on statistical network analysis. The basic idea in this novel approach is that two
firms are in the same labor market if they have similar probabilities to link to the rest of the
network and not because they are located in the same geographical area. This captures the
possibility that – in addition to observed characteristics such as region and industry – labor
markets are determined by unobserved factors. Consider, for instance, amarket that contains
firms which are employing computer scientists with expertise in a specific programming lan-
guage, a market for jobs in an elite political class that can only be accessed by graduates of
certain schools, or even a market that is characterized by a common dress code.3
The separation into endogenous labor markets is based on the stochastic block model
(SBM) (Holland, Laskey, and Leinhardt, 1983; Karrer and Newman, 2011) which is the work-
horse model for the detection of communities in the literature on network analysis. In my
adaption of the SBM, firms are characterized by two sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
First, they have an individual propensity to attract and releaseworkers that captures firm-level
differences in productivity and turnover. Second, they operate on separate, unobserved labor
markets. Firms in the same labor market are characterized by common unobserved latent fac-
tors that determine their probability to link to each other. Worker transitions between firms
are governed by the interplay of firm-level and market-level characteristics.
The SBM is related to a gravity-type equation where interactions between two agents are
2In this definition, links connect employers who draw on the same kind of skills. Moreover, the links entail
information flows and spillover effects. The importance of jobmobility for firmproductivity and agglomeration
economics is emphasized by a growing body of empirical research (Balsvik, 2011; Dasgupta, 2012; Poole, 2013;
Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012, 2014; Serafinelli, 2014).
3Indeed, the British Social Mobility Commission has recently identified obstacles to enter jobs in British
investment banks that preclude market entrance of individuals who do not know the common code of conduct
or dress code in some institutions.
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determined by individual characteristics and ameasure of distance. In the spirit of Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Cortes and Gallipoli (forthcoming), the SBM can therefore be micro-
founded by a simple model of firm choice where job transitions are determined by the costs
of switching. Themain goal of the empirical analysis is then to identify sets of firms that have
a similar structure of switching costs.
My empirical analysis is based on administrative records from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD) which provides detailed matched employer-employee data for all private
sector employees in Austria. Building on the universe of job-to-job transitions from 1975
to 2005, I compute a large and detailed job mobility network and analyze the resulting net-
work structure. The job mobility network comprises about 930,000 job-to-job transitions
and more than 95,000 firms. Given this observed job mobility network, I estimate the SBM
by maximum likelihood via Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods in order to assign firms to
endogenous labor markets conditional on their individual propensity to attract workers.
In an extensive descriptive analysis, I examine the characteristics of my endogenous labor
markets. Compared to local labormarkets, endogenous labormarkets aremore self-contained.
I find higher shares of job transitionswithin endogenous labormarkets thanwithin geograph-
ical entities of the same size. The estimated markets nevertheless reveal a ”local” structure of
job transitions as firmswithin the same endogenousmarket are spatially clustered. The result-
ing geographical structure of endogenous labor markets however deviates from administra-
tive borders in three important ways. First, there are several largely unconnected endogenous
markets located within the same geographical region. The separation of these markets can be
partly rationalized by differences in the industry composition andwage distribution. Second,
some endogenous labor markets are scattered across several regions and contain very distant
firms. Geographically dispersed endogenous markets tend to be relatively more specialized
in particular industries than geographically concentrated markets. In general, however, en-
dogenous labor markets are not particularly concentrated within specific industries. Workers
regularly switch industries and firms hire from a variety of different occupations.4 Third, the
geographical structure of endogenous labor markets varies over time. In particular, the aver-
age spatial distance between firms in the samemarket has increased by about 30%between the
early 1980s and 2000s. In contrast, the industry dispersion within endogenous labor markets
has slightly decreased over time.
The flexibility of the SBM further allows to examine heterogeneity in the scope of endoge-
nous labormarkets for various subgroups of theworking force. I separately analyze job transi-
tions by gender, age group, nationality, and skill-level. Most importantly, endogenous labor
markets differ substantially between high- and low-skilled individuals. On average, the spa-
4This is consistent with evidence from other countries. For instance, Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and
McEntarfer (2011) show that more than 60% of job-to-job transitions in the US are reallocations across the 11
NAICS super-sectors.
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tial distance between firms within endogenous labor markets for high-skilled individuals is
about 1.3 times bigger than for low-skilled individuals. In contrast, markets for high-skilled
workers aremore concentratedwithin particular industries thanmarkets for low-skilledwork-
ers. While endogenous labor markets of female workers were more specialized in particular
industries in the 1980s, these differences vanished in the late 1990s.
My novel approach for the estimation of endogenous labor markets can provide new an-
swers to a range of important economic questions. In the present paper, I utilize the model
to analyze the impact of local labor demand shocks and global trade shocks on employment
and worker mobility. In particular, I demonstrate that endogenous labor markets estimated
in the period prior to the shock can explain and predict worker flows in response to the break-
down of the Austrian steel industry at the end of the 1980s and to the increasing exposure of
manufacturing industries to trade with China and Eastern Europe. In the first application, I
examine employment spillovers following a series of unexpected mass layoffs in the Austrian
steel industry in 1986. The break-down of the steel industry caused adverse effects on em-
ployment in firms from the same endogenous labor market, both in the region of the shock
as well as in distant regions. At the same time, employment in firms from the same region but
different endogenous labor markets remained unaffected. Transition probabilities between
endogenous labor markets were also affected by the shock. In particular, there were less tran-
sitions into the affected market and more transitions out of this market. Importantly, the
change in worker transitions was proportional to the predicted pre-shock transition proba-
bility. In the second application, I exploit the astonishing rise in trade with China and East-
ern Europe in the past decades and quantify the relative importance of different margins of
mobility adjustments. The negative impact of import competition from eastern countries on
wages and employment of manufacturing workers can be partly offset by job mobility. In an
analysis that follows the identification strategies of Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014)
and Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2016), I show that the endogenous labor markets esti-
mated in the period prior to the shock can accurately predict job mobility responses to trade
shocks. In contrast, markets based on geographical areas fail to explain important parts of the
worker movements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss the related literature in Section
1.2. Section 1.3 describes the data, the definition of the job mobility network, and aggregate
network characteristics. In Section 1.4, I explain the stochastic block model and the estima-
tion strategy in detail. I provide a descriptive analysis of the endogenous labor markets and
evidence for worker heterogeneity in section 1.5. Section 1.6 examines spillover effects and
mobility responses to local demand shocks and global trade shocks. Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Related Literature
My proposed new model contributes to a relatively new literature on alternative definitions
of local labor markets. In a recent contribution to this literature, Manning and Petrongolo
(forthcoming) endogenously determine the size of a spatial but flexible concept of local la-
bor markets by optimal job search strategies of unemployed individuals. They find relatively
narrow local markets as workers’ search effort is sharply declining with distance to a vacancy.
Lalive et al. (2015) use particular information on the characteristics of vacancies to predict
whether two unemployed individuals would apply for the same job and hence be in the same
market. Lechner,Wunsch, and Scioch (2013) exploit information on firm andworker location
to determine hiring regions of workers. Commonly, however, the definition of labormarkets
in these papers is based exclusively on observable characteristics. My approach contributes to
this literature by explicitly incorporating unobserved determinants of labor markets. I pro-
vide evidence for the importance of these unobserved determinants in the analysis of spillover
effects and mobility responses to economic shocks.
My approach is also related to Schmutte (2014) who employs computer-based community
detection algorithms to determine the boundaries of job mobility using data from the Panel
Study of IncomeDynamics (PSID). He finds four large segments of the labor market that do
not coincide with industry, occupation, or education categories.
Themethod proposed in this paper adds to a rapidly growing literature that studiesworker
flows across firms inorder to gain insight into thequality andpreferences ofworkers and firms.
Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) and subsequent papers revived the interest in the estimation
of wage decompositions in the tradition of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Similar
to the job mobility network in my paper, the identification of worker and firm fixed effects
in these studies is based on the set of firms that are connected by worker mobility. In a recent
contribution, Sorkin (2015) exploits worker flows across firms to reveal preferences for non-
wage characteristics of firms and compensating differentials. My paper complements these
approaches in detecting common unobserved market-level characteristics of firms that are
revealed by common patterns in worker flows.5
As shown in the application of my model to large economic shocks, estimating endoge-
nous labor markets based on the SBM generates new insights into mobility adjustments to
local shocks. The paper therefore contributes to an important literature that analyzes and
estimates the incidence of shocks to local labor demand and supply (see, e.g., Blanchard and
Katz., 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2013). While existing papers take the
size of the local labor markets as given using predefined regions, endogenizing labor markets
allows for various sources of heterogeneity in these effects. This also holds true for related
5The goal of endogenously grouping firms is also pursued in recent contributions by Bonhomme andMan-
resa (2015) and Bonhomme, Lamadon, andManresa (2016). In contrast to my paper, the assignment of firms to
groups is based on similarities in outcomes such as the distribution of wages in these papers.
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studies that examine spillover effects of positive or negative shocks to local economies (Green-
stone, Hornbeck, andMoretti, 2010; Busso, Gregory, andKline, 2013; Gathmann,Helm, and
Schönberg, 2016). In two recent papers, Cestone, Fumagalli, Kramarz, and Pica (2016) and
Giroud and Mueller (2017) show that local economic shocks are absorbed through worker
flows within internal labor markets that consist of firms affiliated to the larger groups. The
empirical evidence in this paper confirms the view that economic ties are more relevant for
the transmission of economic shocks than geographical proximity.
Finally, my paper adds to a very recent literature that tries to incorporate methods and in-
sights frommachine-learning into economics. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first ap-
plication of the well-established stochastic blockmodel from the statistics literature to an eco-
nomic question. The SBM (Holland et al., 1983; Karrer and Newman, 2011) is the workhorse
model in the literature on statistical networks to partition networks into groups based on
the observed linkages. This task has also been coined community detection. In the origi-
nal stochastic block model of Holland et al. (1983), all nodes in the same community behave
stochastically equivalent and have the same probability distribution of links. The modified
version of Karrer and Newman (2011) allows for heterogeneity within communities by pre-
serving the observed distribution of connections. This is achieved by including node-specific
fixed degree parameters and relates the approach to a recent literature of network formation
with unobserved individual heterogeneity (Graham, forthcoming; Dzemski, 2014). Commu-
nity detection has a long tradition in physics and computer sciences and has given rise to a va-
riety of methods and algorithms (for an overview see Fortunato, 2010). The methods can be
roughly classified into greedy ad-hoc algorithms such as hierarchical clustering (e.g. Clauset,
Newman, and Moore, 2004), algorithms that optimize global criteria over all possible net-
work partitions (e.g. the modularity score of Newman and Girvan, 2004), and model-based
methods. In this paper, I consider a model-based approach, which makes the underlying as-
sumptions and structure explicit.6 This novel approach of unsupervised machine learning is
broadly applicable to other economic contexts as for instance the analysis of supplier relation-
ships among firms, trade networks, and others.
1.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on administrative records for the universe of private sector
employment in Austria. The matched employer-employee data from the Austrian Social Se-
curity Database (ASSD, see Zweimüller, Winter-Ebmer, Lalive, Kuhn, Wuellrich, Ruf, and
Büchi, 2009) provides detailed daily information on employment and unemployment spells
as well as on other social security related states such as sickness, retirement, or maternity leave
since 1972. Each individual employment spell is linked to an employer identifier and some
6For an application of modularity score maximization in the context of job mobility see Schmutte (2014).
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firm-level information.7 Moreover, annual earnings are provided for each worker-firm com-
bination.
To define the jobmobility network, I extract all job-to-job transitions from the ASSD that
occurred between 1975 and 2005 and satisfy the following criteria: First, a change of employer
is classified as a job-to-job transition if there are at most 30 days of non-employment in be-
tween two consecutive employment spells. Second, the sample is restricted to transitions
where workers had a minimum tenure of one year in both their old and new job. This al-
lows me to examine only relatively stable relationships that are not prone to seasonal fluctu-
ations.8 Third, the sample is restricted to transitions between firms with five or more em-
ployees. Fourth, I exclude transitions of apprentices, marginal, and contract workers. Finally,
spurious transitions due to firm renaming, spin-offs, and takeovers are excluded using the
worker flow approach detailed in Fink et al. (2010).
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics of these job-to-job transitions in Austria. The first col-
umn refers to all job-to-job transitions that occurred in the entire observation period between
1975 and 2005, in the other columns I split the sample into job-to-job transitions from shorter
periods in order to track developments over time. In total, there are more than 930,000 job-
to-job transitions. Over time, the number of transition exhibits an upward trend.
The share of job-to-job transitions by female workers amounts to 41% and increases over
time. About 96% of all transitions are experienced by Austrians with a slight decrease from
97% to 95%. The average age at the beginning of the new spell fluctuates between 31 and 35
years.
When switching their job, workers on average engage in more stable relationships. The
average spell duration at the old firm amounts to 1550 days, while the new job last for 2350
days on average. The average time in between two spells decreased from 4.4 days in the late
1970s to 3.5 days in the early 2000s.
Regional mobility is relatively low as about 75-80% of the job switchers transit to a firm
in the same state and 65% remain in their NUTS-3 region.9 In contrast, mobility across in-
dustries is much higher as about two thirds of the job-to-job transitions occur between firms
that are affiliated to different NACE 2-digit industries. This finding is consistent with recent
evidence from the US (Bjelland et al., 2011) where about 60% of job switches are reallocations
across the 11 broad NAICS super-sectors. Over time, however, there are opposite trends in
7I use the terms employer identifier and firm interchangeably. Fink, Kalkbrenner, Weber, and Zulehner
(2010) compare the distribution of employers in the ASSD with official firm registers from Statistics Austria
and find only negligible differences. Hence, they conclude that multi-establishment firms are not an important
component in the Austrian market.
8A substantial part of the Austrian economy is characterized by seasonal sectors such as construction and
tourism. An alternative version of themodel that includes jobs withminimum spell duration above onemonth
does not change the results substantially but generates additional noise.
9Austria consists of 9 very heterogeneous states. The ”Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics” clas-
sification of Eurostat counts 35 NUTS-3 regions in Austria, see also the maps in figure 1.5. NUTS-3 regions in
Austria are aggregations of several municipalities.
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Table1.1:Sum
m
aryStatisticsofJob-to-JobTransitions
1975-2005
1975-1980
1980-1985
1985-1990
1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
D
em
ographics
shareoffem
ales
0.41
0.37
0.37
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.42
(0.492)
(0.482)
(0.489)
(0.491)
(0.495)
(0.492)
(0.494)
shareofAustrians
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.94
0.94
0.95
(0.201)
(0.180)
(0.173)
(0.174)
(0.233)
(0.234)
(0.222)
avg.age
33.0
33.3
31.9
31.0
32.0
33.4
34.7
(9.75)
(10.69)
(10.16)
(9.50)
(9.34)
(9.12)
(9.28)
Avg.duration
(in
days)of
spellatoldfirm
1545.9
1158.0
1429.5
1491.4
1509.6
1583.5
1625.4
(1445.52)
(659.41)
(1075.05)
(1317.09)
(1462.83)
(1567.81)
(1657.43)
spellatnew
firm
2354.0
2650.2
2613.0
2389.4
2237.3
1997.0
1596.4
(2153.34)
(2687.41)
(2565.27)
(2234.63)
(1890.99)
(1443.00)
(907.22)
interm
ission
between
spells
4.0
4.4
4.2
4.0
4.1
3.7
3.5
(5.98)
(6.33)
(6.22)
(5.92)
(6.06)
(5.70)
(5.56)
Shareofworkersstayingin
thesam
e
state
0.78
0.79
0.78
0.78
0.79
0.78
0.74
(0.417)
(0.409)
(0.414)
(0.411)
(0.407)
(0.417)
(0.440)
N
U
TS-3region
0.64
0.66
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.63
(0.479)
(0.473)
(0.476)
(0.474)
(0.472)
(0.475)
(0.484)
2-digitindustry
0.22
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.23
0.26
0.28
(0.417)
(0.410)
(0.404)
(0.400)
(0.422)
(0.441)
(0.447)
occupation
(white-andblue-collar)
0.86
0.87
0.85
0.85
0.86
0.87
0.88
(0.346)
(0.341)
(0.355)
(0.361)
(0.351)
(0.332)
(0.320)
Shareofworkerswith
wageincrease
0.61
0.65
0.63
0.64
0.63
0.60
0.60
(0.487)
(0.476)
(0.484)
(0.481)
(0.483)
(0.492)
(0.490)
increasein
firm
fixedeffect
0.74
0.89
0.86
0.83
0.78
0.72
0.62
(0.441)
(0.31)
(0.35)
(0.379)
(0.415)
(0.451)
(0.485)
N
um
beroftransitions
930,027
258,837
204,832
234,580
273,099
263,006
281,880
Note:Standarddeviationsin
parenthesis.Thistablereportssum
m
arystatisticsforjob-to-jobtransitionsin
thespecifiedperiod.A
changeofem
ployerisclassifiedasajob-to-jobtransition
ifthere
areatm
ost30
daysofinterm
ission
in
between
two
consecutiveem
ploym
entspellsand
tenureatboth
em
ployersexceedsoneyear.Transitionsbetween
sm
allfirm
swith
lessthan
5em
ployeesand
transitionsofapprenticesandm
arginalworkersareexcluded.
14
1.3 Data
mobility across regions and industries. While regional persistence has slightly decreased in
the beginning of the 2000s, there is a clear upward trend in the share of workers that remain
in their industry starting from the early 1990s. The vast majority of workers remain in their
broad occupation (white- or blue-collar workers) with a slight increase in later periods.
In general, most workersmove up the job ladder when switching their employer. Formore
than 60% of the workers the transition is associated with a wage raise. Moreover, 74% of tran-
sitions lead workers to a firm with a higher firm fixed effect as measured by a wage decompo-
sition as in Abowd et al. (1999).10 Interestingly, however, this share deteriorates sharply over
time from 90% in the late 70s to only 62% in the early 2000s.
The main idea behind defining the job mobility network is that job-to-job transitions es-
tablish links between the two firms involved in the transition. Figure 1.1 depicts the concept of
link formation. Whenworkers flow between firms i and j (Figure 1.1a), directed andweighted
links are established between those firms (Figure 1.1b). In particular, the link from i to j is
stronger the more transitions occur in this direction during the sample period.
flows
i
j
(a)
⇒
links
i
j
(b)
Figure 1.1: Link Deﬁnition Based on Job-to-job Transition
Applying this procedure to theuniverse of job-to-job transitions inAustria results in a large
and very detailed job mobility network. Formally, the job mobility network G = {V,E}
consists of a set of N nodes V = {1, 2, . . . ,N}, i.e., the firms in the economy, and a set of
links E, i.e., the job-to-job transitions.11 AnN×N adjacency matrixA indicates which firms
are linked and how strong the ties are. Particularly, Aij denotes the number of job-to-job
transitions from firm i to firm jwithin the sample period.12
10Firm fixed effects andworker fixed effects are obtained from estimating the following equation for log earn-
ings
ywt = αw + ΨJ(w,t) + x′wtβ+ εwt,
where ywt are log earnings of worker w at time t, αw is a worker fixed effect, ΨJ(w,t) is the firm fixed effect at firm
jwhere worker w is employed at time t, x contains a set of covariates such as age and education, and ε is an error
term. This decomposition is known as the AKM decomposition (after Abowd et al., 1999) and will be used at
several points in the paper.
11More precisely, V contains only the non-isolate firms in the economy, that is, firms, which are involved in
at least one job-to-job transition during the sample period (see also appendix 1.A).
12A formal definition of the adjacencymatrix is provided inAppendix 1.A. The jobmobility network defined
in this paper differs from the approach proposed in Schmutte (2014) in a number of important ways. First, it
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There are two important economic aspects of link formation in the job mobility network.
First, links connect firms that employ the sameworker within a short period of time. This en-
sures homogeneity of closely connected firms as they are drawingon the sameworker type and
skill set. Second, links are potential channels for information flows and knowledge spillovers
between firms. Recent theoretical and empirical work has pointed out the importance of job
mobility for knowledge transfers and spillovers (see Balsvik, 2011; Dasgupta, 2012; Poole, 2013;
Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012, 2014; Serafinelli, 2014). These papers show that it matters to
which firms a firm is connected as incoming workers from highly productive firms often gen-
erate positive productivity spillovers. Cestone et al. (2016) and Giroud and Mueller (2017)
show that jobmobility between tightly linked firms can also serve as an insurancemechanism
within internal labor markets of larger corporate companies.
Table 1.2: Links andNodes in the JobMobility Networks
1975-2005 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005
# of nodes 95,237 54,080 51,406 54,615 59,215 59,444 61,068
# of links 930,027 258,837 204,832 234,580 273,099 263,006 281,880
# of components 755 1232 1549 1407 1265 1725 1889
in giant component
% of nodes 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93
% of links 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
average degree 19.84 9.98 8.42 9.00 9.59 9.31 9.75
Note: All measures correspond to the job mobility network sampled during the years indicated. The number of components counts
all subgraphs of the networkwithinwhich all firms are connected by somepath, but not connected to the other subgraphs. Avg. degree
measures the average number of incoming and outgoing connections per firm.
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the number of links and nodes in the job mobility net-
work. Again, column 1 refers to the full network obtained from transitions between 1975 and
2005while the other columns show dynamic developments between shorter periods. In total,
there aremore than 95,000 firms (nodes) in the network and about 930,000 transitions (links).
Over time, these figures tend to rise, reflecting the increase in job mobility and the number
of firms involved. The third row of Table 1.2 shows the number of connected components
in the network. A connected component is a subgraph of the job mobility network within
which all firms are connected by some path, but not connected to the other subgraphs. In the
full network, there are 755 components. The vast majority of these components, however,
contains only 2 firms while the largest connected component (the giant component) contains
about 98% of the firms and almost all links (rows 4 and 5). The analysis in the remainder of
the paper is therefore restricted to the giant component.13
corresponds to the one-mode employer projection graphof his realizedmobility networkbut additionally allows
for directed links that capture actual flows. Second, it distinguishes direct and indirect connections between
firms while this is not possible in his approach where all firms a worker has worked for at any time are directly
connected.
13This restriction is identical to limitations in the literature on AKM-type wage decompositions where
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The last row of Table 1.2 displays the average degree in the network which denotes the aver-
age number of transitions per firm. On average, a firm is connected to 19.84 other firms in the
full network. The average degree is naturally lowerwhen considering shorter timeperiods and
tends to slightly rise over time. The average degree however hides substantial heterogeneity
within the network. Many firms in the job mobility network are involved only in a low num-
ber of job-to-job transitions while others have many connections and serve as “hubs” in the
economy. In appendix 1.A, I provide a detailed discussion on various network characteristics
and document the heterogeneity in the number of connections. In my model for the esti-
mation of endogenous labor markets in the following section, I specifically address firm-level
heterogeneity by including popularity parameters that guide the individual attractiveness of
firms to workers.
1.4 Model
In this section, I present a novelmethod that allows to endogenously determine labormarkets
based on common patterns of worker flows observed in the job mobility network. First, I
set up a model of job mobility that generates job-to-job transitions which are restricted by
transition costs and search frictions. The model is based on a model of occupational flows
in Cortes and Gallipoli (forthcoming) which in turn draws on the literature in international
trade, particularly on Eaton andKortum (2002). The key equation of the jobmobilitymodel
is a gravity equation that relates flows between firms to (market-level) transition costs. In a
second step, I use the Stochastic BlockModel from the literature on network analysis in order
to estimate the most likely assignment of firms to markets using this equation.
The model economy is populated by a finite set of firms indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and a
continuum of workers of measure one indexed by ℓ. Workers differ in observable character-
istics and their initial firm. A worker’s firm at the beginning of the period is predetermined
and given by i.
The potential payoff from switching to firm j for worker ℓ who is currently employed at
firm i is denoted by
φj(ℓ|i) = pj f [Xℓ]
(xj(ℓ)
dij
)
(1.1)
where pj is a single index subsuming firm-level factors that affect all workers at firm j (i.e., the
general attractiveness of j), Xℓ is a vector of individual characteristics that change returns for
worker ℓ in all firms (as for instance general human capital of worker ℓ), xj(ℓ) is a worker
specific match-quality shock that measures howwell worker ℓ is matched with firm j in terms
of productivity and preferences, and dij represents the costs of switching from firm i to j.
worker and firm fixed effects are only separately identified within connected sets of firms that are linked by
worker mobility (Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz, 2002).
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I assume that the costs of transitioning between firms are not firm-pair specific but are
determined on the market level. Specifically, each firm operates on one of k different mar-
kets in the economy. An N × 1 vector z denotes the assignment of firms to markets with
zi ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Formally, dij = dzizj and two firms i and j are in the samemarket, i.e., zi = zj
if the utility costs of moving to other firms in the economy are identical. I normalize costs
such that moves within the same market have a cost of one, duu = 1, while switches across
markets are associated with positive costs, duv > 0 ∀v ̸= u. These utility costs could rep-
resent pure moving costs that depend on spatial distance.14 However, these costs could also
represent time and efficiency costs associated with adapting to the new firm, skill transferabil-
ity between industries and occupations, or other – unobserved – components. The main
idea of the approach is to determine the assignments of firms to markets endogenously, that
is use observed transitions to identify firms that compete for the same worker by a revealed
preference argument.
Match-quality is drawn from a Fréchet distribution
xj ∼ Fj(x) = exp(−Tjx−θ) (1.2)
where T − j is a firm-specific location parameter and θ governs the dispersion of the shock.
At the beginning of the period, workers receive the opportunity to examine outside options
with arrival rate λ. If they get this opportunity, they sample match-qualities, drawing a value
for each firm. They then compare potential payoffs based on the realized draws and decide
whether to switch and where to go.
From the distributional assumption of match-quality it follows that the probability of a
switch from firm i to firm j is
πij(ℓ) = λ︸︷︷︸
switching opportunity
× Tjd
−θ
zizjpθj∑N
s=1 Tsd−θzizspθs
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
j offers the highest payoff of all firms for a worker who starts in i
(1.3)
This result is borrowed from the literature on international trade (Eaton and Kortum,
2002) and derived in more detail in Appendix 1.B. Notably, the switching probability does
not dependent on individual worker level characteristics.
Normalizing by the probability that origin firm i offers the highest payoff, we get an ex-
pression that relates worker flows to a set of firm-level characteristics and the transition costs.
aij = λ×
Tjd−θzizjpθj
Tipθi
(1.4)
According to the assumption of Poisson arrivals, the number of job-to-job transitions be-
14If markets are purely determined by geographical regions, this is consistent with the common assumption
that moves within regions are costless while workers have to pay utility costs to move across regions.
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tween any two firms i and j within a certain time period is an independent draw from the
Poisson distribution
Aij
ind.∼ Pois(γ−i γ+j Mzizj), (1.5)
where γ−i summarizes firm-level characteristics of the firm of origin (i.e., Ti and pi) and
γ+j summarizes destination firm characteristics (Tj and pj). The k × k matrix M captures
(the inverse of) the common cost component of transition probabilities within and between
markets where the typical elementMuv indicates how likely a firm in market u experiences a
job-to-job transition of one of its workers to a firm in market v.
This implies that the expected number of transitions from i to j, E[Aij] = γ−i γ+j Mzizj , is
increasing in the propensity of i to loose workers, the propensity of j to attract workers, and
on the inverse of the transition costs between the markets of i and j.
In the data, the labormarket assignments of firms are unobserved. Hence, the primary goal
is to estimate these assignments given the observed job mobility network G described in sec-
tion 1.3. For a given number of markets, k, the expression in equation (1.5) corresponds to the
key equation of the Stochastic BlockModel (SBM) from the literature on stochastic network
formation.15 Here we interpret the number of transitions between i and j as a weighted link
between the two firms. The SBM can be summarized in the following likelihood function:
L(G|M, z, γ) =
∏
i,j
Pr(i→ j|M, z, γ)
=
∏
i̸=j
Poisson(γ−i γ+j Mzizj)
=
∏
i̸=j
(γ−i γ+j Mzizj)Aij
Aij!
exp(−γ−i γ+j Mzizj).
(1.6)
The product is taken over all combinations of i and jwhile self-loops (job-to-job transition of
a firm to itself) are not allowed in themodel. In order to identify the popularity parameters, I
normalize the sumof all incoming andoutgoing links in amarket toone,
∑
i γ+i 1{zi = u} = 1
and
∑
i γ−i 1{zi = u} = 1 for each market u. Imposing these constraints, the likelihood can
15The original stochastic block model (SBM) of Holland et al. (1983) and Wang and Wong (1987) defines
a probability distribution over networks G, Pr(G|z,M) that is guided only by the parameters z andM. The
underlying assumption is that nodes within a group are stochastically equivalent, that is, all nodes from group
u have the same independent probability of linking to a node from group v. Hence, the SBM does not allow
for degree heterogeneity within groups. As there is typically ample variation in the connectedness of nodes in
empirical networks (compare also figure 1.A14 for the present case), it is important to account for this kind of
heterogeneity. Furthermore, in the original SBM the link variables are independent Bernoulli random variables.
Simulation evidence in Zhao, Levina, and Zhu (2012) however shows that the difference between Bernoulli and
Poisson is negligible especially with many nodes and small interaction probabilities.
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be simplified to
L(G|M, z, γ) =
(∏
i̸=j
Aij!
)−1∏
i
(γ−i )d
−
i (γ+i )d
+
i
∏
u,v
MEuvuv exp
(−Muv) (1.7)
where d−i =
∑
jAij and d+i =
∑
jAji denote out- and indegree of firm i, and Euv =∑
ijAij1{zi = u}1{zj = v} is the total number of links between firms in markets u and v.
Given the observed job mobility network network G, the model parameters can be esti-
mated in a two-step procedure. In the first step, maximum likelihood estimators forM, γ+,
and γ− conditional on a partition z are derived from the logarithm of equation (1.7). In par-
ticular, taking derivatives of the log-likelihood under the identification constraint yields
γˆi
+ =
d+i
δ+zi
, γˆi
− =
d−i
δ−zi
, and Mˆuv = Euv, (1.8)
where δu =
∑
i:zi=u di denotes the sum of degrees in group u. These maximum likelihood
estimators are very intuitive as relative popularity is measured by the relative number of con-
nections and transition probabilities are measured by the number of observed transitions.
Substituting the estimators in equation (1.8) into the (log-)likelihood and neglecting terms
that do not depend on the model parameters considerably simplifies the expression to
lnL(G|z) =
∑
u,v
Euv ln
Euv
δ+u δ−v
, (1.9)
which depends only on the counts induced by the choice of the partition z.
In the second step, the log-likelihood is maximized by choosing the partition of firms into
markets zwhich maximizes (1.9). Since it is not feasible to evaluate all possible combinations
of firms and markets, the empirical analysis relies on computational approximations via a
Markov-chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. In particular, the market assignments of
the firms aremodified in a randomfashion and eachmove is acceptedor rejecteddependingon
the change in the likelihood (for details of the algorithm see Peixoto, 2014a). The estimation
is repeated for different starting partitions in order to avoid lock-in at local maxima.
A generalized consistency framework for community detection using the SBM is provided
by Bickel and Chen (2009) and (including the popularity parameters) by Zhao et al. (2012).
The remaining issue pertains to the choice of the number of markets k which has been
treated as fixed so far. This parameter guides the ”size” of the model as a larger k implies
more parameters in the transition matrix M. It can also be used to ”zoom” into or out of
the economy in order to analyze different levels of market aggregation. However, a tradeoff
between more flexible models and the threat of over-fitting arises. In the empirical analysis, I
estimate the SBM for various choices of k and evaluate the different fits using the modularity
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score of Newman and Girvan (2004).16 The modularity score measures how well a network
decomposes into self-contained communities. A high score indicates dense connections be-
tween firms within markets but only sparse connections between firms from different mar-
kets.17 Figure 1.2 displays the modularity score for varying k in the job mobility network for
the years 1975-2005. There is a clear peak at k = 9 groups, indicating that a SBM with nine
markets is best suited to describe the structure of labor markets in Austria.
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Figure 1.2: Modularity Score for Varying Number of Groups k in the JobMobility Network (1975-2005)
1.5 Descriptive Analysis of Endogenous LaborMarkets
In this section, I present and discuss the endogenous labor markets that arise from partition-
ing the job mobility network among Austrian firms via the stochastic block model (SBM). I
start by comparing endogenous labor markets to geographical characterizations of labor mar-
16In principle, regularization methods such as information criteria (BIC, AIC, etc.), minimum description
length, or likelihood ratio tests, could guide the choice of k. Due to the complex asymptotic behavior of network
models, however, traditional criteria are biased in many ways and finding corrections for model selection is an
active strand of the statistical networks literature (see Yan, Shalizi, Jensen, Krzakala, Moore, Zdeborova, Zhang,
and Zhu, 2014).
17In particular, the modularity score is defined asQ = 12|E|
∑
ij
(
Aij − didj2|E|
)
1{zi = zj}where |E| is the total
number of transitions in the network. It compares the share of links within a market to the expected share in
a model where all firms have the same number of links but links are generated uniformly at random (ignoring
the market structure). This implies that the score is 0 if the markets have no explanatory power while a positive
score indicates that there are more links within communities than expected under random link formation (cf.
Jackson, 2008).
21
1. Job Mobility Networks and Endogenous Labor Markets
kets in section 1.5.1. In section 1.5.2, the analysis continues with a comparison of endogenous
labor markets for several subgroups of the working force.
1.5.1 Endogenous versus Local LaborMarkets
This sectionprovides an extensive descriptive analysis of endogenous labormarkets inAustria.
Particularly, I compare the estimates from the SBM to local labor markets that are based on
predefined geographical characteristics.
Self-Containedness
Figure 1.3 gives an overview of endogenous labormarkets estimated based on the jobmobility
network for the time period from 1975 to 2005. Each circle represents one of the k = 9 sets of
firms that has been assigned to the same market by the SBM.18
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Figure 1.3: Estimated BlockNetwork (node size∝market size, linkwidth∝ transition probability, colours∝ avg. ﬁrm size)
The transition probabilities across and within markets are represented by the gray edges,
which are thicker the more likely a transition is. Job-to-job transitions within markets are
18The numbering of the markets bears no particular meaning and only serves to label markets. The size of
each circle is proportional to the number of firms in the respectivemarket. The coloring of the circles represents
the average firm size in the market. Evidently, firms in markets with many firms tend to be smaller on average
than firms in markets with fewer firms.
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much more probable than transitions between different markets. This clear segmentation
can also be seen in Figure 1.4 which displays the estimated transition probabilities (normal-
ized to sum up to one).19 In total, 80% of all job-to-job transitions occur within endogenous
labor markets.20 Transitions between markets are much less likely. The closest connection is
between markets 1 and 3 where 1.7% (from market 1 to market 3) and 1.9% (from 3 to 1) of all
transitions occur.
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Figure 1.4: Estimated Transition Probabilities betweenMarkets
A natural metric to evaluate how self-contained different definitions of labor markets are
is the modularity score of Newman and Girvan (2004). It computes the share of transitions
between firmswithin the samemarket among all transitions and normalizes it by the share of
withinmarket transitions thatwouldbe expected if linkswere generateduniformly at random
(ignoring the market structure).21 The modularity score therefore measures the explanatory
power of the inherent market structure in excess of random link formation and a positive
value indicates that there are more links within markets than expected. Table 1.3 displays the
modularity score for endogenous labormarkets with k= 9 and k= 35 as well as formarkets de-
fined by the 9 states, the 35NUTS-3 regions, 2-digit industries, and state times 2-digit industry
cells in Austria.
19The actual estimates are reported in Panel A of Table 1.A1 in the appendix.
20Recall that 77.5% of all transitions occurred within Federal states, 64.3% within Nuts-3 regions, and 22.4%
within 2-digit industries.
21See also footnote 17.
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Table 1.3: Modularity Scores for the SBM vs. PredeﬁnedMarkets
SBMwith SBMwith Federal NUTS-3 2-digit States×
9 markets 35 markets States Regions Industries Industries
1975–2005 0.683 0.536 0.610 0.519 0.130 0.102
1975–1980 0.679 0.563 0.607 0.535 0.121 0.106
1980–1985 0.671 0.558 0.613 0.529 0.122 0.099
1985–1990 0.675 0.548 0.616 0.529 0.125 0.099
1990–1995 0.681 0.566 0.619 0.530 0.142 0.111
1995–2000 0.681 0.549 0.598 0.508 0.158 0.121
2000–2005 0.679 0.580 0.567 0.478 0.159 0.118
Note: This table reports modularity scores for labor markets estimated by the SBM (with k = 9 and k = 35) and defined by
several observable characteristics. Themodularity score compares the observed share of links withinmarkets to the expected
share in amodel with the same degree distribution but random link formation. Higher values indicate more self-contained
markets.
For the entire period from 1975 to 2005 and for each of the shorter sample periods, the
SBM outperforms markets based on predefined geographical or industry characteristics. En-
dogenous labor markets with k = 9 have higher modularity scores than the 9 Austrian states
and scores for endogenous markets with k = 35 exceed the scores for the 35 NUTS-3 regions
in Austria. Not surprisingly, 2-digit industries and state by industry cells have much lower
scores. Most importantly, the development over time indicates that the advantage ofmynovel
method to determine endogenous labor markets grows with increasing mobility in the soci-
ety.22
The Geography of Endogenous LaborMarkets
The regional structure of the endogenous labormarkets is illustrated in Figure 1.5. For each of
the 9 markets, the figure presents a map with boundaries according to the NUTS-3 classifica-
tion (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) of Eurostat. In eachmap, the 35Austrian
NUTS-3 regions are colored according to the share of firms from the relevant market within
the respective region. There is clearly a local structure of labor markets in Austria as firms in
the same endogenous market are geographically clustered. For each endogenous labor mar-
ket, the vast majority of firms is concentrated within one Austrian state. The endogenous
market structure however deviates from a classification that is solely based on geographical
boundaries in two important aspects. First, firms in the same geographical area can be part
of different endogenous labor markets. Second, sometimes distant firms from separate local
labor markets are part of the same endogenous market.
22A second test of the performance of the SBM is provided in appendix 1.C. I conduct aMonte-Carlo simula-
tion study with varying degrees of correlation between regions and true labormarkets. The results demonstrate
that even slight deviations from perfect correlation lead to the SBM outperforming regional characteristics.
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Figure 1.5: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1975-2005)
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Separate EndogenousMarkets in the Same Area The maps in Figure 1.5 indicate several mostly
separated endogenous labor markets within the same region. In particular, markets 3, 8, and
9 are all primarily locatedwithinVienna. The estimated probability to switch between any of
these markets is however less than 1.5%. Even within Vienna, the distribution of firms across
different postal code areas is remarkably similar among these threemarkets (see the histograms
in Figure 1.6).23 Hence, firms in the same local labor market are located in different endoge-
nous labor markets. It is therefore interesting to ask what distinguishes these endogenous
markets from each other.
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Figure 1.6: Histogram of Postal Code Areas forMarkets in Vienna (1975-2005)
The histograms in Figure 1.7 illustrate the 2-digit industry composition of the three Vien-
nesemarkets and reveal interesting differences between them. Despite the fact that substantial
shares of firms in all threemarkets are affiliated to generic 2-digit industries such asWholesale,
Retail, andConstruction, there are clear patterns of specialization. Many firms inmarket 3 are
affiliated to manufacturing industries such as Food and Tobacco, Metal Products, Paper and
Print, or the sale, maintenance, and repair of Motor Vehicles. Firms in market 8 are predom-
inantly affiliated to Business Activities, Financial Services and Computer-related industries.
Finally, firms frommarket 9 are specialized inHealth, Public Administration, Lobbying, and
Education.
Further important differences between the three Viennese markets can be found in terms
of the wage structure. Figure 1.8 indicates that the distribution of firm fixed effects from an
AKMwage decomposition is shifted to the right andmore compressed inmarket 8 compared
tomarkets 3 and 9. Not surprisingly, themarket with a larger share of high-paying firms is the
one specialized in Business and Financial Services.
23Note that Figure 1.6 (and Figure 1.7) only lists postal code areas (2-digit industries) where at least one of the
markets has more than 2.5% of firms.
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Figure 1.7: Histogram of 2-digit Industries forMarkets in Vienna (1975-2005)
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Figure 1.8: Kernel Density Estimates for the Distribution of Firm Fixed Effects forMarkets in Vienna (1975-2005)
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DistantFirms in theSameEndogenousMarket Someendogenous labormarkets are spread across
a variety of regions and contain firms from a various states. While the industry affiliation of
firms is in general not a good predictor of their assignment to endogenous labor markets, it
becomes more important for markets that are spread out across the country.
For eachof the 9markets, Figure 1.9 provides a histogramof thebroad sectoral composition.
All markets consist of firms from a broad variety of industries. Evidently, sectors with a high
degree of fluctuation such as construction, wholesale and retail, and hotels and restaurants are
strongly represented in the sample of job-to-job transitions. There are however somemarkets
with a stronger focus on particular sectors such as the dominance of professional services in
market 8, or the health sector in market 9.
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Figure 1.9: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1975-2005)
In Figure 1.10, I show an inverse relation between geographical and industry concentration.
Concentration is measured using the popular Ellison-Glaeser concentration index (Ellison
andGlaeser, 1997)which facilitates the comparison of regional and industry concentration be-
tween differentmarkets.24 In general, values for regional concentration aremuch higher than
values for industry concentration. Moreover, high values of geographic concentration coin-
cide with low values of industry concentration while markets that are more scattered around
the country tend to be more specialized in specific industries.
24For a given market u, the Ellison-Glaeser index of concentration within R regions (or industries) is
EGu =
∑R
r=1(sr − xr)2 −
(
1−∑Rr=1 x2r)Hu(
1−∑Rr=1 x2r)(1−Hu) ,
where sr denotes the share of market u employment in region (or industry) r, xr denotes the share of total
employment in region (industry) r and Hu is the Herfindahl index of the market firm size distribution, i.e.,
Hu =
∑
i:zi=u
(
employment in i
employment in u
)2
.
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Figure 1.10: Ellison-Glaser-Index Regional and Industry Concentration (1975-2005)
Time Trends in the Geography of Endogenous LaborMarkets over 1975-2005
In this section, I track developments in the structure of endogenous labor markets over time
by estimating the SBM based on job mobility networks from the shorter sampling periods
1975-1980 until 2000-2005. This flexibility further distinguishes endogenous labor markets
from the fixed nature of predefined local markets.
Figures 1.A1 to 1.A6 in the appendix displaymaps of the regional structure for jobmobility
networks for the (overlapping) six-year periods from 1975-1980 to 2000-2005. In general, they
show a striking persistence in regional characteristics of the endogenous labormarkets. More-
over, with exception of the early period from 1975-1980, there is a clear trend of increasing
geographical mobility as labor markets are more and more scattered across several regions.
Table 1.4: FirmDistances within LaborMarkets in km
mean sd. 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
1975-1980 90.38 98.49 13.91 56.35 137.58
1980-1985 79.26 91.50 14.25 54.73 113.14
1985-1990 81.24 92.38 14.25 54.73 117.66
1990-1995 90.80 103.31 24.99 55.08 124.47
1995-2000 94.08 94.92 27.16 66.34 144.34
2000-2005 103.14 97.83 30.42 73.72 153.34
Note: Distance between firms is calculated according to the geographical distance between the
centroid of the respective political districts.
This is also supported by an increase in the average distance between firms within labor
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markets. Table 1.4 shows aggregate statistics for the distribution of distances between all pairs
of firms in the same labormarket.25 The average distance between firms within labor markets
is 90.4 km in the late 1970s and 103.2 km in the early 2000s. After an initial decrease, it in-
creased by 30% from the 1980s to the 2000s. The median distance increased by 31% from 56.3
km to 73.7 km over time. The largest increase can be found in the lower part of the distribu-
tion as the distance at the 1st quartile increased by 119%.
While geographical concentration is decreasing over time, the concentration of industries
within endogenous labor markets increases slightly. The development of industry composi-
tionwithin endogenousmarkets over time is depicted in Figures 1.A7 to 1.A12 in the appendix.
Moreover, Figure 1.11 compares the average Ellison-Glaeser index for geographical and indus-
try concentration over all markets for each of the shorter sampling periods. After an initial
increase between 1975-80 and 1980-85, geographical concentration steadily decreases over time
while industry concentration exhibits an inverse pattern. Additionally, the error bars in Fig-
ure 1.11 indicate that the difference between both ways of concentration is statistically signifi-
cant in earlier periods but becomes insignificant later on. These developments lend support
to the hypothesis that over time individuals become more mobile (consistent with the larger
size of labor markets in Table 1.4) and more specialized in specific industries.
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Figure 1.11: Ellison-Glaser-Index of NUTS-3 Region and Industry Concentration over Time
Summarizing the evidence so far, geographical factors seem to be themost important deter-
25Distances are computed by a relatively rough calculation where I assign to each firm the geographical co-
ordinates of the centroid of the political district it is residing in. There are 95 political districts in Austria. The
distance between firms in the same political district is underestimated as it is set to zero. The distance between
firms in different political districts can be both under- or overestimated depending on the relative location to
the centroid.
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minant for the emergence of distinct labor markets. Additionally, largely separated markets
in the same region differ by their industry or wage structure. Importantly, however, there is
still substantial overlap in the distribution of observed characteristics such as regions, indus-
tries, and wages between markets. The endogenous labor market measure proposed in this
paper allows to capture these unobserved determinants that drive frequentworker transitions
between observationally different firms.
1.5.2 Worker Heterogeneity
In this section, I compare the scope of endogenous labor markets for various subgroups of
the working force. The size and shape of labor markets can differ between worker types as
the local availability of specific jobs varies and preferences towards mobility across regions
and industries are heterogeneous. In the empirical analysis, I compare the outcome of the
SBM estimated from job-to-job transitions separately by gender, nationality, age groups, and
several skill measures.26
Themost striking differences occur in the comparison of high-skilled and low-skilledwork-
ers. Figure 1.12 illustrates the development over time of endogenous labor markets defined by
various measures of skill level. The graphs on the left refer to geographical concentration on
the NUTS-3 level while the graphs on the right refer to 2-digit industry concentration, both
measured by the average Ellison-Glaeser index over all markets. Remarkably, the different
measures all point to the same conclusion: labor markets for higher skilled individuals are
more dispersed in terms of geography but more specialized in specific industries than labor
markets for low-skilled individuals. Panel 1.12a shows this difference for individuals without
(blue dots) and with a highschool degree (red triangles), Panel 1.12b confirms that the same
is true when considering individuals below (blue dots) and above the median (red triangles)
in the distribution of individual fixed effects from an AKMwage decomposition, and Panel
1.12c shows the same pattern for blue collar (blue dots) versus white collar workers (red trian-
gles). Difference between skill groups in the geographical scope of endogenous labormarkets
are also expressed in the geographical distances between firms in the same labor markets. Ta-
ble 1.5 displays aggregate statistics of the distribution of distances (in km) between firms. On
average, endogenous markets for white collar workers are about 25% bigger than endogenous
markets for blue collar workers. The difference is even stronger between different schooling
degrees. The average distance between firms in the same endogenous market is 69 km for in-
dividuals without highschool degree, 115 km for individuals with highschool degree, and 135
km for individuals with a university degree.
Finally, there is a similar difference for workers whose transition is associated with a wage
26Note that the modularity maximizing number of markets could be estimated differently in the subgroups
making a comparison of the market structure more difficult. I therefore fix k to 9, the number that maximizes
modularity in the full job mobility network.
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Figure 1.12: Concentration Indices forMarkets based on Job-to-job Transitions of Subgroups
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Table 1.5: FirmDistances within LaborMarkets in km (1975-2005)
mean sd. 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Occupation
blue collar workers 77.26 93.97 14.25 48.84 101.10
white collar workers 96.77 100.77 26.80 67.23 144.34
Education
no highschool degree 68.90 81.08 0 45.56 96.58
highschool degree 115.12 111.25 16.69 100.95 178.13
university degree 135.21 121.77 16.69 141.60 201.98
Worker fixed effect
below median 72.41 80.41 16.69 53.25 98.91
above median 94.86 101.43 26.30 62.46 140.97
Note: Distance between firms is calculated according to the geographical distance between the centroid of the respective
political districts.
increase compared to those who incur a loss (Panel 1.12d). In particular, wage increases are
associated with low regional concentration but higher industry concentration. The pattern
is reversed for workers who incur wage cuts through the transition. Here regional concentra-
tion is higher than industry concentration. A potential interpretation pertains to job special-
ization which might be rewarded with high premiums while regionally less flexible workers
incur wage cuts.
In figure 1.13, I display the development over time of endogenous labor markets defined by
gender, nationality, and age. Again, the graphs on the left refer to geographical concentration
on theNUTS-3 levelwhile the graphson the right refer to 2-digit industry concentration, both
measured by the average Ellison-Glaeser index over all markets. Consistent with the aggregate
trends described in section 1.5.1, there is a clear decrease in geographical concentration for all
subgroups while industry concentration exhibits no strong direction.
Panel 1.13a indicates that there are no clear gender differences in the geographical concen-
tration of labor markets. In terms of industry affiliation, however, labor markets of women
(blue dots) are more specialized into specific industries than markets of men (red triangles)
in the early periods until they converge in the late 1990s and 2000s. The situation is similar
for Austrian (red triangles) versus Non-Austrian (blue dots) workers. Panel 1.13b shows no
significant difference between geographical concentration in both subgroups. In early years,
labor markets defined by Austrians were more concentrated within specific industries with
convergence in later years.
Panel 1.13c compares endogenous labor markets for three age groups: young workers be-
low 30 years of age (blue dots), middle-aged workers from 30 to 50 (red triangles), and elder
workers above 50 (green squares). From the late 1980s on, middle aged workers are the most
33
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Figure 1.13: Concentration Indices forMarkets based on Job-to-job Transitions of Subgroups
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geographically mobile age group with least concentrated markets. Geographical concentra-
tion is higher for both younger and older workers. In terms of industry concentration, young
workers have the most specialized markets for most of the time. Markets of middle-aged and
older workers have low levels of industry concentration with a slight increase for middle-aged
workers in later periods.
1.6 Mobility Responses to Economic Shocks
Based on my novel method to endogenously determine labor markets, I analyze mobility re-
sponses to large economic shocks. In particular, I use the SBM to predict the reactions to
both, local and global shocks that hit specific parts of the economy.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. In the first application, I examine spillover effects of
a large local labor demand shock, the breakdown of the Austrian steel industry in the late
1980s. I document negative spillover effects on employment in other firms from the same
endogenous labor market both within and outside of the geographical location of the shock.
In contrast, employment in firms from other endogenous markets within the affected region
is largely unaffected by the shock.
In the second application, I use endogenous labor markets to predict mobility responses
to global trade shocks, particularly the rising import competition fromChina and Eastern Eu-
rope. Previous research has identified the importance of jobmobility tomitigate the negative
consequences of global trade shocks (Autor et al., 2014;Dauth et al., 2016). An important and
policy-relevant question however is whereworkers go when they are hit by trade shocks. The
analysis shows that endogenous labormarkets, estimated in the period prior to the shock, can
accurately predictmobility responseswhilemarkets based on geographical areas fail to explain
substantial parts of these movements.
In both applications, I take advantage of the flexibility of the SBM and vary the resolution
of the analysis bymodifying the number of markets, k. This allowsme to quantify the effects
at different levels of aggregation.
1.6.1 Local Labor Demand Shocks
The breakdown of the Austrian steel industry at the end of the 1980s was a particularly large
shock that hit the Austrian economy unexpectedly. After World War II, Austria had nation-
alized its iron, steel, and oil industry in a protectionist act fearing expropriation by the Rus-
sian Army. The steel sector was mainly organized in one large company, the VÖEST. Mis-
management led to serious financial problems already starting in the mid-1970s. For several
years, however, the Austrian government covered these losses. In November 1985, a big oil
speculation scandal as well as the failure of a gigantic US plant project lead to an immediate
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turnaround in the company’s strategy. The government installed a new management and
enacted a strict restructuring plan with big mass layoffs and plant closures.27
Employment Spillovers
Mass layoffs that affect large companies can lead to substantial spillover effects on the sur-
rounding economy (Gathmann et al., 2016). On the one hand, adverse shocks to labor de-
mand can trigger domino effects that cause a downturn in the local economydue todecreasing
demand for local goods and services or due to a negative impact on agglomeration economies.
On the other hand, spillovers can affect economically connected firms (e.g., through input-
output relations or common worker pools) that are not necessarily located in the same geo-
graphical area.
In order to examine which firms are negatively affected by spillovers through the break-
down of the VÖEST in Austria, I plot aggregate employment in all firms that are not affili-
ated to the steel sector over the time period from 1980 to 1990 in Figure 1.14. Panel 1.14a shows
aggregate employment in the NUTS-3 region Linz-Wels where the VÖEST was located. I
distinguish between employment in non-steel sector firms that are assigned to the same en-
dogenous labor market as the steel company by the SBM (the blue line) and employment in
non-steel sector firms from other endogenous markets (the red line).28 In order to account
for potential simultaneity in the determination of endogenous markets and responses to the
shock, I estimate the SBMbased on jobmobility in the 5 years prior to the shock, 1980-1985.29
The onset of the shock is indicated by the vertical line in November 1985. About one year af-
ter the strict restructuring plan in the VÖEST was enacted, employment in other (non-steel
sector) firms from the same region and the same endogenousmarket sharply deteriorated. At
the same time, the upward trend in employment at other firms of the same region but differ-
ent endogenousmarkets continued almost at the same pace. Though I do not claim causality
of these effects, the evidence suggests that – in line with the descriptive evidence in section 1.5
– there are several, independent markets within the same region. The connections detected
and predicted by the SBM are capturing the boundaries that are relevant for the transmission
of economic shocks.
This is also emphasized by the evidence in Figure 1.14b, where I plot aggregate employment
in all (non-steel sector) firms from the endogenous market of the steel company that are lo-
27Three years later, the trouble in the steel industry lead to an endogenous policy reaction, the massive ex-
tension of unemployment benefits in the Regional Extended Benefits Program from 1988. A series of paper is
concerned with various effects of this policy change (Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004; Lalive, 2008; Lalive et al.,
2015). Rather than looking at the effects of the policy response, the present application deals with the direct
labor market effects of the breakdown.
28For comparison with the NUTS-3 regional classification, the SBM is estimated with k = 35 endogenous
markets. The results also hold for other choices of k.
29Note that this implicitly assumes that assignments to endogenous labor markets are fixed in the short run.
Moreover, new firms that are founded after 1985 are therefore excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 1.14: Spillovers on Employment in Non-steel Sector Firms
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cated outside theNUTS-3 regionLinz-Wels. The graph shows a strong decline in employment
that starts exactly at the onset of the restructuring plan. Table 1.A2 in the appendix reports
the 3-digit industry affiliations of these firms. They operate in economically related industries
that rely on steel products (such as construction andmanufacturing ofmotor vehicles) but are
not directly involved in the same activities as the steel company. As a robustness check, I also
plot in Figure 1.14c employment in (non-steel sector) firms from the same endogenous labor
market that are located outside the REBP area defined in Lalive et al. (2015) which excludes
other areas that focus on steel-related industries.30 The pattern of rapid decline after the onset
of the shock is unchanged. The evidence therefore suggests that the SBM can also detect and
predict relevant economic ties to other firms outside the steel sector and the original location.
Combining the evidence fromboth panels, I find strong indications that spillovers to other
firms operate on the level of economic ties rather than through local multipliers. This is in
linewith the evidence inGathmannet al. (2016).31 Endogenous labormarkets estimatedby the
SBM seem to be better suited to detect these economic connections than fixed geographical
boundaries.
Mobility Responses
In this section, I briefly examine the effect of the local demand shock on the transition proba-
bilities between the endogenous labor markets. On the worker level, the negative impact on
employment in the endogenous labor market that contained the steel company can be partly
offset by job mobility to other markets.
After the shock, I find an increase in the share of job-to-job transitions out of the endoge-
nous labor market containing the steel company and a decrease in the share of job-to-job
transitions into this market. The share of transitions away from the affected market to other
endogenous markets among all transitions in the economy increases from 1.5 to 1.9 percent.
At the same time, transitions into the affected market decrease from 1.5 to 1.2 percent of all
job-to-job transitions.
Most importantly, the impact on transition probabilities to other markets is larger the
higher the initial transition probability was in the period before the shock. Figure 1.15 shows
a scatter plot of transition probabilities in the period prior to the shock (1980-1985 on the
vertical axes) plotted against transition probabilities after the shock (1986-1990 on the hori-
zontal axes). Comparison to the dashed 45 degree line indicates that there is a change in the
composition of transitions between these periods. In the upper panel, I illustrate the proba-
bility of transitions from the affected endogenousmarket into the other 34markets. Workers
who leave the affected market increasingly target those markets that had a stronger connec-
30Besides the main center in Linz, parts of the Austrian steel industry were located in various parts of Styria.
31Similarly to their paper, I do not find significant impacts of the labor demand shock on wages. This could
potentially be explained by downward wage rigidity.
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tion before the shock. The opposite pattern can be found for transitions into the affected
endogenous market in panel (b). Transitions into this market become less likely, especially
those from markets with a high pre-shock transition probability. The evidence suggests that
an adverse shock to local labor demand leads to changes in job mobility that are roughly pro-
portional to the transition probabilities predicted by the SBM.
In summary, endogenous labormarkets estimated by the SBMhelp to identify the relevant
parts of the economy that are affected by spillover effects of adverse economic shocks. More-
over, they help to predict job mobility flows in response to such shocks. In the following
section, I further analyze the policy-relevant question of worker reallocation by examining a
different type of shock, the increase in import competition from eastern countries.
1.6.2 Global Trade Shocks
The unprecedented rise in the importance of China and Eastern Europe for global trade over
the past decades has caused strong disruptions in the job biographies of workers in industrial-
ized countries (Autor et al., 2013, 2014; Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum, 2014; Dauth et al.,
2016). Import competition through largely exogenous shifts in the productivity of eastern
countries triggered a rapid decline in wages and employment for workers in affected manu-
facturing industries, both in the US and Germany.3233
Workers who suffer from wage or employment losses through strong exposure to import
competition can mitigate the negative impact by switching their employer, industry, sector,
or region. In the present application, I amparticularly interested in the relative importance of
different margins of mobility. Specifically, I examine whether the SBM introduced in section
1.4 is able to predict the mobility responses following global trade shocks more accurately
than ad-hoc definitions of local markets such as regional entities. To this aim, I augment the
studies ofAutor et al. (2014) andDauth et al. (2016) by introducing endogenous labormarkets
estimated by the SBM. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, following Autor et al. (2014)
I decompose the causal impact of trade shocks on medium-run accumulated earnings into
additive components that accrue within the original firm, region, industry, and endogenous
labormarket and throughmobility between these units. Second, followingDauth et al. (2016)
I estimate the contemporaneous impact of trade shocks on earnings using high-dimensional
32The fall of the iron curtain and the ensuing transition of eastern European countries intomarket economies
can be considered a largely unexpected event. Similarly, the rapid improvements in China’s competitiveness,
also boosted by its entry into the WTO in 2001, are mainly driven by internal factors. Furthermore, I follow
the common strategy in the literature and instrument Austria’s exposure to trade with Eastern countries using
trade exposure of other high-income countries in order to account for possible correlation between imports and
domestic demand or productivity shocks. Detailed discussions of the identification strategy are provided by
Autor et al. (2014) and Dauth et al. (2016).
33Export opportunities due to market liberalization in eastern countries, in contrast, increased wages and
employment in specific industries in Germany while there seems to be no such offsetting effect for USmanufac-
turing workers.
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fixed effects to separate direct responses and mobility responses.
Both strategies show that endogenous labor markets estimated in the period prior to the
shock aremuch better predictors ofmobility adjustments after the shock than traditional con-
cepts based on predefined characteristics. Workers with strong exposure to the shockmitigate
the negative impact by switching to firms within the original labor market but in different in-
dustries and regions.
Data
Data on trade exposure I acquire data on trade exposure from the United Nations Commod-
ity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) which provides annual import and export statistics
of over 170 reporter countries detailed by commodities and trade partner countries. I obtain
Austrian trade data on the SITC3 5-digit commodity level andmerge it to theNACE95 3-digit
industries in the ASSD using correspondence tables provided by theWorld Bank.34
Figure 1.16 demonstrates the growing importance of imports from the East compared to
total imports.35 Trade volumes are normalized to 1 in 1990 and shown on a log-scale. The
solid red line indicates a tenfold increase in imports from the East between 1990 and 2010 for
the median industry. In contrast, total imports from all countries have only doubled for the
median industry as shown by the solid black line. The dashed lines illustrate the increase in
imports for industries at the 25th and 75th percentile respectively and show that there is also
more variation between industries in import exposure to the East.36
Exposure to imports from the East varies on the 3-digit industry level. For each worker i in
industry j(i), import exposure in year t is measured by
ImEj(i),t = 100×
IMEAST→AUTj(i),t∑
ℓ:j(ℓ)=j(i) wℓ,t−1
, (1.10)
where, IMEAST→AUTj,t denotes aggregate Austrian imports from the East in industry j and year
t. Imports are normalized by the initial size of industry j in the Austrian economy, measured
by the total wage bill in the previous year,
∑
ℓ:j(ℓ)=j(i) wℓ,t−1.
34As inDauth et al. (2016), ambivalent cases are partitioned according toAustrian employment shares in 1978.
Moreover, I convert all trade values into 2010-Euros using historical exchange rates provided by the Austrian
National Bank and the Austrian CPI.
35The countries subsumed in the East comprise Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ro-
mania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia, Belarus, Estonia, Hongkong, Latvia, Lithuania, Macau, Moldova, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
36Figure 1.A13 in the appendix shows a similar picture for exports. The rise in Austrian exports to the East
is much less pronounced than for imports. In the empirical analysis, I therefore focus on the exposure of the
Austrian economy to imports from the East. Tables 1.A3 and 1.A4 in the appendix report the industries with the
largest increase in im- and exports respectively.
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Figure 1.16: Rising Import Volumes in Austrian Trade
Panel ofManufacturingworkers Imerge the information on trade exposure to individual level
data on workers from the ASSD in the time period from 1990 - 2010. Following Dauth et al.
(2016), I split the data into two balanced ten-year panels with base years 1990 and 2000. Each
panel consists of all individuals who are between 22 and 54 years old and have their main job
(i.e., the job spell with the longest duration) in the manufacturing sector in the base year.37
For each worker, I track the job biography over the 10 year period and compute the sum of
annual earnings for each year (which could be zero due to non-employment in some years).38
In case of multiple job spells within a year, regional, industry, and labor market information
refers to themain job. In case of non-employment, these characteristics are taken from the last
employment spell, assuming some short term attachment to regions, industries and markets.
Most importantly, the assignment of firms to endogenous labormarkets is estimated based on
worker flows in the 5-year period prior to the shock (1985-1990 for the base year 1990 and 1995-
2000 for the base year 2000) in order to account for potential simultaneity in the formation
of the network and the mobility responses to trade shocks.
Table 1.6 presents summary statistics for earnings and trade exposure of workers separately
for both periods. The first row in each panel characterizes the distribution of base year earn-
ings in the sample. The second row shows accumulated earnings for the ten-year period rela-
tive to the base year earnings level. The median worker received exactly 10 times his base-year
37Individuals who die within 10-year period are dropped.
38Since wage information in the ASSD is censored at the social security contribution limit, I merge the data
to uncensored tax records from the Austrian Ministry of Finance. Uncensored information, however, is only
available since 1995. For earlier periods, I therefore impute the upper tail of thewage distribution using a strategy
similar to the one used in Card et al. (2013).
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Table 1.6: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd. 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Panel A. 1990-2000
Earnings
base year 29798.14 18324.82 19351.46 27489.76 36986.72
accumulated / base year 1182.09 4826.94 611.66 1003.99 1188.88
yearly / base year 116.55 501.75 68.76 100.81 117.84
Δ Import Exposure
in base year industry .257 .474 .031 .143 .329
yearly .012 .193 -.003 .003 .028
Observations 499,706
Panel B. 2000-2010
Earnings
base year 34823.11 19969.02 23452.34 31808.98 42130.67
accumulated / base year 1196.39 5307.30 811.53 1026.18 1167.24
yearly / base year 117.85 540.70 89.54 101.15 115.33
Δ Import Exposure
in base year industry .325 .835 .078 .186 .295
yearly .008 .346 -.009 .004 .049
Observations 436,735
Note: The change in import exposure is measured on the 3-digit industry level and computed by the change in imports from the East
normalized by the (lagged) wage bill. Results are derived from 5,496,766 yearly observations of 499,706 workers in Panel a. and 4,804,085
observations from 436,735 workers in Panel B. workers. Base year earnings are expressed in 2010 Euros. Accumulated Earnings are added
over the entire period and normalized by base year earnings. The change in import exposure is computed for the base year industry over
the entire period and on a yearly base for the current industry.
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earnings for the period from 1990 to 2000while there is a substantial degree of (right-skewed)
variation around the median. Values for the 2000s are slightly higher and more compressed.
The third row characterizes the distribution of yearly earnings relative to the base-year level.
The median amounts to 100% of base year earnings, again with substantial variation. In par-
ticular, the first quartile of yearly relative earnings is only 69% (89% in the second period) of
the base level while the third quartile of yearly earnings amounts to 117% (115%) of base-year
earnings. There is also substantial variation in the individual exposure to imports from the
East. The median change in the eleven-year difference of equation (1.10) is 0.143 (0.186) while
the difference in exposure is 0.031 (0.078) for workers at the first quartile and 0.329 (0.295)
for workers at the third quartile. Similarly, the yearly change in the exposure measure in row
5 shows substantial variation across workers.
Medium-run Analysis
In the first estimation strategy, I follow Autor et al. (2014) and estimate the impact of the
eleven-year difference of trade exposure in the base year industry on accumulated earnings
over the entire period (relative to base year earnings). I pool both panels and estimate the
following model:
Yiτ = β0 + β1ΔImEj(i),τ + x
′
iτα+ φJ(i),τ + φR(i),τ + φM(i),τ + φτ + εiτ, (1.11)
where Yiτ =
∑t=τ+10
t=τ+1
Yit
Yiτ denotes accumulated earnings relative to base year earnings for τ ∈
{1990, 2000} andΔImEj(i),τ = ImEj(i),τ+10−ImEj(i),τ denotes the change in import exposure
in the industry where iwas employed in base year τ. Additional controls subsumed in xi, are
indicators for female gender and foreign born status, for 7 different age categories, 3 different
occupation categories, 3 different tenure groups, and for 5 different groups of firm size in the
base year.
Identification of causal effects in this model is extensively discussed in Autor et al. (2014). I
follow their strategy and instrument import and export exposure using trade flows between
other countries and the East in order to purge the effect of domestic shocks within Austria
that simultaneously affect trade and labor market outcomes.39 Moreover, the model includes
dummies for broad manufacturing industries, φJ(i),τ, states, φR(i),τ, and endogenous labor
39In particular, import exposure is instrumented by trade flows of other (non-neighboring) developed coun-
tries which are not in the Euro zone,
ImEINSTRj(i),t =
IMEAST→INSTRj(i),t∑
ℓ:j(ℓ)=j(i) wℓ,t−3
where INSTR comprises Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and
the UK. Note that the normalization now contains the wage bill in t − 3 in order to account for sorting across
industries in anticipation of future trade flows with China.
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markets, φM(i),τ, in order to control for potentially different industry-, state-, or market-level
trends. Finally, the dummy φτ separates the two ten-year panels.
Themain estimate for themodel in equation (1.11) is shown in the first column of Table 1.7.
There is a strong and (weakly) significant negative impact of the eleven-year change in import
exposure on accumulated earnings.
Table 1.7: Estimation Results - Accumulated Earnings and Job Switch Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all employers initial firm endogenous labor market
same other
Panel A. AccumulatedWages
same 3-digit industry yes no yes no
ΔImE -48.11** -59.90*** -31.29 48.07*** -8.820*** 3.835
(23.04) (21.73) (19.55) (18.06) (2.333) (16.91)
same NUTS-3 region yes no yes no
ΔImE 5.707 11.06 -5.984 0.998
(20.61) (10.11) (14.52) (7.521)
Panel B. Job Switch Indicator
same 3-digit industry yes no yes no
ΔImE -0.045*** 0.027*** -0.006*** 0.024***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009)
same NUTS-3 region yes no yes no
ΔImE -0.035*** 0.018** 0.008 0.010**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
1st stage F 12.166
N 936,392
Note: Clustered standard errors on the industry times base year level in parentheses. Results are reported for 2SLS estimates of equation
(1.11) where the change in import exposure is instrumented with the corresponding change of exposure in other high-income countries.
The decomposition of the total effect is additive such that the difference between the aggregate effect in column (1) and the effect in the
initial firm in column (2)results from the sum of the effects in columns (3) to (6). Endogenous labor markets are estimated in the 5 years
before the base year with k = 35 markets.
The main purpose of the analysis is to decompose this total effect of trade exposure on ac-
cumulated earnings into additive parts that capture the direct effect of the shock (excluding
mobility responses) as well as the different mobility margins. Column 2 of Table 1.7 shows
estimates for the effect of trade exposure on all earnings that accrued in the initial firm which
employed the worker in the base year. This effect is even more negative than the total ef-
fect, indicating that workers incur huge earnings and job losses in firms that are negatively
affected by import exposure over the eleven-year period. They can however partly make up
for these losses by switching to different firms, industries, regions, or labormarkets. Columns
(3) to (6) display different types of mobility responses within and between 3-digit industries,
NUTS-3 regions, and endogenous labor markets with k = 35. The estimates referring to in-
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dustry and market mobility in the first row indicate that workers with larger shocks generate
significantly less earnings from firms in the same 3-digit industry (columns 3 and 5). They
have however significantly higher earnings from firms in the same endogenous market but
different industries (column 4). The impact on earnings from outside the original labor mar-
ket and industry is small and insignificant. The estimates referring to regional and market
mobility in the second row are very noisy. The direction of the effects however suggests that
individuals with a stronger exposure to the shock generate more earnings from other firms
in the same endogenous labor market (columns 3 and 4) but less earnings from firms in the
same region but in a different labor market (column 5). Panel B of Table 1.7 displays the re-
sults for a related analysis where I replace the outcome variable with job switch indicators and
estimate linear probability models. Column (3) indicates that workers with stronger import
exposure have a lower probability to stay in their original 3-digit industry and endogenous
labor market. There is however a positive and significant effect on the probability to switch
the industry but to remain in the original endogenous labor market (column 4). Conversely,
the probability to switch the labor market but to remain in the original industry is slightly
negatively affected by the shock. The probability to switch both, endogenous market and
industry, is also increased for highly exposed workers. The picture looks very similar for job
switch probabilities between NUTS-3 regions and endogenous labor markets. In summary,
mobility between regions and industries but within endogenous labor markets appears to be
a main mechanism to mitigate the negative impacts of exposure to import competition from
eastern countries.
Short-run Analysis
In the second empirical strategy, I address the caveat that in the medium-run model in equa-
tion (1.11) all outcomes are related to the trade shock in the initial industry. As mobility re-
sponses are an important aspect of adjustments to trade shocks, it is important to examine
the impact of the actual contemporaneous exposure to trade in the current industry on earn-
ings. To this aim, I follow Dauth et al. (2016) in estimating an annual panel model,40
Yit = β0 + β1 · ImEj(i),t + x′itα+ φt,J(j) + φt,R(i) + φt,M(i) + γi + εit. (1.12)
The most important difference to the medium-term model in equation (1.11) is the inclusion
of individual level fixed effects, γi. Hence, the effect of trade exposure on earnings is identi-
fied on variationwithin individuals rather than between individuals with common observable
characteristics. Estimation results for the baseline version of equation (1.12) are displayed in
column 1 of Table 1.8. The total effect of contemporaneous import exposure on annual earn-
ings is significantly negative confirming the medium-run evidence in the previous analysis. It
40Again, import exposure is instrumented with the relevant exposure from other countries.
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is identified bywithin variation in earnings due towage changes and non-employment as well
as by variation due to job mobility.
Table 1.8: Estimation Results – Short-run Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ImE -0.548*** -1.140*** -1.071*** -0.567*** -0.682*** -0.544*** -0.560***
(0.111) (0.205) (0.196) (0.112) (0.124) (0.107) (0.118)
FE i i× firm i× ind. i× state i×NUTS3 i×market i×market
(k = 9) (k = 35)
R2 0.782 0.910 0.887 0.796 0.841 0.800 0.857
Groups 936,441 1,532,792 1,346,855 1,029,934 1,161,066 984,332 1,101,996
KP 656.1 40.57 39.24 554.9 472.7 580.8 438.5
Note: 10,300,851 observations of 936,441 workers. The main regressor is import exposure, ImE. Further controls include
age polynomials, 1-digit-industry× year, state× year, and endogenousmarket× year dummies. Standard errors, clustered
by industry × year in parentheses. KP denotes the Kleinberg-Papp statistic of the first stage. ***p < 0.1 **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.01
In order to assess the relative importance of various margins of mobility responses to the
contemporaneous trade shock, I replace the individual fixed effects by different sets of higher-
dimensional fixed effects in equation (1.12). Particularly, including individual times firm-level
fixed effects captures the direct effect of import exposure on earnings by exploiting only vari-
ation within spells in the same firm. The estimates in column (2) of Table 1.8 indicate that
the negative impact is much stronger in this specification (consistent with the evidence from
the medium-term analysis). The difference between the two estimates in columns (1) and (2)
derives from mobility responses as the direct effect excludes variation that derives from firm
switches. To examine which type of mobility responses helps to mitigate the adverse direct
impact, I include fixed effects on the individual times industry level (column 3), individual
times state level (column 4), individual times NUTS3-region level (column 5), and the indi-
vidual times endogenous labormarket level (column 6with k= 9 labormarkets and column 7
with k = 35 labor markets). Absorbing variation between industries into the individual times
(3-digit) industry fixed effect (column 3) leads to a strongly negative effect that is similar to
the direct effect in column 2. Movements between 3-digit industries are therefore very impor-
tant to mitigate negative trade impacts. Columns 4 and 5 show that the estimates absorbing
movements across states andNUTS3 regions are in between the direct and the aggregate effect.
Mobility adjustments between NUTS3 regions are still an important part of wage responses
while absorbing variation between states has almost no impact on the trade effect.
Similarly to the evidence from the medium-run analysis, it is variation on the endogenous
labor market level that returns an the estimate closest to the aggregate effect. The estimates
using only variation within the endogenous labor markets with k = 9 and k = 35 are very
close to the aggregate effect. Moreover, Figure 1.17 shows that this is the case even for a finer
disaggregations of endogenous labor markets. This confirms the striking ability of the SBM
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to predict labor market flows that mitigate the negative impact of global trade shocks. Even
for a detailed view on the economy with 1000 labor markets (about 95 firms on average per
market) the SBM accurately predicts those sets of firms that offer better employment and
earnings possibilities to workers.
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Figure 1.17: Impact of Trade Shock on Annual Earnings - VariousModels
1.7 Conclusion
The Stochastic BlockModel is an interesting novel device to enrich the toolbox of economists
who work with network data. In the present context, it allows recovering endogenous la-
bor markets in Austria from observed worker flows. These endogenous labor markets are
geographically clustered but differ substantially from labor markets based on administrative
borders. Furthermore, reflecting differences in mobility patterns, markets become more geo-
graphically dispersed over time and vary substantially across worker types.
The empirical analysis of job mobility responses to labor demand and trade shocks high-
lighted how endogenously determined labor markets can be used to better predict and un-
derstand worker flows in the economy. The increasing availability of administrative matched
employer-employee data covering full populations should allow to applymymethod to other
countries and contexts. Interesting extensions such asmigration induced labor supply shocks
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could therefore be addressed in future research. An important question for the future of
the European Union regards the degree of between-country job mobility to balance inequal-
ities. Endogenous international labor markets could provide answers to important policy
questions in this context.
The SBMcanbeused to identify endogenousmarkets basedondifferent kinds of networks.
In the trade literature, for instance, researchers have analyzed the role of production networks
(based on supplier relationships between firms) for aggregate outcomes (e.g., Carvalho, 2014;
Chaney, 2014). Understanding themarket structure in these networksmight help to examine
spillover effects between firms or countries that are not directly linked but exposed to similar
market-level shocks.
Finally, several model extensions of the SBM have been introduced in the recent network
literature. Airoldi, Blei, Fienberg, and Xing (2009) and Aicher, Jacobs, and Clauset (2015)
consider mixed-membership models where nodes can belong to different communities de-
pending on the kind of interaction. Peixoto (2014b) describes a hierarchical SBMwhere com-
munities are nested in multiple levels. Finding consistent estimation methods and applying
these models to economic networks is an interesting avenue for future research.
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1.A Network Deﬁnition and Characteristics
1.A.1 A formal deﬁnition of the jobmobility network
Let M be the set of firms in the economy and W be the set of workers in the economy.
Further, let t ∈ {1, . . . ,T} denote the time in days during the sample period. I define a
functionm = m(w, t) ∈M that returns the firm that employs worker w at time t. Then we
have the following definition of the entries in the adjacencymatrix of a directed andweighted
network:
Aij = |ω| where ω ={w | ∃ t ∈ T, 1 ≤ x ≤ 30 s.th.
m(w, t− 365) = · · · = m(w, t) = i
m(w, t+ x) = m(w, t+ x+ 1) = · · · = m(w, t+ x+ 365) = j
m(w, t+ 1), . . . ,m(w, t+ x− 1) /∈M}.
While the set of firms M contains all firms that exist in the economy during the sample
period, the set of nodes in the network,N, contains only non isolates:
N = M \ {i ∈M |Aij = 0 ∀ j ∧ Aji = 0 ∀ j}. (1.13)
1.A.2 Empirical Network Characteristics
In this section, I provide additional information on the empirical characteristics of the job
mobility network described in section 1.3. Table 1.A5 provides various characteristics of the
job mobility network. Again, column 1 refers to the full network obtained from transitions
between 1975 and 2005while the other columns showdynamic developments between shorter
periods.
Panel A of Table 1.A5 displays themost important network characteristics that describe the
general structure of the jobmobility network. The average degree in the network denotes the
average number of transitions per firm. On average, a firm is connected to 19.84 other firms in
the full network. The average degree is naturally lowerwhen considering shorter time periods
and tends to slightly rise over time. The ease of information flows in a network can be mea-
sured by the notion of distance betweennodes. In the jobmobility network, the shortest path
between the twomost distant firms (called diameter of the network) requires 17 steps (row 2).
The average number of steps along the shortest paths between all possible pairs of firms in the
network amounts to 4.87 steps (average path length in row 3). The density of the jobmobility
network is very sparse as only a tiny fraction of all possible links materializes (graph density in
row 4). Finally, the clustering coeﬃcient (row 5)measures the transitivity of a network, i.e., the
probability that two firms with common links to a third firm are linked among themselves.
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Transitivity in the job mobility network is relatively low compared to other social networks
as only 2-4% of all potential triangles materialize.41 This finding suggests that, on the very
local level of three firms, job-to-job mobility is not particularly clustered. In the descriptive
analysis in section 1.5, I specifically show that job-to-job transitions are clustered on a broader
labor market level rather than on subsets of a few firms.
Aggregated network characteristics such as the average degree potentially hide substantial
heterogeneitywithin thenetwork. In thepresent case,many firms in the jobmobility network
are involved only in a low number of job-to-job transitions while others have many connec-
tions and serve as “hubs” in the economy. This is documented by the (complementary) CDF
of the degree distribution in Figure 1.A14. The black circles represent the empirical CDF of
the degree distribution on a log-log scale. Like in many social networks, the degree distribu-
tion of the job mobility network exhibits heavy tails, as there are more nodes with very small
and very large degrees than expected in a model where links are formed uniformly at random
(Jackson, 2008).
In an influential paper, Jackson and Rogers (2005) analyze the interdependence between
the process of link formation in social networks and the degree distribution. In a nutshell, a
model where new nodes form links to existing ones uniformly at random is consistent with
an exponential degree distribution. In contrast, a model of preferential attachment, where
the probability to receive links for existing firms is proportional to their current degree, is
consistent with a degree distribution that follows a power law.
The colored lines in Figure 1.A14 therefore show maximum likelihood fits from both, the
exponential distribution (in blue) and the power law distribution (in red). The parameter
estimates of the fitted distributions are given in the first two rows of panel B in Table 1.A5.
Neither of these distributions is a good fit for the degree distribution of the job mobility net-
work.
Most empirical networks are somewhere in between the extreme cases of random link for-
mation and preferential attachment. Jackson and Rogers (2005) therefore develop a hybrid
model where a fraction r of links is formed uniformly at random while the remainder is gen-
erated based on preferential attachment. The green line in Figure 1.A14 displays the fit of this
hybrid model which is much closer to the observed degree distribution. The estimate in the
third row of panel B in Table 1.2 indicates that 39% of links in the job mobility network are
formed uniformly at random while the majority of 61% are formed through network-based
link generation.42
41The clustering coefficient in the jobmobility network is higher than it would be if links were formed purely
random (19.84/95237 = 0.0002). However, Jackson (2008) reports much higher coefficients obtained from vari-
ous other social networks.
42Figure 1.A15 illustrates the degree distribution and parametric fits for the shorter time periods. Although
the share of random and network based link formation varies to some extend, the general picture is very stable
over time.
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Summing up, there is strong evidence for preferential attachment in the link formation
process. Inparticular, workers tend to join firms that received an influx ofmanyotherworkers
and leave firms that are left by many others. Although not taking a dynamic perspective on
link formation, I specifically address this form of firm-level heterogeneity in themodel for the
estimation of endogenous labor markets in section 1.4 by including popularity parameters
that guide the individual attractiveness of firms to workers.
1.B Additional Derivations
If match-quality draws are distributed according to the Frechét distribution, the probability
that worker ℓ starting in firm i has a payoff higher than some threshold φ in firm j is
Pr[φj(ℓ|i) > φ] = 1− Fj
( φdzizj
pjf[Xℓ]
)
= 1− e−Tjd−θzizj (pjf[Xℓ])θφ−θ (1.14)
and the probability that the payoff is lower than φ in all other firms s ̸= j is
Pr[φs(ℓ|i) ≤ φ, ∀s ̸= j] =
∏
s̸=j
Fs
(
φdzizs
psf[Xℓ]
)
=
∏
s̸=j
e−Tsd
−θ
zizs (psf[Xℓ])
θφ−θ (1.15)
As a result, the probability that j offers the highest payoff of all firms for a worker ℓ who
starts in i is
πij(ℓ) = Pr[φj(ℓ|i) ≥ maxs {φs(ℓ|i)}]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr[φs(ℓ|i) ≤ φ,∀s ̸= j]dPr[φj(ℓ|i) ≤ φ]
=
Tjd−θzizjpθj∑N
s=1 Tsd−θzizspθs
1.C Simulation
Inorder to evaluate theperformanceof estimating thedegree-corrected stochastic blockmodel,
I conduct a Monte-Carlo simulation exercise that compares the SBM to using predefined re-
gions in a stylised economy.
The economy consists ofN firms i = {1, . . . ,N} that are located in either of two regions
ri ∈ {1, 2}. With probability τ a firm resides in region 1 and with probability 1− τ it resides
in region 2. Hence, varying the parameter τ allows to examine the robustness of themodel to
changes in the relative size of the regions. The actual market assignments, however, are gov-
erned by an ”unobserved” characteristic z which can be correlated with the region member-
ship. The unobserved characteristic zi ∈ {1, 2} can take two distinct values and is distributed
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conditional on the regionmembership as follows: P(zi = ri) = λ,P(zi ̸= ri) = 1−λ. Hence,
varying the parameter λ from 1 (perfect positive correlation) to 0 (perfect negative correlation)
determines in how far regionmembership guides actual market assignment. The firms in the
economy are furthermore characterised by degree parameters γi. Degrees are drawn from a
power law distribution with minimum expected degree of xmin and parameter α. The degree
parameters γi are then determined fixed according to equation (1.8). The transition matrix
between the markets is set to
M = ρ
(
4 1
1 4
)
,
where ρ is chosen such that it fixes the overall expected degree of the network. Finally, links
between firms i and j in the economy are drawn from the Poisson distribution with mean
γiγjMzizj .
The parameters in the simulation study are chosen as follows: There areN = 1000 firms.
The group sizes are balanced in a version with τ = 0.5 and unbalanced in a version with
τ = 0.75. The power law resembles the actual degree distribution found in the Austrian job
mobility network with xmin = 20 and α = 2.5. Similarly, ρ is chosen such that the overall
average degree equals 8 as in the empirical network. To compare the solution of estimating
the SBM to the true assignments and to the use of the region membership, I use the adjusted
Rand index of Hubert and Arabie (1985) and the normalized mutual information criterion
ofDanon, Diaz-Guilera, Duch, andArenas (2005). These indices are commonly used tomea-
sure the similarity between partitions in clustering and network analysis. Both measures are
scaled such that 1 corresponds to a perfect match between two partitions while a value of 0
zero would be expected for two random partitions.
Figure 1.A16 displays the median adjusted Rand index over 100 replications varying the
correlation coefficient between regions and group assignments from 1 to 0. In panel a, the
group sizes are balanced. As expected, the concordance of the predefined regions with the
true group assignments decreases with a declining correlation between the two random vari-
ables. When λ equals 0.5 group assignments are independent from region membership and
the Rand index approaches 0. In contrast, the degree-corrected SBMdoes not depend on the
region membership and therefore constantly achieves high scores of the adjusted Rand index
which are of similar magnitude as the simulation results for sparse networks in Zhao et al.
(2012). The results in an unbalanced setting (panel b) are very similar. The estimation of the
SBM, however, is a bit less precise as indicated by the standard error bars.
The results of this simulation study indicate that even for slight deviations from perfect
congruence of regions and relevant labor markets, it is favorable to base the analysis on the
degree-corrected SBM proposed in this paper. The fact that the SBM does not rely on ob-
served covariates but infers the group structure solely based on observed links enables a stable
detection of relationships independent of whether the relevant covariates are known or avail-
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Table1.A1:TransitionProbabilitiesandM
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Table 1.A2: Industry Composition of Endogenous SteelMarket outside Linz-Wels
NACE 3-digit industry Share of employment
452 Building of complete constructions 7.30
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 6.95
361 Manufacture of furniture 5.66
751 Administration of the State 3.66
247 Manufacture of man-made fibres 3.24
524 Retail sale in specialized stores 3.24
287 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products 3.21
182 Manufacture of wearing apparel and accessories 2.59
602 Other land transportation 2.22
453 Building installation 1.96
293 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 1.91
193 Manufacture of footware 1.84
502 Maintainance and repair of motor vehicles 1.76
651 Monetary intermediation 1.73
211 Manufacture of pulp, paper amd paperboard 1.67
159 Manufacture of beverages 1.55
295 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 1.54
Note: This table reports NACE 3-digit industry affiliations of the firms in endogenous labor market of the steel company but outside the
NUTS3 region Linz-Wels for the years 1980-1990. The share for each industry is weighted by employment.
Table 1.A3: Industries with Highest Increase in Imports from the East over 1990 to 2010
NACE 3-digit industry Percent increase
283 Steam generators 183.96
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 160.23
233 Nuclear fuel 63.10
341 Motor vehicles 51.43
243 Paints, coatings, printing ink 48.76
322 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 46.46
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 46.03
267 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 40.08
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 38.55
222 Printing 38.02
245 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 30.98
273 Other first processing of iron and steel 19.79
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 19.66
221 Publishing 18.45
282 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and boilers 17.82
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 16.99
313 Isolated wire and cable 15.46
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 14.89
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 14.78
295 Other special purpose machinery 12.10
268 Other non-metallic mineral products 12.03
342 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 11.85
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 11.82
334 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 11.75
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 11.50
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Table 1.A4: Industries with Highest Increase in Exports to the East over 1990 to 2010
NACE 3-digit industry Percent increase
202 Panels and boards of wood 62.57
296 Weapons and ammunition 29.56
233 Nuclear fuel 24.52
204 Wooden containers 21.83
265 Cement, lime and plaster 18.93
153 Fruits and vegetables 15.71
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products 15.01
171 Textile fibres 12.60
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 10.36
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 10.28
151 Meat products 9.70
172 Textile weaving 8.32
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 7.92
342 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 7.52
341 Motor vehicles 6.46
181 Leather clothes 6.14
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 6.02
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery 5.89
334 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 5.78
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 5.40
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 4.26
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 4.11
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 3.87
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 3.64
193 Footwear 3.59
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1. Job Mobility Networks and Endogenous Labor Markets
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Figure 1.A1: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1975-1980)
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Figure 1.A2: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1980-1985)
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Figure 1.A3: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1985-1990)
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Figure 1.A4: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1990-1995)
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Figure 1.A5: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (1995-2000)
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Figure 1.A6: Share of Firms in NUTS-3 Regions for eachMarket (2000-2005)
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Figure 1.A7: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1975-1980)
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Figure 1.A8: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1980-1985)
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Figure 1.A9: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1985-1990)
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Figure 1.A10: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1990-1995)
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Figure 1.A11: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (1995-2000)
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Figure 1.A12: Histogram of Industry Composition byMarket (2000-2005)
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Figure 1.A13: Rising Export Volumes in Austrian Trade
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Figure 1.A14: Complementary CDF of the Degree Distribution in the JobMobility Network 1975-2005
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Figure 1.A15: Complementary CDF of the Degree Distribution in the JobMobility Network over Time
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Figure 1.A16: Results for the Predeﬁned Regions and the Degree-corrected SBM, λ varies, error bars indicate one
standard deviation to each side
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Chapter 2
Learning Dynamics in Tax Bunching at the Kink:
Evidence from Ecuador
with Albrecht Bohne
2.1 Introduction
Despite the predictions of labor supply models, empirical studies have only found limited
evidence for bunching behavior at kink points in themarginal tax schedule. Information fric-
tions are a commonly used explanation for the absence of pronounced spikes in the income
distribution in the literature on behavioral responses to taxation. An important open ques-
tion is how individuals that are new to the institutional setting of paying taxes react to incen-
tives posed by the system. Moreover, there is no clear consensus on how information about
tax adjustment opportunities is transmitted andwhat the driving factors of these adjustments
are.
In this paper, we exploit new and very detailed administrative data on personal income
tax (PIT) returns in a developing country, Ecuador. The environment of a rapidly formal-
izing economy with a steady inflow of new individuals to the tax system provides a unique
setting to study the dynamics of tax responses. This is especially relevant since in the pro-
cess of formalization, developing countries rely ever more on PIT (Besley and Persson, 2013).
Particularly, we examine how workers’ responses to jumps in the marginal tax rate (inducing
kinks in their budget sets) change over time and with increasing experience and exposure to
the tax system. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature by disentangling the effects that
firm-level practices and co-worker behavior have on individual tax-filing.
Using new individual tax return data on the universe of formal-sector wage earners in
Ecuador ranging from2006 to 2015, weprovide evidence for substantial sensitivity of reported
taxable income to a discontinuous jump in the marginal tax rate. We observe a large and pro-
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nounced spike in the distribution of taxable income just before the income tax exemption
threshold. We quantify the prevalence of this bunching behavior using an established bunch-
ing estimator which relates the excessmass in this area to an estimated counterfactual (Kleven,
2016). The effect is primarily driven by about 20% of the working population who take ad-
vantage of generous deduction possibilities in health, education, housing, clothing, and food.
These deduction possibilities are the main part of the Ecuadorian government’s policies to
induce an increase in formalization. The tax responses shown in the data represent report-
ing behavior rather than real labor supply responses as there is no indication of bunching
in gross income. Most importantly, the mass of bunchers in taxable income increases with
higher experience in filing taxes and stronger exposure to the tax incentives. This leads to the
conclusion that workers in Ecuador learn about the incentives and measures to avoid paying
taxes as they adjust to the system.
However, it is unclear how exactly workers learn about the tax system. We shed light on
how individuals learn about these tax adjustment opportunities and what the predominant
channels of information transmission are. Based on detailed matched employer-employee
data and a research design that exploits job transitions, we can disentangle whether the ob-
served learning patterns are mainly driven by individuals learning from firms (and firm-level
institutions) or individuals learning from their co-workers.
To quantify how individuals learn about tax adjustment opportunities from their firm,
we generate a sample of job switchers who change their main employer within our sample
period and track the degree of bunching among their co-workers in the old and new firms.
Our results show a strong and asymmetric adjustment to the prevailing bunching practices
at the firm level. The probability to bunch for individuals who move to a firm in the top
quintile of the distribution of bunching shares (from an origin firm in the middle quintile)
increases overall by about 3-5 percentage points while it remains constant when moving to a
firm in the bottom quintile, even when controlling for a range of individual and firm-level
characteristics. We show that the effects are persistent and even increase their magnitude in
the second year at the new firm. The asymmetry of the effects lends strong support to the
hypothesis that knowledge spillovers and memory play an important role in determining in-
dividual tax-filing behavior. Particularly, our evidence is consistent with a model of learning
and memory in which individuals learn about tax adjustment opportunities when moving
into a high-knowledge environment. When moving to a low-knowlege environment, how-
ever, individuals retain their previous knowledge andmaintain their behavior with respect to
taxes.
To shed light on the secondpossible learningmechanism atwork, namely individuals learn-
ing from their co-workers, we generate a sample of firms that hire new employees. We com-
pare bunching among incumbent employees in firms with incoming workers who were pre-
viously bunching to incumbent employees in firms with incoming workers who were not
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bunching before.1 We find no evidence of workers learning about tax adjustment opportu-
nities from new co-workers. Even among small firms and firms without any experience in
bunching where we would expect larger effects, we cannot provide evidence for spillovers of
new co-workers to incumbent workers. We conclude that in the setting of this study, firms
seem to be a much stronger driver of individual tax-filing behavior than a given employee’s
co-workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we give an overview of
the related literature and the contributions of this paper. Section 2.3 provides information on
the institutional background in Ecuador and describes the PIT system in detail. Section 2.4
gives detailed information on the various data sources employed in our study. In section 2.5
we present the results from our analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on bunching at kinks and notches in the tax
schedule that was started by the seminal paper by Saez (2010). The method of estimating
labor supply responses from the size of the excess mass at kinks and notches was further de-
veloped by Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) and Kleven andWaseem (2013) and
is thoroughly summarized in Kleven (2016). Evidence on behavioral responses to personal
income taxation stems mainly from developed countries. Chetty et al. (2011) and Bastani and
Selin (2014) analyze data from Scandinavia. They find bunching only at selected, particu-
larly salient kinks (e.g., the top tax bracket) and for subgroups that can adjust their income
relatively easily such as self-employed workers. In comparison, our results indicate relatively
strong reactions to a very small kink.2 Moreover, we concentrate on bunching solely among
wage earners. In line with large parts of the literature, we find bunching to be driven mainly
through reporting behavior and not real labor supply responses. The generous deduction
possibilities in Ecuador are an interesting environment to study in this regard since they lend
workers considerable scope to adjust their reported income.
Evidence on knowledge diffusion and spillover effects in bunching is provided by Chetty
andSaez (2013), Chetty, Friedman, andSaez (2013), andPaetzold andWinner (2016). These pa-
pers analyze the effect of moving to high- or low-bunching environments and find significant
impacts of coworker/regional bunching shares on individual bunching. Moreover, their evi-
dence is supportive of learning and memory as individuals increase bunching when exposed
1We only regard incoming workers with previous gross income in the range where bunching at the first kink
would have been possible.
2The first kink in the Ecuadorian tax schedule is very salient. The change in marginal tax rates from zero to
five percent, however, is very small in international comparison.
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to high-bunching environments but keep bunching when moving into low-bunching envi-
ronments.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we add the dimension of experience
with the tax system and find important impacts of previous exposure to the system on the
adjustment process. Second, we analyze bunching of job switchers on the firm level and
find much stronger effects than the studies that examine aggregate effects on the regional
level. Third, we disentangle learning effects at the firm-level from those occuring between
co-workers.
Another related strand of the literature is concerned with behavioral responses to taxes in
developing countries. Kleven andWaseem (2013) and Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn,
and Waseem (2015) analyze responses to notches in the PIT in Pakistan. Bachas and Soto
(2015), Carrillo, Emran, and Rivadeneira (2012), and Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017)
assess the reactions to incentives in corporate taxation. Most interestingly, the last two papers
refer to data in Ecuador and find substantial evidence for tax evasion of firms in the country.
As shown by Besley and Persson (2013), however, in the course of their progress towardsmore
formal economies, developing countries rely increasingly on PIT. This lends importance and
relevancy to our analysis of a personal income tax system in a developing country in themiddle
of this transition.
2.3 Institutional Background
Since 2008, Ecuador has implemented a wide range of economic and political reforms. The
government has greatly increased spending on social programs and public service delivery.
While a surge in oil revenues facilitated some of this increased spending, the tax administra-
tion has also pushed wide-ranging reforms of the tax system and tax collection policies. As a
result, tax revenue as well as the tax base have grown substantially over the past years. More-
over, there has been a strong increase in the formalization of the economy.
Taxation in Ecuador can be broadly categorized into personal income taxes (PIT), a value-
added tax (VAT) of 12 % (food and some other goods are exempt)3, corporate taxation (22%
of profits since 2013), and a tax on foreign money transfers and special consumption taxes.
Figure 2.1a gives a clear picture of the growth of tax revenue in Ecuador in the past years.4
Between 2006 and 2015, central government tax revenues have increased from about 10% to
almost 14% of GDP and have more than doubled in real terms. One of the main reasons for
higher tax revenue is an increase in formalization of the economy and the tax administration’s
wide-ranging efforts to increase tax compliance.
3Following a large destructive earth quake in 2016 the Ecuadorian government increased the VAT to 14 % for
the duration of one year starting in June 2016.
4The Ecuadorian economy was completely dollarized in 2000 following extreme hyperinflation.
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Figure 2.1: Formalization
The government has adopted a number of policies to increase formalization of the econ-
omy, the most important of which are extensive deduction possibilities of income tax. Along
with ‘receipt lotteries’, in which citizens have the possibility to submit receipts andwin prizes,
these policies substantially increase the demand for receipts. Emitting receipts is not only
linked to paying more VAT but also to taking part in other aspects of the formal economy
such as retaining income tax and social security contributions for employees. The receipts
handed in to the authorities are used to cross-check the sales of businesses and fight tax fraud,
especially with respect to VAT reporting behavior. Further measures to increase tax compli-
ance include improved information sharing between government agencies.
The general hike in tax revenue in Ecuador is also reflected in a strong increase in the num-
ber of taxpayers subject to personal income taxation. Figure 2.1b gives an overview of the
absolute number of tax declarations submitted. Between 2006 and 2015, the total number of
tax declarations for private sector employees increased from 1Million to about 2.5 Million.
2.3.1 Personal Income Taxes
Ecuador has a unified PIT schedule which is levied on almost all regular sources of wage and
self-employed income.5 Tax liability in Ecuador is individually determined (no family taxa-
tion).6
ThePIT liability is calculated progressivelywith numerous small jumps in themarginal tax
5Notable exceptions include all forms of payments from the social security system (pension payments, edu-
cational stipends, disability benefits, etc.), severance payments, interest on savings accounts, occasional capital
gains, returns from investment funds or long-termdeposits aswell as certain additionalwage benefitsmandatory
under labor market regulations.
6Furthermore, employees in the private sector pay 9.35% of their wage income in social security contribu-
tions. Paying these social security contributions entitles people to a range of benefits including pensions, health
insurance, disability insurance and unemployment benefits. Social security contributions are only levied on reg-
ular wage income, not irregular special payments such as boni. Since 2014, the contribution has increased to is
9.45%. The employer pays a slightly larger share of 11.15%, constant over time.
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rate, starting at 5% and going up to 35%. In 2008, the government enacted a series of reforms
of the tax system, including an increase of the maximum marginal tax rate from 25% to 35%.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of themarginal tax rates in 2013. The cutoff income levels change
yearly according to inflation7, the exact values since 2006 are displayed in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Tax Rates 2013
PIT in Ecuador starts being levied at relatively high levels. In 2013, annual income below
10,180 USDwas not charged any income tax. For the same year, the monthly minimumwage
is set at 318USD, corresponding to yearly taxable income of 3,816USD,well below the first tax
bracket. The minimum wage is estimated to be slightly above the median wage and slightly
below average wage in Ecuador for 2008 to 2012 (Canelas, 2014). This shows that PIT is only
applicable to relatively high-earning individuals in Ecuador.
A uniqueness of the Ecuadorian tax system are the generous deduction possibilities for
personal expenses in education, health, food, clothing and housing introduced in 2008. The
total deductible amount of personal expenses is limited to the smaller of 50% of individual
income or 1.3 times the tax-exempt income amount (in 2013 this was 1.3 × 10,180 = 13,234
USD). Each category is individually capped at 0.325 times the tax-exempt income amount,
except for health expenditures, which have an upper limit of 1.3 times the tax-exempt amount.
To make receipts presentable to the tax authority, they must be issued to the name of the
tax payer or his/her dependents and include their unique identification number. One main
7The rate used for inflation adjustments is the yearly change in consumer price index for urban areas pub-
lished by Ecuador’s National Statistics Institute INEC on November 30 of a given year.
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policy objective of these deduction possibilities is to increase formalization of the economy,
as wage earners have an incentive to demand receipts. In order to claim these deductions,
taxpayers are legally obliged to keep copies of their receipts. The standard tax declaration form
F107 submittedby the firm, however, only contains informationon the total yearly amount of
personal expenses in each category. If the total value of deductions exceeds a certain reporting
threshold, the tax authority asks the taxpayers to additionally submit an online annex with
details about the receipts.8
The mechanism by which tax declarations and deductions are submitted in Ecuador de-
serves some special attention and is key to understanding the findings in our analysis. Personal
income tax is primarily filed on a firm-reported form (F107, see figure 2.A3 in the Appendix).
This form can only be submitted to the tax authority by the employing firm and includes
the level of deductions in personal expenses. In March of each year, wage earners fill out a
form with their projected expenses in health, education, food, clothing and housing for that
whole year and submit it to their employer. Based on these figures, the employer computes
the level of the withholding tax for the following year. Workers are given the opportunity
to update their information on deductions in October. If an individual claims deductions
above the reporting threshold (50% of the tax free amount, or 5090 US$ in 2013), he must
submit the receipts with the unique receipt number via an online annex after the end of the
fiscal year9. While the ultimate responsibility for the overall correctness of these deductions
lies solely with the employee, this system induces a unique form of third-party reporting of
deductions. Recent literature shows that third-party information reporting by firms is a key
driver for sustaining high levels of taxation (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2016).
For the vast majority of employees (87% of our observations), taxes and personal deduc-
tions are only reported by the employer. The remaining 13% of all observations addition-
ally submit a self-reported tax declaration (form F102). The primary purpose of this self-
reported tax declaration form is to report self-employment income. However, some individ-
uals who additionally submit a self-reported income declaration actually do not report any
self-employment income.10
8From 2008 to 2010, this threshold was $7500 and since 2011 the tax authority applies the threshhold 50% of
the tax-free amount (hence 5090 US$ in 2013).
9The fiscal year corresponds to the calendar year.
10In related work, we are analyzing how individuals are using these self-reported tax declaration forms to
circumvent their employer and change their level of deductions. Self-employed individuals need to file the self-
reported tax declarationwith their total income inMarch of the year following the relevant fiscal year. The exact
date depends on the individual identity number and lies in between March 10th and 28th. Self-employed are
liable to pay personal income tax on all of their business profits and wage income and have the same deduction
possibilities as wage earners. Each summer, they are charged an advance of 50% of the previous year’s tax liability.
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2.4 Data andDescriptives
The data we use in this paper results from the merges of several administrative datasets in
Ecuador administered by the Ecuadorian tax authority Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI). The
core data consist of firm-reported personal income tax returns of regular employees (tax form
F107) for the years 2006-2015.
We augment these tax records by two important administrative datasets. First, we use the
Ecuadorian civil registry (Registro Civil) that provides a range of socio-demographic variables,
including the year of birth, highest level of education and gender. Second, we merge the tax
returns to the central firm-level registry in Ecuador (Catastro de RUC ). This registry contains
firm-level data on industry affiliation, sector (public or private), time of formation of the firm
and place of registry. We end up with detailed matched employer-employee data that allows
us to track a given individual’s coworkers over time.
A significant fraction of workers has multiple observations per year due to the fact that
people have various employers throughout a given calender year (each employer submits one
declaration per employee). To compute annual earnings we sum up the incomes at different
employers for each individual and year. We consider the spell with the highest earnings as
the main employer. We deflate all earnings to real 2013 USD values using the consumer price
index of the Ecuadorian National Statistics Institute INEC.
For our analysis of tax responses, we exclude all individuals who are employed in the public
sector and only focus on private sector employees for two important reasons. First, private
sector employeesmight havebetter opportunities to adjust their taxable incomebybargaining
with their employer about the wages and employers in the private sector might provide more
support in filing the deductions. Second, public sector employees face different incentives
than private sector employees and their pay is often regulated by predetermined government
pay scales.
Figure 2.3 displays the distribution of gross income in Ecuador pooling all observations in
our sample from 2006 to 2015. We concentrate on workers who earn at least twelve times the
monthly Ecuadorian minimum wage (yearly earnings of 12 × 318 = 3,816 USD in 2013) and
those who earn less than 30,000USD. The individual data is compressed into bins of $50 and
plotted as bin frequencies for each bin. In general, the income distribution is downward slop-
ing, with the most frequent points being around the minimum wage. The graph contrasts
the income distribution with the marginal tax schedule, as given by the step function with
values on the right vertical axis. The gross income distribution is clearly smooth around all
kink points of the marginal tax schedule depicted in the figure.
This is different for taxable income, i.e., gross income minus all deductions, displayed in
Figure 2.4. There is a clear spike in the distribution of taxable income just before the first
kink in the marginal tax schedule at 10,180 USD. Evidently, individuals do not change their
83
2. Learning Dynamics in Tax Bunching at the Kink: Evidence from Ecuador
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
M
ar
gi
na
l T
ax
 R
at
e
0
20
,0
00
40
,0
00
60
,0
00
80
,0
00
10
0,
00
0
N
um
be
r o
f T
ax
pa
ye
rs
3,000 10,000 20,000 30,000
Gross Income
Figure 2.3: Binned Gross Income
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real labor supply but change the amount of deductions in response to the tax incentives.
While bunching is strong and pronounced at the first jump in the marginal tax schedule,
we donot observe anybunching at later kinkpoints. This could be due to the fact that the first
kink where an individual starts paying taxes is the most salient. Arguably, due to behavioral
biases the first dollar in taxes an individual pays can lead to higher disutility than further tax
payments. Moreover, individuals may perceive a discontinuity in audit probabilities at the
thresholdof paying taxes andprefer to stayunder the radar of the tax authority. Inour analysis
of bunching behavior in the following section, we therefore focus exclusively on the first kink
of the marginal tax schedule.
The difference between Figures 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that adjustments in taxable income
are entirely driven by reporting behavior. In particular, the introduction of the generous
deduction possibilities in Ecuador in 2008 led to a wedge between the number of individuals
with gross income above the first kink in the tax schedule and thosewith taxable income above
the first kink (see Figure 2.5). Over time, a growing number of individuals avoids paying
taxes by adjusting the taxable income. In the following section we quantify the amount of
bunching and analyze the determinants of learning about tax avoidance.
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2.5 Results
In this section, we present the empirical results from analyzing the individual tax return data
in Ecuador. The first part uses the bunching methodology developed by Saez (2010) and
Chetty et al. (2011) to estimate the extent of behavioral responses to taxation and documents
general learning dynamics. The second and third part of this section analyze the channels
through which this learning takes place by focusing on two main mechanisms: adapting to
the firm-level practices and learning from co-workers.
2.5.1 Tax Bunching
To quantify the amount of bunching at the first kink of the marginal tax schedule, we draw
on themethods laid out in Saez (2010) andChetty et al. (2011). Using binned incomedata (50$
bin size), we estimate a counterfactual density (polynomial of degree 5) around the kink that
would prevail in the absence of the kink and compute the difference between the actual den-
sity and the counterfactual density.11 Figure 2.6 displays the distribution of taxable income
around the kink. The empirical density is represented by the blue dots and the estimated
counterfactual is represented by the red line. The estimate for the excess mass is highly sig-
nificant and very large, indicating that more than three times as many individuals are located
around the kink compared to the expected mass under the counterfactual of no kink.
Table 2.2 displays the estimated excess mass separately for each year in the sample period.
We find positive and significant bunching in taxable income and over time the estimates of
the excess mass increase strongly from 1.36 in 2006 to 6.03 in 2015. In 2006 and 2007, before
the introduction of the deduction possibilities, our bunching estimates in taxable income are
identical to those of gross income. Starting in 2008, however, bunching in taxable income
increases strongly while we do not observe significant bunching in gross income anymore.
We employ two different strategies in order to analyze whether the overall increase in tax
bunching in Ecuador is driven by experience in filing taxes. First, we show the increase in the
excessmass separately for each cohort that enters the formal economy. In particular, we exam-
ine the degree of bunching for the subgroup of individuals that is observed for the first time
in a particular year and follow this cohort over time. In order to hold the sample composition
constant within cohorts, we only consider individuals who are observed without interrup-
tion once they entered the formal economy. Table 2.3 displays bunching estimates over time
for our cohort analysis. Each row corresponds to one of the cohorts that entered between
2007 and 2014. The columns indicate how the level of bunching changes over time for these
cohorts. For each cohort, there is a clear increase in the amount of bunching. Moreover, the
estimates become more precise over time, indicating less heterogeneity within cohorts over
11Sensitivity checks varying the bin width, the parametric form of the polynomial and the bunching window
left out in the estimation of the counterfactual density are available on request.
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Figure 2.6: Bunching Estimates Taxable Income
years. Individuals entering the formal economy in 2007 for instance had a modest (and in-
significant) excess mass of 2.59 while the same individuals had an excess mass of 6.65 in 2015.
The pattern is similar for cohorts that entered the formal economy in later years. In general,
bunching levels are higher in 2007 and 2008before the introductionof deductionpossibilities.
Afterwards, learning did not only occur within cohorts but also across cohorts as individuals
entering the formal economy in later years tend to have higher degrees of bunching.
As a second strategy to evaluate the effect of experience on the amount of bunching, we
construct a specific measure of experience with the tax system. Our experiencemeasure keeps
track of whether individuals have earned more than the tax exempt threshold in the previous
two years. This measure is important since only individuals who earn more than the income
threshold of the first kink have an incentive to learn about deduction possibilities in order to
avoid paying taxes.
Figure 2.7 depicts andquantifies the amount of tax bunching for individualswith andwith-
out recent exposure to the tax system. In Panel (a) we observe that individuals who have not
had any gross income above the first kink of the marginal tax schedule in the previous two
years show rather low levels of bunching. Those individuals with at least one year of gross
income above the first kink in the previous two years, however, showmuch stronger stronger
levels of bunching. The mass in the vicinity of the kink is estimated to be 6.171 times higher
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than the counterfactual.
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
5180 7680 10180 12680 15180
Taxable Income
Excess Mass (b): 3.413
Standard Error: .3688
(a)NoGross Income above First Kink in Previous 2 Years
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
5180 7680 10180 12680 15180
Taxable Income
Excess Mass (b): 6.171
Standard Error: .2142
(b)At Least One Year of Gross Income above First Kink in Previous 2 Years
Figure 2.7: Experience in Paying Taxes
Onemajor concern in comparing bunching estimates between these two subgroups is that
theymay be selectedwith regard to income and other socio-demographic factors.12 To address
this issue, we measure the effect of our experience measure on tax-adjustment behavior while
12This is partly already mitigated by the fact that the bunching estimator is a local estimator measuring the
excess mass only for the specific sample at hand.
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holding other factors such as income levels fixed. Table 2.4 presents results from simple pro-
bit regressions with an indicator for bunching, defined as having taxable income within the
range of 1000$ to the left of the tax-exempt threshold, as the outcome variable. We restrict
the sample to individuals in the years 2008 - 2015 with gross income above the kink but still
within the relevant range for bunching using the deduction possibilities. Column (1) of Table
2.4 shows that our measure of experience with the tax system (defined as having earned more
than the tax exempt threshold in the previous two years) has a positive and significant effect
on individual bunching behavior. More importantly, column (2) illustrates that even when
controlling for gross income and a range of individual and firm-level control variables, the
size, direction and significance of the experience effect remains comparable. The regression
furthermore provides insight into which demographic characteristics are important in deter-
mining whether a given taxpayer bunches. Woman and married individuals are more likely
to bunch, and interestingly higher levels of education lead to a higher propensity to bunch.
The evidence presented in this section strongly supports the hypothesis of learning dynam-
ics in tax bunching at the kink. Next, we turn to the question of how learning takes place and
investigate firm-level responses to tax incentives.
2.5.2 FirmDynamics
An important component of the Ecuadorian personal income tax system is that firms directly
submit tax declarations to the tax authority on behalf of their employees. Moreover, even the
value of deductions is jointly submitted at the workplace (see Section 2.3.1 for details). This
leads to the hypothesis that firm-level practices in filing taxes have a decisive role in shaping
behavioral responses to tax incentives. In this section, we provide evidence for the importance
of firm-level behavior.
First, we show that the increase in bunching documented above is mainly driven by an
increase in the share of firms that employ workers who use deductions in order to bunch
below the first kink. We define potential bunchers as individuals with gross earnings in a range
allowing them to lower their taxable income below the first kink of the tax schedule by using
deductions. In 2013 realUSD, thiswas gross earnings between 10180 and 20360USD. For each
firm, we calculate the share of actual bunchers among the potential bunchers as a measure of
firm-level knowledge about the tax system. Analogously to the individual level cohort analysis
in section 2.5.1, we then follow cohorts of firms which first appeared in the formal sector in
the respective year.13 Table 2.5 reports the extensive margin of firm bunching, i.e., the share of
firms that employ at least one potential buncher who actually bunches. Evidently, there is a
strong increase in the share of firms that employ bunchers over time for each of the cohorts.
13We restrict our sample to firms that employed potential bunchers throughout all years since their first ap-
pearance in the formal sector.
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Table 2.4: Bunching Individuals
(1) (2)
Income Experience 0.0828*** 0.0666***
(0.0119) (0.0136)
Gross Income 0.0000242***
(0.00000223)
Age 0.00626***
(0.00226)
Female 0.114***
(0.0113)
Foreign -0.00962
(0.0173)
Married 0.0454***
(0.00816)
Secondary Education 0.0346*
(0.0197)
Tertiary Education 0.0600**
(0.0280)
Observations 1069607 1050694
The table shows results from a probit regression with a binary
indicator for bunching individuals as dependent variable. The
sample is restricted to potential bunchers in 2008 to 2015. Fur-
ther (unreported) control variables include age squared as well
as firm-level control variables such as industry affiliation, firm-
size, province, firm age and corporate firm indicator. Year fixed
effects are included. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the firm level. Significance levels given by *< 0.1, **<
0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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Moreover, new cohorts start with a higher fraction of firms with bunchers than the previous
cohorts had in the beginning.
Table 2.5: ExtensiveMargin of Firm-level Bunching over Time by FirmCohort
Cohort 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Obs
2008 0.20 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.67 489
(0.40) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47)
2009 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.61 528
(0.42) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
2010 0.21 0.31 0.43 0.51 0.56 0.54 555
(0.41) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
2011 0.26 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.55 1100
(0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
2012 0.31 0.41 0.50 0.49 1657
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
2013 0.37 0.46 0.48 2203
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
2014 0.38 0.44 3280
(0.48) (0.50)
2015 0.36 4847
(0.48)
Note: Share of firms in given cohort with at least 1 buncher. Cohorts conditioned on year of
entry into formal sector and having potential bunchers in all subsequent years.
In a second step, we analyze the intensive margin of firm-level bunching and show that
there is only a moderate increase in the share of bunchers within firms that started to have
bunchers. Table 2.6 displays the average share of bunchers among potential bunchers in firms
that have at least one buncher. In general, the share of bunchers within participating firms
is relatively high (given that potential bunchers in the higher part of the income distribution
would have to claim deductions at maximum values, i.e., half of their income, in order to
count as a buncher). Over time, however, this share does not increase notably. In contrast,
firms that enter into bunching later seem to have lower shares on the intensive margin.
In summary, the increase in overall bunching levels is primarily driven by new firms enter-
ing the set of bunching firms. Experience of the firm in the formal sector leads to a higher
probability to engage into bunching on the firm level. Once a firm took the decision to allow
for bunching, at least on average a relatively stable fraction of workers adjusts their income
to values below the first kink. In order to gain a more detailed understanding of the mecha-
nisms that underlie these dynamic patterns, we investigate a sample of job switchers as well as
individuals with changes in their co-worker composition in the next subsections.
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Table 2.6: IntensiveMargin of Firm-level Bunching over Time by FirmCohort
Cohort 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2008 Share 0.62 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.49
Std. Dev. (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Obs 96 151 187 201 258 298 310 327
2009 Share 0.59 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50
Std. Dev. (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33)
Obs 123 174 216 247 281 312 323
2010 Share 0.68 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.53
Std. Dev. (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32)
Obs 115 173 238 281 312 300
2011 Share 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61
Std. Dev. (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
Obs 286 417 493 553 601
2012 Share 0.75 0.68 0.66 0.66
Std. Dev. (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
Obs 508 686 822 818
2013 Share 0.81 0.73 0.73
Std. Dev. (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)
Obs 809 1021 1049
2014 Share 0.84 0.79
Std. Dev. (0.27) (0.29)
Obs 1231 1444
2015 Share 0.88
Std. Dev. (0.24)
Obs 1738
Note: Share of bunchers among potential bunchers in given cohort within firms with at least 1 buncher. Co-
horts conditioned on year of entry into formal sector and having potential bunchers in all subsequent years.
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2.5.3 Job Switchers
For our sample of job switchers, we consider all job transitions of individualswho switch their
main employer between 2010 and 2014.14 In the case of multiple moves of one worker in this
period, we only consider the first move.15 In order to have balanced observations for the event
study outlined below, we only keep job switchers where we are able to observe at least two
consecutive years before and after the move at the respective firm of origin and destination.
We classify the firm of the job switchers into quintiles based on the coworker bunching
shares in their origin and destination firm. In particular, based on the sample of all private
sector employees with gross earnings between 5000 and 25000USD16 in a given year, we com-
pute the distributionof the share of co-workerswhobunch and split the sample intoquintiles.
For each move, we can then assign the origin firm as well as the destination firm to one of the
quintiles for the respective years.
Summary statistics for the full sample of job switchers are reported in the first column of
Table 2.7. On average, an individual who changed jobs is 32 years old. 46% of the movers are
married, 30% are female, and 25% of the movers have some kind of tertiary education. The
averagemove is related to a substantial raise in wages as themean gross income increases from
about $6100 to about $6700. Similarly, taxable income increases from $5660 to $6200. The
share of workers who file deductions also increases (from 8% to 10%).
Using an event study graph, we observe the dynamic adjustment process of individuals de-
pending on the quintile they are moving to. Figure 2.8 plots the share of bunchers in taxable
income, defined as those who report taxable income in a $1000window to the left of the kink,
among workers starting from a firm in the middle quintile of the bunching share distribu-
tion. The horizontal axis indicates the year relative to the move where year zero is the first
year at the new firm. The data show a clear asymmetric pattern of adjustment. The share of
bunchers amongworkers whomove to a high-bunching firm sharply increases after themove
with an especially strong increase in the second year at the new firm, resulting in the bunch-
ing share more than doubling its pre-move level. In contrast, the share of bunchers among
workersmoving tomid- or low-bunching firms both have a general upward trend in the years
after the move. However, this upward trend is magnitudes smaller than the increases among
individuals moving to a high bunching environment.17
14In case of multiple employers we consider the main employer as the one with the highest earnings. The
year of move is the first year in which the main employer of an individual has changed.
15In a robustness check, we also analyze the sample of movers who move only once with no change in the
results.
16By restricting our sample to this subset, we guarantee that we only take into account those coworkers that
are close enough to the first kink for bunching to be a viable option.
17Table 2.A2 in the appendix depicts the same event-study graph for individuals starting in the low or high
quintile of the bunching distribution. In both alternative samples we also find a much stronger increase in the
share of bunchers among individuals moving to the top quintile than among individuals moving to the mid or
low quintile.
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Table 2.7: Job Switchers - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Mid to Low Mid toMid Mid to High
Demografics
Age 32.29 33.27 31.27 30.75
Married 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46
Female 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.31
Tertiary Education 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.27
Pre-Move
Gross Income 6092.72 5868.99 6278.32 6703.97
Taxable Income 5662.10 5493.57 5838.80 6232.53
Share Deduction Filers 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Buncher 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
Post-Move
Gross Income 6733.50 5115.60 7037.30 7450.82
Taxable Income 6190.15 4854.24 6483.60 6748.53
Share Deduction Filers 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.14
Buncher 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Observations 152617 5919 6717 5682
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the job switcher sample, consisting of all individuals
who switch their job between 2010 and 2014 (regarding only their firstmove) and forwhom it is possible
to observe at least two consecutive years before and after the move. Pre-move gives mean values in the
year before the move, post-move the respective values in the first year at the new firm. Individuals are
grouped into quintiles depending on their coworker bunching shares for any given year. Columns (2)
to (4) represent individuals starting in the mid (third) quintile of the bunching distribution in the year
before the move and moving to a firm in the low (first), mid (third) or high (fifth) quintile.
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Figure 2.8: Event Study Job Switchers
Figure 2.8 indicates parallel and stable pre-move trends between individuals moving to
firms in different parts of the bunching share distribution. This lends credibility to the paral-
lel trends assumptions in standard difference-in-differences type analyses. However, columns
2-4 of Table 2.7 show that job switchers to low-, middle-, and high-bunching firms might be
selected in terms of observable pre-move characteristics. In order to address possible selec-
tion issues, we employ three differing identification strategies that quantify the magnitude
and significance of the effects of switching a job while controlling for individual unobserved
heterogeneity as well as a number of time varying individual characteristics such as earnings
before and after the job switch.
The main idea of the first identification strategy is to compare job switchers starting in a
firm in the mid qunitile of the bunching distribution and moving to a firm in the high quin-
tile to those starting in the mid quintile and moving to a firm in the same quintile. We apply
the same approach to individuals moving to a firm in the low quintile of the bunching dis-
tribution. For each destination quintile ∈ {low, high}, we separately estimate the following
regression on the subsample of individuals starting in a firm in the mid quintile and moving
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to the respective destination quintile:
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkDkit + δpostit × quintilei + θXit + λt + αi + εit. (2.1)
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if individual i has taxable income
within a $1000 window to the left of the kink at time t. We include event-time dummies
Dkit = 1{t = k} indicating the respective year relative to the job switch (with k = 0 being
the first year at the new firm) in order to control for any general trends occurring in event
time. The indicator variable postit takes on the value of one in the years after the job switch
and quintilei takes on the value of one if an individual moved to a high or low quintile respec-
tively. Xit are worker and firm characteristics, including gross earnings, age squared, firm size,
industry classification and an indicator for corporate firm status. We further include individ-
ual (αi) and time (λt) fixed effects. The coefficient δmeasures the general effect of moving to
a high or low bunching firm respectively. 1819
The estimates are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.8. Columns (1) and (3) are without and
columns (2) and (4) with the individual and firm-level controlsXit. The results confirm very
strong firm-level effects on individual tax adjustment behavior: moving to a high quintile firm
increases bunching bymore than 3 percentage points whilemoving to the low quintile has no
significant effect (particularly when controlling for time-varying worker and firm characteris-
tics).
In a second model, we explicitly look at the timing of the effects by estimating separate
coefficients for each period relative to the move. Particularly, we modify the equation to
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkDkit +
k=2∑
k=−2
δkDkit × quintilei + θXit + λt + αi + εit (2.2)
where the coefficients δk on the interaction term measure the anticipatory and post treat-
ment effects reported in Panel B of Table 2.8. Differentiating the effect by year relative to the
job switch we find no anticipatory effects before the job switch throughout the samples. The
effects accruing to moves to a high bunching environment are persistent and strongest in the
second year after the move. In contrast, moving to a lower bunching environment has no
significant effect in any year after the move.
In our third specification, we restrict the sample to those individuals who switched to a
high or low bunching environment and identify the effects only through the timing of the
18In a sensitivity check, we estimate this same regression without individual fixed effects but instead a wide
range of individual specific demographic controls (age, gender, education) and find no substantial difference in
the results.
19We furthermore estimate the same regression without theDkit event-time indicators and find no substantial
change in the direction of the results.
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Table 2.8: Job Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mid to Low Mid to High
Panel A: Overall Effect
After event year -0.00774** -0.00188 0.0356*** 0.0314***
(0.00386) (0.00405) (0.00485) (0.00473)
Panel B
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 0.00350 0.00332 0.00417 0.00333
(0.00519) (0.00519) (0.00559) (0.00562)
Event year - 1 0.00408 0.00525 0.00534 0.00408
(0.00546) (0.00542) (0.00616) (0.00612)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year -0.00906 -0.00274 0.0185** 0.0148*
(0.00591) (0.00597) (0.00779) (0.00765)
Event year + 1 -0.00288 0.00349 0.0544*** 0.0488***
(0.00666) (0.00690) (0.00790) (0.00787)
Event year + 2 -0.000188 0.00561 0.0494*** 0.0435***
(0.00838) (0.00838) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Observations 65224 65186 64504 64473
Panel C: Timing
Event year - 1 -0.00272 -0.00130 -0.00212 -0.00578
(0.00327) (0.00544) (0.00409) (0.00767)
Event year -0.00238 0.00634 0.0245*** 0.0165
(0.00337) (0.00931) (0.00613) (0.0144)
Event year + 1 0.0132*** 0.0212 0.0699*** 0.0541**
(0.00450) (0.0137) (0.00595) (0.0231)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 23560 23542 22676 22662
The panels of this table denote the results from regression equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3)
respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination firm by year
level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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move. We do not employ a comparison group anymore. Specifically, we run the following
regression:
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−1
γkDkit + θXit + λt + αi + εit (2.3)
with the variables as defined above. In order to rule out any compositional effects, we
furthermore restrict the sample in this regression to only include observations from the two
years before and after themove forwhichwe have a perfectly balanced panel. Panel C ofTable
2.8 presents the results of these additional regressions. We find very similar results to before
and take this as further evidence for the robustness of our findings.
In summary, the asymmetry in the adjustments after moves into the different quintiles
points towards workplace or firm driven knowledge effects. In particular, moving to an envi-
ronment with a higher share of coworkers who bunch has a learning effect and increases the
likelihood to bunch. This effect is persistent and strongest in the second year after the job
switch. On the contrary, moving to an environment with a lower share of bunchers does not
change an individual’s behavior and thus is consistent with a memory effect.
The asymmetric response to firm-level bunching confirms the finding of knowledge effects
in Chetty et al. (2013). They analyze moves of self-employed individuals between regions and
find asymmetric responses that are also consistent with learning and memory. In particular,
self-employed workers who move to a region with a high share of bunchers increase their
bunching while there is no effect for movers to low-level regions.
In order to lend credibility to our resultswe have conducted a number of robustness checks
and alternative specifications. Table 2.A1 in the Appendix shows the results from regression
equation (2.1), however, here restrict the sample to those individuals with gross income in
a range where they can use their deductions to bunch at the first kink of the marginal tax
schedule. Even though the sample is smaller, we find no changes in the results. If anything,
the magnitude of the effects is larger.
2.5.4 Co-worker Learning
The previous section on job switchers documents that firms seem to be a key driver for indi-
vidual bunching behavior. Individuals learn about tax adjustment opportunities from their
firms. However, this learning could be driven both through learning directly from the firm or
learning from co-workers. In order to disentangle these two learning mechanisms from each
other, we look specifically at how individuals respond to possible information flows provided
by their co-workers. We do not find evidence for individuals learning about tax-adjustment
opportunities through changes in the composition of their co-workers.
We quantify this co-worker learning channel by looking at individuals with recent changes
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to their co-worker composition. Specifically, we construct a sample of firms with incoming
employees whowere potential bunchers20 due to their gross income in the year before joining
the new firm. We only consider firms hiring new workers once in the years 2010-2014 and in
which we can observe at least two years before (2008 and 2009) and two years after (2014 and
2015) the event. These restrictions provide a sample balanced in event time and allow us to
abstract from various treatments happening sequentially.
Among these firms with incoming potential bunchers, we divide the new employees into
those that reduced their taxable income to just below the first kink (“bunchers”)21 and those
that did not in the year before joining the new firm. We use this distinction to classify firms
into “treatment” (receiving bunchers) and “control” (receiving non-bunchers) groups.
Table 2.9provides descriptive statistics for theworkers in this sample of firms. Alongkeyde-
mographic variables (average age, share married, share female, share tertiary education) treat-
ment and control groups are very similar. Furthermore, average firm size between the two
groups (58 and 61 employees) is very similar. There are some differences in terms of wages
and tax-filing behavior in the year before the arrival of new co-workers.
Table 2.9: Co-worker Learning - Descriptives
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Control Treatment
Demografics
Avg. Age 35.87 35.88 35.81
Share Married 0.51 0.51 0.52
Share Female 0.37 0.36 0.39
Share Tertiary Education 0.32 0.32 0.33
Firmsize 58.68 58.27 61.35
Pre-Event
Avg. Gross Income 7143.18 7018.27 7939.66
Avg. Taxable Income 6396.51 6301.83 7000.20
Share Deduction Filers 0.13 0.13 0.17
Share Taxable Income Buncher 0.06 0.05 0.08
Observations 3526 3048 478
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the co-
worker analysis. Control refers to firms receiving incoming potential bunchers that did
not bunch and treatment refers to firms receiving incoming potential bunchers that did
bunch in the year prior to joining their new firm. Pre-event refers to the year before the
arrival of new co-workers.
Using a similar event studymethodology as employed in Section 2.5.3, weplot average leave-
20We define potential bunchers as individuals with gross earnings in a range allowing them to lower their
taxable income below the first kink of the tax schedule by using deductions. In 2013 real USD, this was gross
earnings between 10180 and 20360 USD.
21We again take at an interval of 1000 USD to the left of the first kink.
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out bunching levels in treatment and control firms relative to the year of the move. A given
firm’s leave-out bunching share disregards the new co-worker and only calculates the share of
bunchers among the original co-workers. The results in Figure 2.9 suggest that, whileworkers
in treatment firms tend to have higher bunching shares throughout the whole sample period,
their tax adjustment behavior does not change substantially after the arrival of a buncher.
We conduct the same event study for subsamples in which we suspect the influence to be
stronger. Figure 2.10 depicts firms which had no bunchers before the incoming worker and
Figure 2.11 small firms (less than 25 employees). In both of these cases our original finding of
no effect is confirmed.
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Figure 2.9: Coworker Learning - All
Table 2.10 provides regression results for the previous graphic evidence. With the aim of
addressing possible selection issues and quantifying the magnitude of the effects, we mirror
the identification strategies employed in Section 2.5.3. Specifically, we estimate
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkDkit + δpostit × treati + θXit + λt + αi + εit. (2.4)
where i now refers to a given firm and not an individual. Yit is the leave-out bunching share
among the incumbent co-workers,Dkit are indicators for event time, postit is an indicator for an
observation being after the incoming co-worker, treati is an indicator for a firm receiving an
incoming buncher. We include firm (αi) and time (λt) fixed effects and in Xit we control for
firmsize as well as employee characteristics (average income, share tertiary educated, average
age, share married, and share female).
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Figure 2.10: Coworker Learning - No Bunchers
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
A
ve
ra
ge
 F
irm
 B
un
ch
in
g 
Le
ve
l
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Year Relative to Incoming Event
Treatment Control
Figure 2.11: Coworker Learning - Small Firms
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Table 2.10: Co-worker Learning - Regression Results
All No Bunchers Small Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.0248 0.0258 0.0336 0.0252 0.0237 0.0237
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0325) (0.0338) (0.0430) (0.0431)
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 0.0137 0.0186 0.0136* 0.0100 0.0263 0.0406
(0.0309) (0.0311) (0.00827) (0.00952) (0.0631) (0.0640)
Event year - 1 -0.000354 0.00374 0.0136* 0.00921 -0.0184 -0.00190
(0.0324) (0.0326) (0.00827) (0.0102) (0.0648) (0.0657)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.00421 0.00601 0.00331 -0.00726 -0.0277 -0.0155
(0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0336) (0.0348) (0.0648) (0.0659)
Event year + 1 0.0480 0.0540 0.0842 0.0737 0.0731 0.0874
(0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0531) (0.0544) (0.0731) (0.0735)
Event year + 2 0.0447 0.0516 0.0478 0.0340 0.0406 0.0491
(0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0855) (0.0859)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 11579 11574 2595 2590 4731 4731
The table reports results from regression equations (2.4) and (2.5) at the firm level. Outcome variable is the leave-
out bunching share and event year refers to the year of incoming employees. Firm and year fixed effects are included
throughout. We control for average income, share tertiary educated, average age, share married, share female and
firmsize. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **<
0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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In a similar identification approach, we separate the overall effect into individual time com-
ponents by estimating the following regression:
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkDkit +
k=2∑
k=−2
δkDkit × treati + θXit + λt + αi + εit. (2.5)
In this regression the coefficients δk measure the anticipatory and post treatment effects.
These coefficients, along with the estimate for the overall effect from equation (2.4), are re-
ported inTable 2.10. Among all three samples there donot seem tobe any effects of the change
in co-worker composition on individual tax-adjustment behavior.22 We conclude these find-
ings with the observation that learning about tax adjustment opportunities seems to bemore
likely driven through firm-level effects than through learning from co-workers.
The observation that firms are the main drivers of individual bunching naturally leads to
the question of characterizing those firms whose employees are most likely to bunch. The
following regression results in Table 2.11 show correlations between the share of bunchers in a
given firm (amongpotential bunchers in the respective firm) andvarious firm-level characteris-
tics and aggregate demographic characteristics of the employees. We see that larger firms tend
to have smaller bunching shares. The sectors (industry classification) seem to play an impor-
tant role in characterizing a given firm’s bunching share. The reported coefficients compare
a given industry with the omitted category, in this case agriculture, livestock and mining. In-
deed a number of these sector coefficients go into the expected direction. Sectors with strong
connections to the public sector (electricity, gas and water as well as health and social services)
are related to low firm-level bunching shares.23 The strongest positive coefficient is given by
firms operating in the financial sector, as we can expect these (and their employees) to bemost
knowledgeable in adjusting their taxable income.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze bunching in personal income taxes using new administrative tax-
return data from Ecuador. Learning seems to play an important role in determining how
individuals adjust their taxable income: people with experience and exposure to the tax sys-
tem are more likely to position their taxable incomewithin the vicinity of the first kink of the
marginal tax schedule. The main margin of adjustment of taxable income lies in the report-
ing of generous deduction possibilities. We do not find evidence for true economic adjust-
ments such as labor supply responses. Moreover, by exploiting data on individuals switching
22In unreported results we additionally identify the effect of co-workers within the sample of treated firms
purely through the timing of the effect akin to the regression strategy in equation (2.3). We do not find robust
evidence for any effects.
23Note that these results pertain only to firms in the private sector as public sector firms where excluded
throughout the analysis.
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Table 2.11: Bunching Firms
Share of Bunchers in Firm
Share Married 0.00957** (0.00418)
Mean Age 0.00193** (0.000857)
Share Female 0.0341*** (0.00326)
Between 10 and 100 Employees -0.0260*** (0.00300)
Between 100 and 1000 Employees -0.0774*** (0.00787)
More than 1000 Employees -0.127*** (0.0103)
Corporate Firm -0.0237*** (0.00304)
Sectors
Manufacturing 0.0178*** (0.00166)
Electricity, gas and water -0.00690*** (0.00179)
Construction 0.0180*** (0.00152)
Trade; Repairing 0.0187*** (0.00244)
Hotel and Restaurant 0.0117*** (0.00171)
Transport, Storage, Communication 0.00741** (0.00241)
Financial Sector 0.0283*** (0.00253)
Real Estate, Business and Renting 0.0159*** (0.00204)
Education 0.00577** (0.00212)
Health and Social Services -0.0115*** (0.00220)
Other 0.00526** (0.00217)
Observations 126540
The table reports results from an OLS regression at the firm level with the share
of bunching individuals in a firm as the dependent variable. Sample and share of
bunchers constructed using only potential bunchers in 2008 to 2015. Further (unre-
ported) control variables include average age squared, share secondary and tertiary
education, share foreign workers, average number of jobs among workers and firm
age. Year andprovince fixed effects are included. The agriculture, livestock andmin-
ing sector is the omitted category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the industry level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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their jobs, we find strong bunching spillovers at the firm level. Someone moving from a mid-
bunching environment to a high-bunching environment increases their probability to bunch
by 3-5 percentage points. In contrast, for someone switching to a low bunching environment,
we find almost zero effect on their probability of bunching. These asymmetric effects lead
us to believe that knowledge seems to be the main driver in these spillover effects at the firm
level.
Apart from establishing the importance of knowledge in individual tax adjustment behav-
ior, we constrast a further channel of information transmission: co-worker learning. By study-
ing firms which receintly hired employees we look at how incoming bunchers affect their
co-workers’ tax-filing behavior. We find no evidence for incumbent employees learning from
their new co-workers’ behavior, even among small firms or firmswithout any previous bunch-
ers. We conclude that firms, not co-workers, seem to be the main driver of tax adjustment
behavior.
From a policy perspective, these findings on how taxpayers in a low-enforcement setting
learn about tax adjustment and avoidance opportunities are highly relevant. A range of de-
veloping and middle-income countries have recently undergone numerous reforms aiming
towards the formalization of the economy. While designing these reforms it is important to
take into account how new taxpayers react to the incentives provided by the tax system over
time. Our analysis has shown that firms play an important role in how knowledge about
tax adjustment opportunities is spread. In devising strategies to combat tax avoidance and
increase revenue, this is an important fact to keep in mind.
In future research on behavioral responses to taxation, we think it is important to focus
more strongly on dynamic aspects, especially taking into account that individuals learn over
time about the incentives given by the tax system. In our analysis we show that firm-level ef-
fects play an extremely important role in determining individual tax-filing behavior. In future
research, it would be of great interest to quantify the role of firms in tax filing and possibly
tax avoiding behavior of individuals.
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2.A Additional Tables and Figures
Further evidence for the fact that bunching is driven by reporting behavior can be found in
Figure 2.A1. Individuals who do not file deductions for personal expenses do not display high
levels of bunching (Figure 2.A1a). In contrast, individuals who file deductions (Figure 2.A1b)
form a substantial excess mass to the left of the first kink in the tax schedule. The estimate
here is extremely high (ten times as many individuals) and significant. Moreover, when only
looking at gross income pooled in our sample period, our estimate of the bunching estimator
is extremely small and insignificant (Figure 2.A5). Summing up, we find that in line with the
large majority of research about behavioral responses to income taxation the reactions to tax
incentives are mostly driven by reporting behavior rather than real labor supply responses.
Furthermore, deductions for personal expenses are the primary tool used to avoid taxes.
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Figure 2.A1: The Impact of Filing Deductions
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Figure 2.A2: Event Study Job Switchers
The asymmetry of the response is further emphasized by the evidence in Figure 2.A2. The
left panel showsbunching shares amongworkerswho start froma firm in the lower quintile of
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Table 2.A1: Job Switchers Potential Buncher
Mid to Low Mid to High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Effect
After event year 0.00360 0.0130 0.0622*** 0.0637***
(0.0200) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0229)
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 -0.0110 -0.0338 0.0543* 0.0404
(0.0323) (0.0336) (0.0293) (0.0310)
Event year - 1 -0.0280 -0.0423 0.0610* 0.0535
(0.0351) (0.0363) (0.0354) (0.0351)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year -0.0197 -0.0283 0.102*** 0.0993**
(0.0331) (0.0349) (0.0329) (0.0388)
Event year + 1 -0.0198 -0.0152 0.106*** 0.100***
(0.0408) (0.0425) (0.0337) (0.0348)
Event year + 2 0.0242 0.00290 0.126*** 0.109**
(0.0497) (0.0508) (0.0445) (0.0460)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5493 5493 5701 5701
This table reports results for a reduced version of the job-switcher sample from Table
2.8. The sample is restricted to individuals with gross earnings between 10180 and 20360
USD, that is individuals who can use their deductions to reduce their annual income
below the threshold for paying taxes. We report results from the event study-type re-
gressions. Due to the lower number of observations we use terciles instead of quintiles.
The regressions are run for individuals starting in the mid-tercile of the bunching distri-
bution andmoving to the low or high tercile respectively. The outcome variable is an in-
dicator for having taxable income in an interval of 1000$ below the first kink. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination firm by year level. Significance
levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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the bunching distribution while the right panel refers to movers who start in the upper quin-
tile. Among workers starting in the lower bunching quintile we see very similar patterns as
before: individuals who move to the high quintile experience strong and sustained increases
in bunching, whereas individuals moving to the low or mid quintile exhibit much smaller
increases. Considering workers starting in the high bunching quintile we see some small ad-
ditional increases among those going back to the high quintile, whereas taxpayers moving to
the mid or low quintile have a temporary decrease in their probability to adjust their taxable
income.
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3.- La deducción total por gastos personales no deberá superar el 50% del total de ingresos gravados, y en ningún caso será mayor al equivalente a 1.3 veces la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a 
la Renta de personas naturales.
4.- A partir del año 2011 debe considerarse como cuantía máxima para cada tipo de gasto, el monto equivalente a la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta en:
vivienda 0.325 veces, educación 0.325 veces, alimentación 0.325 veces, vestimenta 0.325, salud 1.3 veces.
6.- De conformidad con la Resolución No. NAC-DGER2008-0566 publicada en el Registro Oficial No. 342 el 21 de mayo del 2008, el beneficio de la exoneración por tercera edad se configura a partir
del ejercicio en el cual el beneficiario cumpla los 65 años de edad. El monto de la exoneración será el equivalente al doble de la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta.
7.- A partir del año 2013, conforme lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica de Discapacidades el monto de la exoneración por discapacidad será el equivalente al doble de la fracción básica exenta de
Impuesto a la Renta.
1.- El trabajador que, en el mismo período fiscal haya reiniciado su actividad con otro empleador, estará en la obligación de entregar el formulario 107 entregado por su anterior empleador a su nuevo
empleador, para que aquel, efectúe el cálculo de las retenciones a realizarse en lo que resta del año.
DECLARO QUE LOS DATOS PROPORCIONADOS EN ESTE DOCUMENTO SON EXACTOS Y VERDADEROS, POR LO QUE ASUMO LA RESPONSABILIDAD LEGAL QUE DE ELLA SE 
DERIVEN (Art. 101 de la L.R.T.I.)
8.- El presente formulario constituye la declaración de Impuesto a la Renta del trabajador, siempre que durante el período declarado la persona únicamente haya prestado sus servicios en relación de
dependencia con el empleador que entrega este formulario, y no existan valores de gastos personales que deban ser reliquidados. En caso de pérdida de este documento el trabajador deberá solicitar
una copia a su empleador.
Por el contrario, el trabajador deberá presentar obligatoriamente su declaración de Impuesto a la Renta cuando haya obtenido rentas en relación de dependencia con dos o más empleadores o haya
recibido además de su remuneración ingresos de otras fuentes como por ejemplo: rendimientos financieros, arrendamientos, ingresos por el libre ejercicio profesional, u otros ingresos, los cuales en
conjunto superen la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta de personas naturales, o cuando tenga que reliquidar gastos personales con aquellos efectivamente incurridos, teniendo presente los
límites referidos en las notas 3 y 4 de este documento.
5.- El trabajador deberá presentar el Anexo de Gastos Personales que deduzca, de cumplir las condiciones establecidas por el Servicio de Rentas Internas.
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO ASUMIDO POR ESTE EMPLEADOR                                                     
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO RETENIDO AL TRABAJADOR POR ESTE EMPLEADOR
INGRESOS GRAVADOS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (informativo)                                                                                                  
301+303+305+381
IMPORTANTE: Sírvase leer cada una de las siguientes instrucciones.
2.- El campo 307 deberá ser llenado con la información registrada en el campo 349 del Formulario 107 entregado por el anterior empleador, y/o con la proyección de ingresos de otros empleadores
actuales, en caso de que el empleador que registra y entrega el presente formulario haya efectuado la retención por los ingresos percibidos con éstos últimos.
BASE IMPONIBLE GRAVADA
301+303+305+307-351-353-361-363-365-367-369-371-373+381 ≥ 0 
IMPUESTO A LA RENTA CAUSADO                                                                                           
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO RETENIDO Y ASUMIDO POR OTROS EMPLEADORES DURANTE EL PERÍODO 
DECLARADO
(-) EXONERACIÓN POR DISCAPACIDAD
(-) EXONERACIÓN POR TERCERA EDAD
IMPUESTO A LA RENTA ASUMIDO POR ESTE EMPLEADOR
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - EDUCACIÓN
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - ALIMENTACIÓN
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - VESTIMENTA
(-) APORTE PERSONAL IESS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES (únicamente pagado por el trabajador)
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - VIVIENDA
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - SALUD
FONDO DE RESERVA
OTROS INGRESOS EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA QUE NO CONSTITUYEN RENTA GRAVADA 
(-) APORTE PERSONAL IESS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (únicamente pagado por el trabajador)
INGRESOS GRAVADOS GENERADOS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES
DÉCIMO TERCER SUELDO
DÉCIMO CUARTO SUELDO
Liquidación del Impuesto
SUELDOS Y SALARIOS
SOBRESUELDOS, COMISIONES, BONOS Y OTROS INGRESOS GRAVADOS
PARTICIPACIÓN UTILIDADES
200 Identificación del Trabajador (Contribuyente)
201
CÉDULA O PASAPORTE
202
APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
100 Identificación del Empleador (Agente de Retención)
105
 RUC
106
 RAZÓN SOCIAL O APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
FECHA DE ENTREGA 103
AÑO MES DIA
COMPROBANTE DE RETENCIONES EN LA FUENTE DEL IMPUESTO A LA RENTA 
POR INGRESOS DEL TRABAJO EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA 
   No.
FORMULARIO 107
RESOLUCIÓN No. NAC-DGERCGC12-00829 EJERCICIO FISCAL 102
Figure 2.A3: Tax Declaration Form 107 for Dependent Employees
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FORMULARIO SRI-GP
EJERCICIO FISCAL
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ENTREGA/RECEPCION
CIUDAD AÑO MES DIA
51
USD$
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INGRESOS GRAVADOS PROYECTADOS (sin decimotercera y decimocuarta remuneración) (ver Nota 1)
(+) TOTAL INGRESOS GRAVADOS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (con el empleador que más ingresos perciba)
(+) TOTAL INGRESOS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES (en caso de haberlos)
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Firmas 
EMPLEADOR / AGENTE DE RETENCION EMPLEADO CONTRIBUYENTE
(+) GASTOS DE EDUCACION
(+) GASTOS DE SALUD USD$
 Identificación del Agente de Retención (a ser llenado por el empleador)
(=) TOTAL GASTOS PROYECTADOS (ver Nota 2)
(+) GASTOS DE VESTIMENTA
(+) GASTOS DE ALIMENTACION
FIRMA DEL SERVIDOR
112
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 RAZON SOCIAL, DENOMINACION O APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
SERVICIO DE RENTAS INTERNAS
NOTAS: 
1.- Cuando un contribuyente trabaje con DOS O MÁS empleadores, presentará este informe al empleador con el que perciba mayores in gresos, el que efectuará la retención considerando los ingresos gravados y 
deducciones (aportes personales al IESS) con todos los empleadores.  Una copia certificada, con la respectiva firma y sello del empleador, será presentada a los demás empleadores para que se abstengan de 
efectuar retenciones sobre los pagos efectuados por concepto de remuneración del trabajo en relación de dependencia. 
2. La deducción total por gastos personales no podrá superar el 50% del total de sus ingresos gravados (casillero 105), y en ningún caso  será mayor al equivalente a 1.3 veces la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto 
a la Renta de personas naturales. A partir del año 2011 debe considerarse como cuantía máxima para cada tipo de gasto, el monto equivalente a la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta en: vivienda 0.325 
veces, educación 0.325  veces, alimentación 0.325 veces, vestimenta 0.325, salud 1.3 veces.
Figure 2.A4: Tax Declaration Form for Filing Deductions for Personal Expenses
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Chapter 3
Sourcing, Learning, andMatching in Labor
Markets
with Albrecht Glitz, Virginia Minni, and Andrea Weber
3.1 Introduction
Hiring decisions are an important determinant of firm success. Informational uncertainties
about worker quality, however, are an impediment to finding good matches and hence to la-
bormarket efficiency. It is particularly complicated to screen and evaluate skills that have been
acquired on the job in other firms. As a potential mechanism to reduce uncertainty around
worker quality, firms can rely on information provided through various types of networks.
The literature has started to explore the role of personal relations trough referrals, e.g., from
former coworkers (Cingano and Rosolia, 2012; Saygin, Weber, andWeynandt, 2014; Hensvik
andNordströmSkans, 2016;Glitz, 2017), fromneighbors (Bayer,Ross, andTopa, 2008), from
family members (Kramarz and Skans, 2014), from individuals from the same ethnic group
(Dustmann, Glitz, Schönberg, and Brücker, 2016), or more theoretically in Galenianos (2013)
and Galenianos (2014).
Much less emphasis, however, has been placed on the role of networks among firms di-
rectly. In particular, firms potentially gain experience from repeated interaction with each
other and might be able to learn about the match quality of workers that are poached from
particular firms. As an employer hires workers from a particular source firm, it learns over
time their actual productivity and it discovers whether, on average, the workers hired from
the source firm possess the skills the employer is looking for. The more a firm gains hiring
experience, the more it should systematically hire workers from a selected group of source
firms in a non-random fashion. Hence, firms decrease match uncertainty by learning where
to recruit individuals with a high firm-specific human capital base taking advantage of their
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prior business and industry experiences. This learningmechanism can improve thematching
of workers and firms by ensuring profitable and efficient job-to-job flows.
In this chapter, I document a range of empirical facts that emphasize the importance of ex-
perience of hiring firmswith specific source firms. The analysis is based onmatched employer-
employee data fromAustrian Social SecurityRecords fromwhich I extract the universe of job-
to-job transitions in the economy. Analyzing these transitions, I first show that older firms
tend to poach their workers from a narrower set of source firms. As the age of a firm increases,
its hiring getsmore concentrated and new hires come from a smaller number of selected firms
when conditioning on firm size and growth. This result is robust when controlling for other
firm characteristics, industry classes and geographical factors. Secondly, I show that a firm’s
acquired experience in hiring from a specific source firm leads to higher starting wages and
longer tenure of workers hired from that particular firm. Having gained experience from pre-
vious interactions with the same source reduces uncertainty and therefore results in better
matches. With increasing tenure, however, the information advantage disappears and work-
ers that are hired from sources with no previous experience catch up.
To substantiate the empirical findings, I propose a theory of employer’s learning where
firms learnover time fromwhich source firms tohire theirworkers. Workers gain labormarket
experience that can be relevant for alternative job opportunities and firms learn from which
firms topoach their employees. The literature on learning aboutmatchquality has focusedon
the firm and the worker’s learning about the match quality of the firm-worker pair. Instead,
I separate two different learning processes. The first is the traditional learning about the id-
iosyncratic match quality introduced by Jovanovic (1979, 1984). The second, unexplored by
the literature, is the firm’s learning about which set of source firms to hire its workers from.
I develop a search andmatchingmodel with heterogeneousworkers, on-the-job search and
match-quality as a pure experience good. Themodel builds onPries andRogerson (2005) and
Moscarini (2005) who combine variants of two benchmark models from the literature: the
Jovanovic (1979, 1984) learning model and the Pissarides (1985) search andmatching model. I
extend the previous research in several ways to analyze the role of employer’s learning about
his source firms in shaping the hiring strategies of firms and the matching between jobs and
workers. In themodel framework, a firm learns over time about the average quality ofworkers
from different source firms. If a firm repeatedly proves to be a good source of highly produc-
tive matches, hiring firms are more willing to employ workers from this particular source. As
a result, new workers hired from the most appropriate source firms are, on average, better
matched to their firm than workers hired from other firms. Hence, they earn higher starting
wages and have lower separation rates. However, as workers and firms learn about their id-
iosyncraticmatch-specific productivity, low qualitymatches are terminated and the wage and
turnover advantage dissipates over time.
The analysis contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper is related to the
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literature on firm heterogeneity in terms of age and size and matching patterns (Brown and
Medoff, 1989, 2003; Brixy, Kohaut, and Schnabel, 2007; Heyman, 2007; Gabaix and Landier,
2008; Terviö, 2008; Shane, 2009; Friebel and Giannetti, 2009). It is generally found that new
firms tend to have younger workers, aremore likely to hire from the unemployment pool and
experience greater rates of employee turnover (see, e.g., Behrends, 2007;Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
and Miranda, 2013; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2014; Janicki, Hyatt, Dinlersoz, et al., 2017). On
the other hand, old and established firms are able to attract individuals that already have a
job and are characterized by longer employment tenures (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989;
Bergmann and Mertens, 2011; Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and McEntarfer, 2015). This empirical
evidence is consistent with the theory of the employers learning over time about their source
firms and improving on the matching with the new hires.
In addition, I contribute to the empirical literature onwage equations and individual earn-
ings dynamics by adding to the debate on the effect of job experience on starting wages and
wage growth andonhow job experience interactswith job tenure (Altonji andShakotko, 1987;
Dustmann and Meghir, 2005; Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin, 2014). Economic
theories of on-the-job search suggest workers will move up the job ladder from lower-paying,
less productive firms towards higher-paying, more productive firms (see, e.g., Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2013, 2016). A corollary implication is
that such flows will also be from young and small to old and large firms, since theory implies
that firms that are more productive will be older, larger and higher paying. The implied close
relationship between firm size, productivity and wages has received some mixed empirical
support. I contribute to this literature by focusing on how firm’s experience in hiring from
a particular source firm impacts the starting wages and wage growth of the workers coming
from that firm. As the firm learns about its source firms, there is less uncertainty over the
success of the match and hence, there is less scope for wage growth since starting wages are
already reflecting the true productivity of the match.
Finally, hiring strategies by firms and matching have also been discussed by the broader
economic literature on personnel practices as in Lazear and Oyer (2012), Oyer and Schaefer
(2010) and, more specifically on matching, in Andersson, Freedman, Haltiwanger, Lane, and
Shaw (2009). DeVaro (2005, 2008) finds that there is a strong association between recruit-
ment choices and starting wages where firms face a trade off between hiring speed and match
quality. Moreover, the literature has considered extensively the issue of the uncertainty con-
cerning match quality (see, e.g., Lazear, 1995; Burgess, Lane, and Stevens, 1998; Lazear and
Gibbs, 2014). Lazear (1995) develops an equilibrium model where potential employees vary
in terms of their riskiness, and derives predictions about which firms are good matches for
risky workers. The idea is that potential employees may vary not just in their skill, the first
moment of the productivity distribution, but also in the degree to which they are risky, the
secondmoment of theproductivity distribution. Within this broad literature, thenovel learn-
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ing process points out at the role of firms’ hiring experience as an additional solution to the
uncertainty problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I establish empirical results
concerning the role of hiring experience for wages and tenure. In Section 3.3, I set up a learn-
ing model that rationalizes the results of the empirical analysis. In Section 3.4, I calibrate the
model to illustrate its empirical predictions and its congruence with the empirical facts. Sec-
tion 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Findings
3.2.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on administrative records for the universe of private sector
employment in Austria. The matched employer-employee data from the Austrian Social Se-
curity Database (ASSD, see Zweimüller et al., 2009) provides detailed daily information on
employment and unemployment spells as well as on other social security related states such
as sickness, retirement, and maternity leave since 1972. Each individual employment spell is
linked to an employer identifier and some firm-level information. Moreover, annual earnings
are provided for each worker-firm combination.
I use the spell data in the ASSD to extract all job-to-job transitions that meet a range of
criteria. The sample period is from 1975 to 2010. For each year, I select all individuals who
start a job spell in this particular year and link the beginning job spell to the previous job spell.
I only keep the transition if there are atmost 30 days of non-employment between the two job
spells and if both spells last for at least 30 days. I exclude transitions that are due to renamings,
spin-offs, or takeovers and exclude transitions of apprentices and marginal workers using a
worker flow approach (Fink et al., 2010). Finally, I only keep job transitions to firms with
more than 5 employees.
I conduct two types of analysis. First, I use firm-level data to look at how firm age impacts
on the number of source firms. Second, I focus on the relationship between the firm’s hiring
experience, on one side, and wages and spell durations, on the other side.
Firm-level Data
For the first part of the empirical analysis, I aggregate job transitions at the firm-year level. Let
i = 1, . . . ,N denote all the firms in the economy and ni denote the number of new hires at
firm i within the annual period. Each firm i is sourcing employees from ki other firms. Let
nij denote the number of beginners at firm i that are poached from firm j and sort the firms
fromwhich firm i hires according to the number of hirings, i.e., 0 ≤ ni1 ≤ · · · ≤ niki ≤ ni. I
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then compute the Gini coefficient of the distribution of shares as:
Ginii =

1
ki
(
ki + 1− 2
(∑ki
j=1(ki+1−j)nij∑ki
j=1 nij
))
if ki > 1
1 if ki = 1
(3.1)
I drop observations from the firm-level analysis where the firm hires only one worker in the
respective year, i.e. ni = 1.
I use two different dependent variables: the Gini coefficient, Ginii, and the number of
source firms, ki. The main regressor of interest is firm age (in years) which is constructed
as the difference between the current year and the first appearance of the firm in the data.
In order to deal with left censoring of firm age (since data collection started only in 1972) I
consider only firms that were founded after 1972. I also compute the size of the firm in the
year of the move and firm growth in terms of employees between the year of the move and
the last quarter of the previous year. Moreover, I collect data on industry (4-digit NACE95
code) and location (state level, NUTS-3 level). As further control variables, I compute Gini
indexes for the concentration of hirings on the regional (NUTS-3) level and industry level.
For instance, the regional Gini index is 0 if all hirings are from different regions and 1 if all
hirings are from the same region. In the baseline version of the empirical analysis, I restrict
the sample to stable firms that survive for at least 10 years and restrict the set of source firms
to those firms that are likewise present during the respective time.1
Hiring Data
For the second part of the empirical analysis, I follow individuals who experience a job-to-
job transition over the course of the spell in the new firm. I consider only hirings by firms
that exist for at least ten years and from sources that exist for at least the same time as the
hiring firm. Again, I restrict the sample to firms that were established after 1972. A hiring
event is a job-to-job transition that satisfies the criteria specified above. For each hiring event,
I compute twomeasures of previous hiring experience from a particular source firm as proxies
for an employer’s learning. The first measure is the number of hirings from the same source
prior to the hiring event. The second measure is the number of years that have passed since
the first hiring event from the same source. Moreover, I compute a measure of general hiring
experience, namely, the average number of previous hirings from all other sources.
For each hiring event, I collect the initial daily wage in the year of the job transition and
keep track of the individual’s daily wages until the spell ends. The daily wage is computed as
the sum of annual earnings and bonus payments (censored at the social security contribution
limit) in the year divided by the number of days worked. The second outcome variable of
1The results, however, are not sensitive to changes in the age restriction to 15 or 20 years and to covering the
full sample.
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interest is an indicator that equals to one if the spell ends in the next year. Finally, I collect
data on worker characteristics and employment history before the hiring event.
3.2.2 Results
Firm-level analysis
In the first part of the analysis, I examine how the set of source firms depends on the age of
the hiring firm. I pool the firm-year level information over all periods. I estimate equations
with the following structure by OLS:2
yit = α0 + α1 f (ageit) + X′itβ+ γi + εit (3.2)
where yit can be either Giniit or the number of sources, kit, f (ageit) is a flexible function of
firm age, and γi are firm-level fixed effects. Additional regressors collected in Xit are firm size,
firm growth between t and t − 1, the number of new hires, state level FE, NUTS-3 level FE,
industry level FE and Gini coefficients that correspond to the distribution of hirings among
industries and regions.3
Regression results for various specifications of equation (3.2) are displayed inTables 3.1 and
3.2. There is a clear positive and significant relation between firm age and the Gini coefficient
of source firm concentration (Column 1 ofTable 3.1). The size of the effect could be diluted by
the fact that larger firms (which are typically older) operate in various fields and therefore need
workers from different sources. When controlling for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity
(Column2), firmgrowth (Column3), firm size (Column4), thenumberofhirings (Column5)
and the dispersion of hirings across regions and industries (Column 6) the impact of firm age
becomes indeed larger. Moreover, the positive relation remains stablewhen consideringmore
flexible specifications of firm age (Columns 7 and 8) and firm size (Column 9). This indicates
that older firms poach their workers from a narrower set of sources, i.e. hiring gets more
concentrated over a firm’s lifetime. Table 3.2 reports results where the dependent variable is
the number of hiring firms and displays a clear and stable negative relation to firm age.
To get a sense of the magnitude of these effects, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the profile of the
Gini coefficient and of the number of source firms over firm age when dummies for each
individual year of firm age are included in the Equation (3.2).4 The estimated coefficients
for the Gini coefficient (number of source firms) increase (decrease) almost monotonically as
firm age increases. On average, ten additional years of firm age increase the Gini coefficient by
0.04 points and decrease the number of hiring firms by about one firm. These trends slightly
2Firmswhich, at any point in time, exceed 2 times the 99 percentile in firm size are excluded from the analysis.
3Note that I do not include year fixed effects in any specification since otherwise age and the year dummies
would be collinear in the specification with year and firm FE.
4The omitted category is firm age equal to 1, the first full calender year of observing each firm.
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level off after 30 years. Given that the Austrian economy is mainly dominated by small and
medium sized firms that hire rather occasionally, this effect is relatively sizeable. Notably, the
average number of source firms in the sample is 4.83 while the median firm has only three
sources (see Table 3.A1 in the appendix).
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Figure 3.1: Gini Index and Age
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Figure 3.2: Number of Source Firms and Age
InAppendixB, I report additional regression tables and figures of various sensitivity checks.
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Hiring-level analysis
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I examine the relation between the hiring experi-
ence a firm has gained with respect to a particular source firm and the wages and tenure of the
workers hired from that firm. I consider all hiring events over the sample period from 1975 to
2010 and estimate equations with the following structure by OLS:
yℓ(ij,τ),t = α0 + α1experij,τ + α2experij−1,τ + X
′
ℓ,τβ+ γi + δt + εℓ(ij,τ),t (3.3)
where yℓ(ij,τ),t is the (log) daily wage of worker ℓ hired by firm i from source firm j in year t,
and τ is the year of the hiring event. Themain regressor of interest, experij,τ, is one of the two
measures of experience of firm i in hiring from source firm j at the time of the hiring event τ
(see Section 3.2.1), and experij−1,τ is the average number of hirings firm i did from other source
firms (j−1) prior to the time of the hiring. I control for initial worker characteristics Xℓ,τ such
as the daily wage prior to the hiring event, tenure at the old firm, worker age, gender, and
nationality. Some versions of the model also include firm fixed effects, γi, year fixed effects, δt
or firm× year fixed effects.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report results fromestimating various versions of Equation (3.3). InTable
3.3, log daily wages of individual ℓ are regressed on the number of previous hirings from the
same source firm. There is a positive and significant relation between hiring experience and
wages. Of course this relation could be driven by the fact that firms with higher hiring experi-
ence are older firms that generally employ different workers than younger firms. To control
for this potential confounder, I condition on theworker type by includingworker characteris-
tics and employment history in Column (2). While smaller inmagnitude, the positive impact
of hiring experience remains significant. Furthermore, the estimate does not change when
controlling for a measure of aggregate hiring experience in Column (3). This indicates that
it is indeed specific experience with a certain source firm that is important for the reduction
of uncertainty and therefore the determination of wages. Finally, Columns (4) and (5) show
that the positive relation between experience andwages is also presentwithin firms, years, and
firm-years by including firm and year fixed effects or firm× year fixed effects. The difference
between the raw correlation in Column (1) and themore elaborate specifications indicate that
part of the effect is driven by selection while a significant role of specific hiring experience is
present even within firm-years. The same conclusion arises when hiring experience is mea-
sured by the number of years since the first hiring event of a worker from the same source
firm (Table 3.4).
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 have the same structure as the previous tables but the outcome variable
is the probability to leave the firm in the next year. This probability is negatively impacted by
hiring experience, indicating thatmore experience leads to longer tenure, less uncertainty and
bettermatches. While the impact of the number of previous hirings from the same source has
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Table 3.3: Impact of the Number of Previous Hirings on Log DailyWages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
No. prev. hirings 0.00454*** 0.00198*** 0.00179*** 0.000674** 0.000819**
(0.000897) (0.000532) (0.000544) (0.000325) (0.000363)
Prev. wage 0.625*** 0.624*** 0.409*** 0.387***
(0.00742) (0.00731) (0.00707) (0.00725)
Spell duration (days) 0.0000163*** 0.0000164*** 0.0000164*** 0.00000732***
(0.000000986) (0.000000968) (0.000000825) (0.000000745)
Age 0.0000946 0.000142 -0.00763*** -0.0318***
(0.000304) (0.000290) (0.00169) (0.000294)
Female -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.148*** -0.130***
(0.00503) (0.00494) (0.00280) (0.00261)
Austrian 0.0728*** 0.0727*** 0.0422*** 0.0630***
(0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00214) (0.00214)
Avg. prev. hirings 0.00121*** -0.000145 -0.0000157
(0.000365) (0.000132) (0.000126)
Constant 4.066*** 1.668*** 1.669***
(0.00598) (0.0268) (0.0266)
Firm FE No No No Yes No
Year FE No No No Yes No
Firm-year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5564494 5562620 5562620 5556516 5228428
R2 0.009 0.513 0.514 0.667 0.824
Note: The wage is the log daily wage obtained as the sum of annual earnings and bonus payments (censored
at the social security contribution limit) in the year divided by the number of days worked. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Impact of the Number of Years of Hiring Experience on Log DailyWages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
No. prev years 0.0187*** 0.00264*** 0.00235*** 0.00156*** 0.00194***
(0.000992) (0.000668) (0.000631) (0.000274) (0.000296)
Prev. wage 0.627*** 0.625*** 0.408*** 0.387***
(0.00764) (0.00744) (0.00721) (0.00742)
Spell duration (days) 0.0000156*** 0.0000158*** 0.0000162*** 0.00000718***
(0.00000102) (0.000000973) (0.000000850) (0.000000780)
Age -0.0000998 -0.0000188 -0.00765*** -0.0321***
(0.000350) (0.000323) (0.00172) (0.000302)
Female -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.148*** -0.130***
(0.00545) (0.00518) (0.00279) (0.00260)
Austrian 0.0740*** 0.0736*** 0.0423*** 0.0631***
(0.00489) (0.00485) (0.00215) (0.00215)
Avg. prev. hirings 0.00180*** -0.0000839 0.0000379
(0.000493) (0.000117) (0.000125)
Constant 4.051*** 1.662*** 1.665***
(0.00614) (0.0276) (0.0269)
Firm FE No No No Yes No
Year FE No No No Yes No
Firm-year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5564494 5562620 5562620 5556516 5228428
R2 0.016 0.512 0.512 0.667 0.824
Note: Thewage is the log daily wage obtained as the sumof annual earnings and bonus payments (censored
at the social security contribution limit) in the year divided by the number of days worked. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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no significance, this is clearly the case for the number of years since the first hiring.
Table 3.5: Impact of the Number of Hirings on the Probability to Leave the Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave
No. prev. hirings 0.0000499 -0.000125 -0.0000331 0.0000892 -0.0000304
(0.000196) (0.000171) (0.000145) (0.0000980) (0.0000892)
Prev. wage -0.0186*** -0.0181*** -0.0342*** -0.0291***
(0.00274) (0.00263) (0.00152) (0.00154)
Spell duration (days) -0.0000373*** -0.0000374*** -0.0000226*** -0.0000200***
(0.000000795) (0.000000786) (0.000000500) (0.000000471)
Age 0.00384*** 0.00382*** 0.00914*** 0.0151***
(0.000247) (0.000241) (0.00124) (0.000237)
Female -0.0181*** -0.0179*** -0.0148*** -0.0101***
(0.00280) (0.00274) (0.00141) (0.00145)
Austrian -0.0259*** -0.0258*** 0.0253*** 0.0209***
(0.00314) (0.00314) (0.00147) (0.00132)
Avg. prev. hirings -0.000607** 0.000115 0.000230*
(0.000244) (0.000130) (0.000136)
Constant 0.263*** 0.377*** 0.377***
(0.00215) (0.0112) (0.0109)
Firm FE No No No Yes No
Year FE No No No Yes No
Firm-year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5642235 5640249 5640249 5634173 5298454
R2 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.150 0.347
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that turns on if the worker leaves the firm in period t+ 1. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
Finally, I examine how the impact of hiring experience onwages evolves over the job spell. I
modify the model in Equation 3.3 to incorporate interactions between the measure of hiring
experience and dummy variables for each year of tenure. In Figures 3.3 to 3.5 I display log
daily wage profiles over tenure for different levels of hiring experience with respect to the
source firm. All other covariates are displayed at their mean, including the firm and year fixed
effects in Figure 3.4 and firm × year fixed effects in Figure 3.5. All graphs indicate a clear
premium in starting wage levels for workers from source firms that are known to the hiring
firm through previous hirings, conditional onworker characteristics and employment history.
The increase in wages with tenure, however, is less steep for these workers such that the slope
is very similar after 10 to 15 years. The course of the wage-tenure profiles is consistent with
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Table 3.6: Impact of the Number of Years of Hiring Experience on the Probability to Leave the Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave
No. prev. years 0.000244 -0.00102*** -0.000925*** -0.000725*** -0.00141***
(0.000316) (0.000311) (0.000305) (0.000138) (0.000136)
Prev. wage -0.0185*** -0.0179*** -0.0339*** -0.0286***
(0.00280) (0.00264) (0.00152) (0.00154)
Spell duration (days) -0.0000372*** -0.0000372*** -0.0000224*** -0.0000198***
(0.000000805) (0.000000787) (0.000000499) (0.000000471)
Age 0.00406*** 0.00403*** 0.00925*** 0.0154***
(0.000264) (0.000258) (0.00125) (0.000228)
Female -0.0181*** -0.0178*** -0.0148*** -0.00997***
(0.00280) (0.00271) (0.00141) (0.00146)
Austrian -0.0261*** -0.0260*** 0.0252*** 0.0207***
(0.00314) (0.00314) (0.00147) (0.00132)
Avg. prev. hirings -0.000585** 0.000133 0.000236*
(0.000258) (0.000132) (0.000136)
Constant 0.263*** 0.377*** 0.376***
(0.00224) (0.0114) (0.0110)
Firm FE No No No Yes No
Year FE No No No Yes No
Firm-year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5642235 5640249 5640249 5634173 5298454
R2 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.150 0.347
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator that turns on if the worker leaves the firm in period t+ 1. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
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our hypothesis of information advantages through hiring from well-known firms that are
diminished by learning about individual match quality over time. In the next section, I set
up a theoretical model that incorporates uncertainties about match quality and a learning
mechanism about the average quality of workers fromdifferent sources in order to rationalize
the empirical results.
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Figure 3.3: Wage-tenure Proﬁle in Hiring Firms at Different Levels of Hiring Experience
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Figure 3.4: Wage-tenure Proﬁle in Hiring Firms at Different Levels of Hiring Experience –with Firm and Year Fixed Effects
3.3 Model
This section presents the search and matching model, characterizes the equilibrium and de-
rives its main testable predictions.
129
3. Sourcing, Learning, and Matching in Labor Markets
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
lo
g 
wa
ge
0 10 20 30 40
tenure
no prev hirings 5 prev workers
10 prev workers 15 prev workers
20 prev workers 50 prev workers
100 prev workers
Figure 3.5: Wage-tenure Proﬁle in Hiring Firms at Different Levels of Hiring Experience –with Firm× Year Fixed Effects
3.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete. There is a homogeneous population of risk-neutral young workers of mass
n that enter the labormarket with no previous labormarket experience. There are three firms
of three different types, i ∈ {a, b, c}. They discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). Posting a
vacancy, v, to find a worker imposes a per period cost of kv to the firm.
The workers start unemployed and are randomly employed by one of these three firms.
Each firm provides the workers with some training, which is also valuable for working at one
of the other firms. Hence, workers gain some labormarket experience that can be relevant for
alternative job opportunities. In particular, the firms are related to each another according to
the network structure described in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Network Structure
a b c
a 0.5(μl + μh) μh μl
b μh 0.5(μl + μh) μh
c μl μh 0.5(μl + μh)
Table 3.7 indicates that a worker trained at firm a receives relevant market experience to
potentially be a highmatch with firm b, while the skills learned at firm a are unlikely to be val-
ued at firm c. For simplicity, I assume that the network is symmetric. To allow for individual
worker heterogeneity, I assume that match qualities are drawn from a normal distribution
N(μτ, σ2), where τ ∈ {l, h} and μl < μh (see Figure 3.6). Hence, training at a specific firm
affects themean of the distribution ofmatch qualities, which changes depending on the pairs
of firms. I assume that the productivity of thematch between theworker and his starting firm
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is fixed to be 0.5(μl + μh): the distribution of match qualities for workers who stay at their
starting firm is degenerate at 0.5(μl + μh). It is important to emphasize that the different
levels of the mean of the distributions, μ ∈ {μl, μh}, are not indicative of the firms’ produc-
tivities and they just represent the complementarities of the skills accumulated by the worker
in one firm for production in an alternative firm.
Figure 3.6:N(μτ, σ2), τ ∈ {l, h}
To summarize, when firm ameets a worker from firm b, the worker and the firm draw the
quality of their match from the distributionN(μh, σ2). Instead, when firm ameets a worker
from firm c, the worker and the firm draw the quality of their match from the distribution
N(μl, σ2). Finally, thematch quality between firm a and a worker trained at firm a is 0.5(μl+
μh).
I focus on job-to-job transitions. Workers can be unemployed, in a “training state” at the
starting firm or they can find a job at a different firm. I introduce two frictions. First, infor-
mation frictions, whereby workers and firms do not know the worker’s type. In particular,
workers are ex-ante homogeneous. Once each worker gets his first job, his match quality with
the other firms is unknown: the match is entirely an experience good. However, the match
quality of workers that are at their starting firm is known and takes the value of 0.5(μl + μh).
Hence, the match is uncertain only in the case that the worker changes firm after his starting
firm from which he receives training.
Second, there are search frictions. I assume a constant returns to scale matching function,
m(vi, n), where n is the number of workers, who can be either unemployed or employed,
and vi is the number of vacancies created by firm of type i, where i ∈ {a, b, c}. A worker,
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employed or unemployed, meets a vacant job in firm iwith probability pi = m/n. A vacancy
meets a worker with probability qi = m/vi. Constant returns to scale implies that pi and qi
are functions only of the ratio vi/n. I also assume two boundary conditions: as vi/n → ∞,
pi → 1 and qi → 0, and as vi/n→ 0, pi → 0 and qi → 1.
The unit of production is a matched worker-firm pair. The observed output of a match is
given by:
y˜ij = yij + ε
for firm type i ∈ {a, b, c} and for anyworkerwho received training at a different starting firm,
j ̸= i. True match quality is yij and, depending on the hiring firm-source firm combination,
match quality is drawn from a normal distribution withmean μτ and variance σ2, τ ∈ {l, h};
ε is a mean-zero independently and identically distributed random variable, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
The role of the “noise” term ε is to prevent firms and workers from perfectly inferring match
quality immediately after first producing.
There are two different albeit related learning processes. The first concerns learning about
the idiosyncratic match quality and evolves according to the firm-worker pair. If a worker
and firm decide to form a match, they attempt to infer its quality from the observed match
outputs. Learning takes a simple “all-or-nothing” form: each period, firms and workers fully
learn about theworker’s true productivitywith probability α. The quality of amatch is persis-
tent – a goodmatch remains good and a badmatch remains bad – as long as it remains intact
given the exogenous job destruction rate, δ. Moreover, firms do not know if the distribution
of match qualities has a low or a high mean. This second type of learning, about the mean of
the distribution, is not match-specific but it is source firm-specific: it is a belief on the average
match quality of all the workers hired from the same starting firm. Firm i has a prior belief
on the probability of the mean being high, Prob(μij = μh), which it updates to πij using the
true match qualities, once they are fully revealed, and Bayes’ rule.
Hence, there are two sources of uncertainty: the quality of the specificmatch and the value
of the mean of its distribution, which depends on the hiring firm-source firm combination.
First, firms andworkers use the signal, y˜ij, to update their belief about the worker’s idiosyn-
cratic productivity. Denote the updated belief of the match quality as mij = E(yij|y˜ij,πij),
where πij is the employer’s belief on the probability that the mean of the distribution is high.
Denote the distribution of expected match qualities asG(mij|πij). Note that:5
mij|πij ∼ πijN
(
μh,
σ4
σ2 + σ2ε
)
+ (1− πij)N
(
μl,
σ4
σ2 + σ2ε
)
(3.4)
5See the derivations in Appendix A.
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Hence, expected match qualities follow a mixture distribution of two normals with mean:
E(mij|πij) = μ˜ = πijμh + (1− πij)μl (3.5)
and variance:
V(mij|πij) = σ
4
σ2 + σ2ε
+ πijμ2h + (1− πij)μ2l − (πijμh + (1− πij)μl)2 (3.6)
Moreover, firms learn about the probability that themean of the distribution of thematch
qualities with workers coming from a particular source firm is high. This belief on the mean,
instead of being match-specific, is about the hiring firm-source firm combination. It is set
on a prior of Prob(μij = μh) = 0.5 and is updated to πij using Bayes’ rule once true
match qualities are fully revealed. Note that the mean is a discrete random variable: it can
take only two values, μ ∈ {μl, μh}. On the other hand, true match quality, y, is a con-
tinuous random variable taken from the normal distribution, N(μτ, σ2), τ ∈ {l, h}. Since
the belief about the mean takes into account the realizations of match quality for all workers
hired from a specific source firm, Bayes’ rule is computed using the mean of the realizations,
y¯ij ∼ N(μτ, σ2/ny¯), τ ∈ {l, h} where ny¯ is the total number of matches whose true quality
is revealed. Hence, as the true productivity of a worker hired from firm j is revealed, firm i
updates its belief to:
πij = Prob(μij = μh|y¯ij) =
Prob(μij = μh)f(y¯ij|μij = μh)∑
μ′ Prob(μij = μ′)f(y¯ij|μij = μ′)
(3.7)
whereProb(μij = μh) is the unconditional probability that themean is high and it is equal to
0.5 at the start and f(y¯ij|μij = μh) is theprobability density functionof the samplemeanof the
realizations of true match qualities given the mean is high, f(y¯ij|μij = μh) = N(μh, σ2/ny¯).
Figure 3.7 graphically shows how the belief about the mean is updated as the firm learns the
true match quality of one additional worker each period.
LetF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij) denote the distribution of theworker’s productivity yij, given that the
signal is y˜ij and that the belief that themean is high isπij. SinceF(·) is amixture of twonormal
distribution it can be characterized by the three parameters of themean,mij, the variance, σ2ij,1
and the mixing probability, πij.
Using the formula for the conditional Gaussian model and considering that F(·) is a mix-
ture distribution I obtain that6 (Brockwell and Davis, 2016):
F(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij) = πijN
(μhσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
,
σ2σ2ε
σ2 + σ2ε
)
+ (1− πij)N
(μlσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
,
σ2σ2ε
σ2 + σ2ε
)
(3.8)
6See the derivations in Appendix A.
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Note: The plots show the pdf of a normal distribution withμh = 1 and σ2 = 1,N(1, 1). The ﬁrm learns if themean is high,
μh = 1, or low,μl = 0, whereπ is the belief that themean is high. The vertical line represents the expectation of the
mean conditional onπ, whereπ is updated using Equation 3.7 and the ﬁrm learns the true productivity of one newworker
each period, i.e ny¯ = 1. Above each plot, it is indicated the value ofπ that corresponds to the conditional expectation. The
initial value ofπ is taken to be equal to 0.5.
Figure 3.7: Learning about theMean
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Hence the mean is:
mij = E(yij|y˜ij,πij) = πij
μhσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
+ (1− πij)
μlσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
(3.9)
and the variance is:
σ2ij,1 = Var(yij|y˜ij,πij) =
σ2σ2ε
σ2 + σ2ε
+ πij
(μhσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
)2
+ (1− πij)
(μlσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
)2
(3.10)
−
(
πij
(μhσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
)
+ (1− πij)
(μlσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
))2
Wage Bargaining
In the case of employed workers, any new firm a worker comes in contact with perfectly ob-
serves the wage and the expected productivity of his current match and it receives a signal
about the productivity of the potential match. The two firms play an English first-price auc-
tion and the auction ends after a firm fails to raise the last bid. The worker then receives the
highest bid (lump-sum transfer) in exchange for giving up the contract with the losing firm
and restarting Nash bargaining with the winner.
Hence, if a firm meets an employed worker, I use a generalized Nash bargaining solution
for the wage in which the worker’s threat point is the value of being unemployed, the firm’s
threat point is the value of an unmatched employment position, and the worker’s share of
the surplus is γ. Given the lump sum transfers by firms and the fact that on-the-job search
is costless to the worker, wages set by the Nash bargaining linear sharing rule still satisfy the
Nash efficiency axiom (Moscarini, 2005).
In the case of unemployed workers, I assume that firms have all the bargaining power and
thus that the wage offered to an unemployed worker reflects just the value of leisure. The
assumption that unemployed workers have no bargaining power may seem restrictive. How-
ever, there are at least two reasons that justify the choice. First, I assume that part of the
worker’s gain from being employed is to receive on-the-job training. Workers in the unem-
ployment pool are inexperienced and a job can train them to then have the opportunity of
better job prospects. Secondly, workers that are hired from the unemployment pool can po-
tentially be poached away by competitors so that the employer suffers an unrecoverable loss.
Giving all the bargaining power to the firm attenuates this cost.
Timing
The timing of the events in each period is as follows. Each firm can hire workers both from
the unemployment pool and from the other firms. Workers start unemployed and meet jobs
from any of the three firms. In this case, match quality is known, the firm offers a wage that
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makes workers indifferent between accepting the job and staying unemployed and workers
accept the job offer.
In case theworker is poached from another firm, the poaching firm and theworker observe
a signal about the quality of thematch and the firmmakes a wage offer. If the worker accepts,
in the next period, the worker and the firm learn the productivity of the match with proba-
bility α and the firm updates its belief about the mean of the distribution of match qualities
for the workers from a given source firm. The firm then makes a new wage offer and, if the
employee turns it down, he becomes unemployed, and the position becomes vacant. I assume
that, if a worker becomes unemployed, the skills learned at his training firm are lost and the
worker would need to be trained again. Finally, each period, every match can be hit by a low
productivity shock with probability δ, which will destroy it.
Starting Firm
Aworker starts unemployed and can find a job at one of the three firms where he receives on
the job training, match quality is
(
0.5μl + 0.5μh
)
and there is no match uncertainty. The
worker at starting firm i earns a wage wii and, with probability pj, he receives an alternative
job offer from firm j ̸= i. The value function of a worker in the starting firm is:
Wii = wii+β(1− δ)
(
pjEmax
(
Wji,1,Wii
)
+ pkEmax
(
Wki,1,Wii
)
+ (1− pj − pk)Wii
)
(3.11)
+ βδU
for i ∈ {a, b, c} and i ̸= j ̸= k. The notation is such thatWii stands for the value function
of a worker trained at firm i and currently employed at firm i andWji,1 stands for the value
function of a worker being poached by firm j from firm i at the beginning of the employment
spell.
The firmwith an inexperiencedworker earns
(
0.5μl + 0.5μh
)−wii and can lose theworker
if he is poached by another firm. The value function of a firm with a worker hired from the
unemployment pool is:
Jii =
(
0.5μl + 0.5μh
)− wii + β(1− δ) (1− pj1{Wji,1 > Wii} − pk1{Wki,1 > Wii}) Jii
(3.12)
where i ∈ {a, b, c} and 1 is an indicator function so 1{Wji,1 > Wii} = 1 only if a worker
accepts an outside offer from firm j. I used the fact that free entry drives the value of vacancy
to zero, Vi = 0.
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The value function for being unemployed is:
U = b+ βpamax (Waa,U) + βpbmax (Wbb,U) + βpcmax (Wcc,U) (3.13)
+ β(1− pa − pb − pc)U
where b is the unemployment benefit.
Firms post vacancies which can be filled either by employed workers or by unemployed
ones. The value of a vacancy is given by:
Vi = −kv + β
(
qi
nj
n E max(Jij,1,Vi) + qi
nk
n E max(Jik,1,Vi) + qi
u
nE max(Jii,Vi)
)
(3.14)
+ β(1− qi
nj + nk + u
n )Vi
where i ∈ {a, b, c}, i ̸= j ̸= k and ni is the number of workers employed at firm i.
I assume that when firms meet an unemployed worker, they have all the bargaining power
and thus that the wage offered to an unemployed worker reflects just the value of leisure.
The wage will be that which equals the value of working and the value of being unemployed,
Wii = U.
Poaching ﬁrm
I now consider the value functions in the case aworker is poached fromhis starting firmby an-
other firm. In this case, match quality is uncertain and it is drawn from a normal distribution,
which, depending on the hiring firm-source firm pair, has a high or lowmean, μ ∈ {μl, μh}.
Given the initial signal about match quality, a worker can choose to leave his starting firm
to work at the new firm. Once the match quality is revealed, if too low, the worker chooses
to quit the job and join the unemployment pool and, if high enough, the worker continues
working at the firm. At this point, working at the poaching firm after the match quality is
revealed is an absorbing state: the worker works at the firm as long as the job is not destroyed
and there is nopossibility of changing firm againwithout first becomingunemployed. Hence,
a worker can be poached away by another firm only if he is working at the firm that hired him
from the unemployment pool and trained him.
Poaching auction
When the employed worker comes into contact with a new firm, the two firms immediately
play the English first-price auction and the auction ends after a firm fails to raise the last bid.
Let Ωij denote the final bid of poaching firm i against firm j. Necessarily, Ωij ∈ [Wij,1, Sij,1]
for the bid to be acceptable both to the bidding firm and to the worker, where Wij,1 is the
value of working at firm i having previously worked at firm j, given that match quality has
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not been revealed yet, and Sij,1 denotes the surplus of the match, given that match quality has
not been revealed yet. The bid is the sum of a lump-sum transfer ωij = Ωij−Wij,1 and of the
promise, worthWij,1 to the worker, to match, produce output and bargain bilaterally from
then on. The auction is a symmetric information game in extensive form and the following
strategies are a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game: each firm bids just the bargaining
value Ωij = Wij,1 and no lump-sum transfer ωij = 0. This equilibrium is supported by the
threat of the more productive of the two firms to outbid the competitor at the next round
(Moscarini, 2005).
Stage 2
I start with the value functions for being in a match with the poaching firm, once the true
match quality has been realized. With probability (1− δ), thematch survives and the value of
thematch remains unchanged. With probability δ, the job is destroyed for exogenous reasons.
The worker’s and firm’s value functions,Wij,2 and Jij,2 are:
Wij,2 = wij,2 + β(1− δ)Wij,2 + βδU (3.15)
Jij,2 = yij − wij,2 + β(1− δ)Jij,2 (3.16)
where wij,2 is the wage offered to the worker, Wij,2 indicates the value function of a worker
poached by firm i from firm jwhen the productivity of the match has been fully revealed and
Jij,2 is defined similarly with respect to the firm’s side.
Wages are determined by:
Wij,2 − U = γ(Wij,2 − U+ Jij,2) (3.17)
where I use the fact that Vi = 0 due to free entry. There is a reservation match quality, y∗
such that, if y > y∗, the worker prefers to stay at the firm and the firm chooses to keep the
worker.
Stage 1
Each firm canmeetworkers that come from twodistinct source firms. For example, firm a can
meet a worker from firm b or from firm c. Considering firm a, the mean of the distribution
of workers from firm b is μh while it is μl for workers from firm c.
As they meet, the worker from firm j and firm i observe a signal and compute the expected
productivity of the match, mij. If hired, the worker earns wij,1 in the current period. Next
period, the job is destroyed for exogenous reasons with probability δ. With probability (1 −
δ)(1 − α), the job survives, the firm and the worker receive no new information about the
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worker’s productivity, and the worker’s value of the match remains unchanged. Finally, with
probability α(1 − δ), the job survives and the worker’s productivity is revealed. In this case,
the worker chooses between staying at the current firm or quitting the job and becoming
unemployed. The worker’s value of the match is given by:
Wij,1 = wij,1+β(1− α)(1− δ)Wij,1 (3.18)
+ βα(1− δ)
∫
max(Wij,2,U)dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij) + βδU
where i ∈ {a, b, c} is the firm where the worker is currently employed and j ̸= i is the firm
where he was trained.
The firm’s value of the match is:
Jij,1 = mij − wij,1+β(1− α)(1− δ)Jij,1 (3.19)
+ βα(1− δ)
∫
max(Jij,2, 0)dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining where the worker’s outside option is the value
of unemployment:
Wij,1 − U = γ(Wij,1 − U+ Jij,1) (3.20)
There is a reservation expectedmatch quality,m∗ij such that, ifmij > m∗ij, theworker prefers
to stay at the new firm and the firm chooses to hire the worker.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
Reservationmatch qualities
I solve for the reservation match qualities and reservation expected match qualities for the
poached workers in Stage 2 and Stage 1.
Considering first the reservationmatch qualities (Stage 2), workers stay with the firm if the
total surplus of the match Sij,2 = Wij,2 − U+ Jij,2 is positive. RearrangingWij,2 and Jij,2 and
adding them up yields:
Sij,2 =
yij − (1− β)U
1− β(1− δ)
It follows that the reservation match quality is:
y∗ = (1− β)U (3.21)
Note that the reservation match quality does not depend on the hiring firm-source firm
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pair but only depends on the value of being unemployed.
Next, I consider the reservation expectedmatchqualities (Stage 1). Workers choose tomove
to the poaching firm if the total surplus of the match Sij,1 = Wij,1 − U + Jij,1 is positive7.
RearrangingWij,1 and Jij,1, adding them up and using y∗ = (1− β)U, yields:
Sij,1 =
mij − y∗ + αβ(1−δ)1−β(1−δ)
∫∞
y∗ (yij − y∗)dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)
1− β(1− α)(1− δ)
Hence, the reservation expected match quality is:
m∗ij = y∗ −
αβ(1− δ)
1− β(1− δ)
∫ ∞
y∗
(yij − y∗)dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij) (3.22)
Note that the reservation expected match quality depends on both the hiring firm and the
source firm.
Learning about themean
Tobetter understand how learning about themean of the distribution interacts with learning
about the idiosyncratic match quality, I establish some results, which follow from the formu-
las of the distributions. Figure 3.8 shows themixture of twonormal distributions for different
values of the mixing probability and graphically illustrates the points below.
• The higher the belief that the mean is high, πij, the higher the conditional expectation
of match qualities, E(yij|y˜ij,πij) = mij.
• The more uncertain the belief that the mean is high, i.e. the closer πij is to 0.5, the
higher the conditional variance of match qualities, V(yij|y˜ij,πij).
• The higher the belief that the mean is high, πij, the higher the expectation of expected
match quality, E(mij|πij).
• The more uncertain the belief that the mean is high, i.e. the closer πij is to 0.5, the
higher the variance of the expected match qualities, V(mij|πij).
• The higher the belief that the mean of the distribution is high, πij, the lower the reser-
vation expected match quality,m∗ij. The intuition follows from the fact that firms and
workers are willing to accept worse matches the greater the expectation that the mean
of the distribution is high. In fact, with the additional learning process about themean,
the firm relies less on the signal about the idiosyncratic match quality, y˜ij. For instance,
7I have assumed that the wage in the starting firm is such thatWii = U.
140
3.3 Model
Note: The ﬁgure shows the probability density function of themixture of two normal distributions,
πN(1, 1) + (1− π)N(0, 1), for different values of themixing probability,π = 0.9 orπ = 0.5. Whenπ = 0.5, the
distribution is shifted to the left (lowermean) and has fatter tails (higher variance).
Figure 3.8: Mixture of TwoNormal Distributions, Different Values ofπ
assuming the firm knows that there is a high probability that the mean is high, a low
signalmay just be due to the noise term. Similarly, the lower the belief that themean of
the distribution is high, πij, the higher the reservation expected match quality. In this
case, the firm requires a high signal for the quality of thematch since there is a plausible
chance that true match quality will be low.
• The reservationmatch quality, y∗, does not depend on the belief that the mean is high,
πij, since at that point the productivity of the match is fully revealed.
Steady-state ﬂows
In steady state, the outflow of workers from firm j is equal to the inflow of workers into firm
j, j ∈ {a, b, c}, so that each firm has a constant fraction of the total workers. Note that, in
steady state, each firm has fully learned about the mean of the distributions of the workers
hired from its source firms and only the first learning process, about the idiosyncratic match
quality, remains active.
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For any firm i, the outflow of workers is equal to:
outflowi = δni + (1− δ)pj(1− G(m∗ji|πji))ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
nji
+(1− δ)pk(1− G(m∗ki|πki))ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
nki
(3.23)
+ α(1− δ)
∑
j̸=i
(∫ ∞
m∗ij
∫ y∗
−∞
dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)nij
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
)
where j ̸= k ̸= i, and ni is the total number of workers employed at firm i.
The inflow of workers is equal to:
inflowi = piu+ (1− δ)pi(1− G(m∗ij|πij))nj︸ ︷︷ ︸
nij
+(1− δ)pi(1− G(m∗ik|πik))nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
nik
(3.24)
The outflows from unemployment are:
outflowsu = pu (3.25)
where p = pa + pb + pc.
The inflows into unemployment are given by:
inflowsu = δ(na + nb + nc) (3.26)
+ α(1− δ)
∑
i
∑
j̸=i
(∫ ∞
m∗ij
∫ y∗
−∞
dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)nij
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
)
By equating outflows (Equation 3.23) and inflows (Equation 3.24) respectively for each firm
I obtain the number of workers in each firm, ni, i ∈ {a, b, c}. The number of unemployed
workers is given by equating Equation 3.25 with Equation 3.26. Finally, the number of vacan-
cies for each firm, vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}, is pinned down by the free entry condition and Equation
3.14.
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Wages
Using Equations 3.11-3.13 andWii = U, the average wage of a worker hired from the unem-
ployment pool is:
w¯ii = (1− β(1− δ)(1− pj − pk)− βδ) b1− β (3.27)
− β(1− δ)γ
(
pj
(∫∞m∗ji (mji − y∗ + αβ(1−δ)1−β(1−δ) ∫∞y∗ (yji − y∗)dF(y|mji, σ2ji,1,πji))dG(mji|πji)
1− β(1− α)(1− δ)
)
+ pk
(∫∞m∗ki (mki − y∗ + αβ(1−δ)1−β(1−δ) ∫∞y∗ (yki − y∗)dF(y|mki, σ2ki,1,πki))dG(mki|πki)
1− β(1− α)(1− δ)
))
Using Equations 3.18-3.20, the average wage of the workers in the poaching firm whose
productivity has not been revealed yet is given by:
w¯ij,1 =
∫∞
m∗ij
wij,1dG(mij|πij)
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
(3.28)
=
γ
∫∞
m∗ij
mijdG(mij|πij)
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
+ (1− β)(1− γ)U
Using Equations 3.15-3.17, the average wage of the workers whose productivity has been
revealed:
w¯ij,2 =
∫∞
m∗ij
∫∞
y∗ wij,2dF(y|mij,σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)
1−F(y∗|mij,σ2ij,1,πij)
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
(3.29)
=
γ
∫∞
m∗ij
∫∞
y∗ yijdF(y|mij,σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)
1−F(y∗|mij,σ2ij,1,πij),πij
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
+ (1− β)(1− γ)U
Turnover
The worker can leave his current firm for three different reasons. First, the worker leaves the
starting firm in case of an alternative offer from a poaching firm. Second, the worker leaves
the poaching firm if, upon the discovery of the true match quality, the productivity of the
match is too low. Finally, in both cases, the job can be destroyed, in which case the worker
becomes unemployed.
The probability that a worker leaves his starting firm next period is:
Probii = δ+ (1− δ)
(
pj
∫ ∞
m∗ji
dG(mji|πji) + pk
∫ ∞
m∗ki
dG(mki|πki)
)
(3.30)
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where i ̸= j ̸= k.
The probability that a worker whose productivity has not been revealed yet leaves the
poaching firm in the next period is:
Probij = δ+
α(1− δ) ∫∞m∗ij ∫ y∗−∞ dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)∫∞
m∗ij
dG(mij|πij)
(3.31)
The probability that a worker whose productivity has been revealed leaves the poaching
firm in the next period is δ.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
I choose the time period to be one year. I assume a constant returns to scale matching func-
tion,m(n, vi) = nηv1−ηi . I normalize themean of the low productivity distribution to μl = 0.
I select the value of μh to minimize the squared distance between the model and the data
moment of the starting wage differential depending on the hiring experience of the firm (see
Figure 3.3 in the empirical section).8 The variance of productivity, σ2, and of the noise, σ2ε , are
taken fromNagypál (2007), who estimates the parameters based on a structural model using
French data. The learning rate, α, is taken from Lange (2007), who empirically estimates the
speed of employer learning using US data. The remaining exogenous parameters are taken
fromBorovicková (2016), who estimates an equilibriummodel of the labormarket with Aus-
trian data.9 I follow the literature and set workers’ bargaining power, γ, equal to the match
elasticity (Pries and Rogerson, 2005). Table 3.8 lists the values of the exogenous parameters
of the model.
To compute the model moments, I first compute the endogenous variables, y∗, m∗ij, ni, u,
vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}, of the model for the parameter values in Table 3.8.
These are the Equations that determine these variables:
• The reservation expected match qualities of workers,m∗ij, are given by Equation 3.22.
• The reservationmatch quality of workers, y∗, is given by Equation 3.21. Plugging in the
value of unemployment and noting that wages are set such that,Wii = U:
y∗ = (1− β)U
= b
8I consider the difference in the log daily wages between the case of a hiring experience of 100 previous work-
ers compared to the case of no previous hirings (Figure 3.3).
9Borovicková (2016) uses the same data of this paper, the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD).
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Table 3.8: Calibration
Parameter Description Value Source
β Discount factor 0.9542 Borovicková (2016)
b Unemployment benefit 0.24 Borovicková (2016)
kv Cost vacancy
Calibrated to match steady-state un-
employment, 0.12 (Borovicková, 2016)
η Match elasticity 0.5 Borovicková (2016)
α Rate at which match quality is revealed 0.2592 Lange (2007)
δ Rate of exogenous job destruction 0.1032 Borovicková (2016)
γ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990)
μl LowMean Productivity 0 Normalization
σ2 Variance of Productivity 0.3920 Nagypál (2007)
σ2ε Variance of the noise 1.0574 Nagypál (2007)
• The free entry condition and Equation 3.14:
kv = β(1− γ)qi
(
nj
s
(∫∞m∗ij mij−y∗+ αβ(1−δ)1−β(1−δ) ∫∞y∗ (yij−y∗)dF(y|mij,σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)1−G(m∗ij |πij)
1− β(1− α)(1− δ)
)
+
nk
s
(∫∞m∗ik mik−y∗+ αβ(1−δ)1−β(1−δ) ∫∞y∗ (yik−y∗)dF(y|mik,σ2ik,1,πik)dG(mik)1−G(m∗ik|πik)
1− β(1− α)(1− δ)
)
+
u
s
( 0.5μl + 0.5μh − wii
1− β(1− δ)(1− pj(1− G(m∗ji|πji))− pk(1− G(m∗ki|πki)))
))
where the wage, wii, is given by Equation 3.27.
• The equality of the outflow of workers out of unemployment, given by Equation 3.25,
and the inflow of workers into unemployment, given by Equation 3.26:
(pa + pb + pc)u = δ(na + nb + nc)
+ α(1− δ)
∑
i
∑
j̸=i
(∫ ∞
m∗ij
∫ y∗
−∞
dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)nij
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
)
• The equality of the outflow of workers out of a firm, given by Equation 3.23, and the
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inflow of workers into a firm, given by Equation 3.24:
δni + (1− δ)pj(1− G(m∗ji|πji))ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
nji
+(1− δ)pk(1− G(m∗ki|πki))ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
nki
+ α(1− δ)
∑
j̸=i
(∫ ∞
m∗ij
∫ y∗
−∞
dF(y|mij, σ2ij,1,πij)dG(mij|πij)nij
1− G(m∗ij|πij)
)
= piu+ (1− δ)pi(1− G(m∗ij|πij))nj︸ ︷︷ ︸
nij
+(1− δ)pi(1− G(m∗ik|πik))nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
nik
• The matching technology gives pj = ( vjn )(1−η) and qj = (
n
vj )
η.
3.4.2 Quantitative Results
I am interested in analyzing theworker flows and thewage and turnover outcomes. Regarding
the worker flows, I look at the proportion of the workers employed in a firm that is poached
away from another firm. The number of workers employed in firm i poached from firm j,
nij, is given by: nij = (1 − δ)pi(1 − G(m∗ij|πij))nj. Table 3.9 compares the results between
the steady-state where the firm has fully learned about the mean of the distributions and the
steady statewhere the learningmechanism is shut down and the firmbelieves there is an equal
chance that the mean is high or low (π = 0.5). First, when π = 0.5, firms do not discrimi-
nate between their sources and they poach the same proportion of workers from all of them.
However, when they fully learn, hiring gets more concentrated and, considering the network
structure ofTable 3.7, the results are intuitive. Firm apoachesmoreworkers from firm b, with
whom the distribution of match qualities has a high mean, compared to firm c, with whom
the distribution of match qualities has a low mean. The ratio of the workers hired by firm a
from firm b to the workers hired from firm c is above 2:1. Given the symmetric network struc-
ture, firm c is the analogue of firm a. Instead, firm b poaches the same amount of workers
from firm a and firm c since both firms train their workers to acquire the skills that are highly
valued by firm b.10
Secondly, I considerworker turnover. The probability that aworker leaves his starting firm
next period is given by Equation 3.30. The probability of separation for a worker whose pro-
ductivity has not been revealed yet is given by Equation 3.31. Once productivity is revealed,
theworker leaves the firm only in case of job destruction, which occurs with probability δ and
is the same for all workers regardless of their starting firm. In Table 3.9 I compute the proba-
bility of leaving the starting firm, Probii, i ∈ {a, b, c}, as well as the probability of leaving the
poaching firm, given the productivity of the match has not been revealed yet, Probij, i ̸= j.
By the symmetry of the network structure (c.f. Table 3.7), I have that Probij = Probji. In
10The distribution of match qualities has a high mean in both cases.
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Table 3.9: EstimatedMoments (Steady-state)
Moment Value (π = 0.5) Value
nab 33.27% 33.03%
nac 33.27% 11.35%
nba 33.27% 20.96%
nbc 33.27% 20.96%
nca 33.27% 11.35%
ncb 33.27% 33.03%
Probaa 0.7686 0.5401
Probbb 0.7686 0.5316
Probcc 0.7686 0.5401
Probab = Probba 0.1768 0.1047
Probac = Probca 0.1768 0.2678
Probbc = Probcb 0.1768 0.1047
fact, what discriminates between the different cases is whether the hiring firm-source firm
combination is high or low.
When the firm does not know about the true mean of the distributions, the probabil-
ity of leaving a starting or a poaching firm does not change across the different firms (Ta-
ble 3.9). However, this is no longer the case when the firm knows the mean of the distri-
butions. Considering the probability of leaving a poaching firm, it is more than two times
more likely that a worker who is poached by firm a/c from firm c/a leaves the poaching
firm compared to the other two combinations. Indeed, this is the case where the hiring
firm-source firm combination has a low mean distribution of match qualities. Moreover,
Probab = Probba = Probbc = Probcb (Probac = Probca) is greater (lower) when π = 0.5
than when π = 1.
Turning to the probability of leaving the starting firm, I need to take into account two con-
trasting effects. First, the training received at firm b is valued both at firm a and c, which points
to a higher chance that theworkers trained at firm b leave the firm for a better job opportunity
at either firm a or firm c. However, at the same time, firm b can have profitable matches with
the workers trained both at firm a and at firm c, encouraging firm b to post a higher number
of vacancies. In this case, the second effect dominates leading to a slightly higher probabil-
ity of separation from firm a and c compared to firm b since workers from firm a and c have
a greater chance of finding an alternative job opportunity given the relatively high vacancy
posting of firm b. By the symmetry of the network structure, the probability of leaving firm
a is the same as the probability of leaving firm c.
Finally, in all the hiring firm-source firm combinations, the probability that a worker leaves
the poaching firm given that true productivity has not been revealed yet is higher than the
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probability that a worker leaves the poaching firm given that true productivity has been re-
vealed, which, in all cases, is given by δ = 0.1032.
Considering the wages, for each firm i hiring workers from firm j ̸= i, I calculate the differ-
ence between the average wage when the firm has fully learned about the mean of the dis-
tribution of match qualities and the average wage when the firm does not know the true
value of the mean. I compute the moment both at the beginning of the employment rela-
tionship, when true idiosyncratic productivity is unknown, Δw¯ij,1, and for the subsequent
years of employment, Δw¯ij,av. In the first case, w¯ij,1 is given by Equation 3.28. The mean wage
in subsequent years of the employment relationship, w¯ij,av, is a weighted average of the wage
of workers whose productivity has not been revealed yet, w¯ij,1 (Equation 3.28), and that of
workers whose productivity is known, w¯ij,2 (Equation 3.29). The moment is given by:
w¯ij,av =
(1− α)w¯ij,1 + αδ
∫∞
m∗ij
(
∫∞
y∗ dFij)dGijw¯ij,2∫∞
m∗ij
dGij
(1− α) + αδ
∫∞
m∗ij
(
∫∞
y∗ dFij)dGij∫∞
m∗ij
dGij
Moreover, I look at how the wage difference changes between the two periods. I expect
Δw¯ij,1 − Δw¯ij,av > 0, since, once the firm has learned about the idiosyncratic match quality,
it matters less whether it knows about the mean of the distribution.
The different hiring firm-source firm combinations can be reduced to two cases: the ones
with a high mean distribution of match qualities and those with a lowmean distribution. In
Table 3.10 I illustrate the average wage difference between the case when the firm has learned
the value of the mean of the distributions of match qualities and the case when it has not
(π = 0.5).
Table 3.10: EstimatedWageDifferential
Moment Value
Δw¯h,1 0.2486
Δw¯l,1 -0.2116
Δw¯h,av 0.1718
Δw¯l,av -0.2057
Δw¯h,1 − Δw¯h,av 0.0768
|Δw¯l,1| − |Δw¯l,av| 0.0059
In the high (low) mean case, I find that average starting wages are higher (lower) when the
firm knows that the mean is high (low).11 Moreover, the wage difference declines over time as
11This result always holds although the reservation expected match qualities evolve in the opposite direction.
For example, in the high mean case, the more the firm has learned about the value of the mean, the lower is the
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the firm learns about the true productivity of the specific matches.
3.5 Conclusion
I explore the role of hiring experience a firm gains by repeatedly poaching workers from the
same source firms. Using large-scale matched employer–employee data covering private sec-
tor employment in Austria, I show that more experienced firms hire their employees from a
narrower set of source firms. Experienced hires lead tomore stable employment relations and
higher starting wages. Over time, the information advantage dissipates as firms and workers
learn about actual match quality.
The empirical findings are rationalized by a model of job-to-job flows where match qual-
ity is uncertain and firms learn over time from which firms to source their employees. In the
model, there are two different learning processes. The first is the well-known learning about
the idiosyncraticmatch quality of the firm-worker pair. The second is the employer’s learning
about the mean of the distribution of match qualities for a particular hiring firm-source firm
combination. The model framework assumes that firms are related to each other through a
network of labor flows that expresses skill transferability. Themodel suggests a novel perspec-
tive on the role of employer’s learning about its source firms in shaping the direction of labor
flows and in improving the matching between workers and firms. The more a firm learns
about its source firms, the better the matches of the new hires resulting in higher wages and
lower turnover. However, thewage and turnover advantage dissipates over time as firms learn
about match-specific productivity and bad matches are terminated.
reservation expected match quality. Nonetheless, starting wages are higher. The fact that the higher π shifts the
distribution of expectedmatch qualities to the right dominates unambiguously the fact that the higherπ lowers
the reservation expected match quality.
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3.A Additional Derivations
I show the following conditional normal distributions hold:
1.
m = E(y|y˜) ∼ N
(
μ, σ
4
σ2 + σ2ε
)
2.
y|y˜ ∼ N
(
μσ2ε + y˜σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
,
σ2σ2ε
σ2 + σ2ε
)
Using the formula for the conditional distribution of a bivariate normal:
m = E(y|y˜) = μ+ σ
2
σ2 + σ2ε
(y˜− μ) = μσ
2
ε + σ2y˜
σ2 + σ2ε
Var(m) = Var (y|y˜) = σ
2σ2ε
σ2 + σ2ε
Hence, the distribution of y|y˜ ∼ N( μσ2ε+y˜σ2σ2+σ2ε ,
σ2σ2ε
σ2+σ2ε
).
From the equation above and the property that the random variable y˜− μ = y+ ε− μ is
normal with mean zero and variance (σ2 + σ2ε), it follows thatm (expected match quality) is
itself normally distributed with mean and variance given by:
E(m) = μ
Var(m) = E ((m− μ)2) = E
[
(
σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
(y˜− μ))2
]
=
σ4
σ2 + σ2ε
Given these distributions, the mean and the variance of the mixture distributions with the
mixing probability p are given by:
f(y) ∼ pN(μh, σ2) + (1− p)N(μl, σ2)
Then E(y) = pμh + (1 − p)μl and Var(y) = E(y2) − E(y)2 = p(σ2 + μ2h) + (1 − p)(σ2 +
μ2l )− (pμh + (1− p)μl)2.
Figure 3.A1 plots an example of a mixture distribution of two normal distributions. I con-
sider the mixture of two normal distributions with different means and same standard devia-
tion. Depending on the distance between the two means, μh − μl, the mixture distribution
can become bimodal.
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Figure 3.A1: f(y) = 0.5N(1, 1) + 0.5N(0, 1)
3.B Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.A1 provides summary statistics for the relevant variables in the firm-level data.
Tables 3.A2 and 3.A3 have the same structure as Tables 3.1 and 3.2 but do not impose the
restriction on firm survival.12 While slightly weaker, the impact of firm age is still present and
significant in the full sample. Figures 3.A2 and 3.A3 correspond to Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and show
the profile of the Gini coefficient and of the number of sources over firm age when dummies
for each individual year of firm age are included in the full sample.
Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5 report results for the preferred specification (column 7 of the previ-
ous tables) for 15 different sectors in the economy, i.e., Agriculture and Fishing; Construc-
tion; Education; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Financial Intermediation; Health and
Social Work; Hotels and Restaurants; Manufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; Other com-
munity, Social and Personal service activities; Private households employing domestic staff
and undifferentiated production activities of households for own use; Public administration
and defense; Real Estate and Business Activities; Transport, Storage and Communication;
Wholesale andRetail trade, Repair ofmotor vehicles and personal and household goods. The
strongest effects are present in sectors where uncertainty about worker quality plays a bigger
role, e.g., in Construction, Social and Personal service activities, Real Estate and Business Ac-
tivities, Transport, Storage and Communication, andWholesale and Retail trade.
12These results are not sensitive to changes in the age restriction to 15 or 20 years.
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Table 3.A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75
Gini 682144 .08 .21 0 1 0 0 .07
No. source firms 682144 4.83 5.92 1 280 2 3 5
Firm age 682144 11.36 8.95 1 38 4 9 17
Firm growth 671742 1.91 21.76 -9650 1085 -1 1 4
Firm size 682144 61.32 104.84 5 1213 12 25 61
No. of beginners 682144 5.99 10.5 2 966 2 3 6
Gini NUTS-3 reg. 682144 .49 .41 0 1 .17 .35 1
Gini 4-digit ind. 682144 .19 .3 0 1 0 0 .25
156
3.B Additional Tables and Figures
Ta
bl
e3
.A
2:
Fi
rm
Ag
ea
nd
Gi
ni
Co
ef
ﬁc
ien
t–
Fu
llS
am
pl
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
G
in
i
Fi
rm
ag
e
-0
.00
07
99
***
0.0
00
53
0*
**
0.0
00
66
9*
**
0.0
01
33
***
0.0
01
98
***
0.0
01
65
***
0.0
02
52
***
0.0
03
21
***
0.0
01
28
***
(0
.00
00
40
7)
(0
.00
00
44
3)
(0
.00
00
55
2)
(0
.00
00
64
4)
(0
.00
00
62
7)
(0
.00
00
47
4)
(0
.00
01
28
)
(0
.00
02
79
)
(0
.00
00
45
0)
Fi
rm
gr
ow
th
0.0
26
8*
**
0.0
31
0*
**
0.0
13
1*
**
0.0
06
88
***
0.0
07
09
***
0.0
07
16
***
0.0
05
27
***
(0
.00
04
57
)
(0
.00
04
80
)
(0
.00
04
29
)
(0
.00
03
31
)
(0
.00
03
31
)
(0
.00
03
32
)
(0
.00
03
27
)
Fi
rm
siz
e
-0
.02
95
***
-0
.06
57
***
-0
.04
18
***
-0
.04
32
***
-0
.04
35
***
(0
.00
13
6)
(0
.00
13
5)
(0
.00
09
61
)
(0
.00
09
84
)
(0
.00
09
91
)
N
o.
of
be
gin
ne
rs
0.0
88
9*
**
0.0
49
5*
**
0.0
49
8*
**
0.0
49
9*
**
0.0
46
2*
**
(0
.00
08
91
)
(0
.00
07
86
)
(0
.00
07
87
)
(0
.00
07
87
)
(0
.00
07
72
)
G
in
iN
U
TS
-3
re
g.
0.0
69
6*
**
0.0
69
6*
**
0.0
69
6*
**
0.0
70
3*
**
(0
.00
08
38
)
(0
.00
08
38
)
(0
.00
08
38
)
(0
.00
08
41
)
G
in
i4
-d
igi
ti
nd
.
0.4
06
***
0.4
06
***
0.4
06
***
0.4
08
***
(0
.00
29
5)
(0
.00
29
5)
(0
.00
29
5)
(0
.00
29
6)
Fi
rm
ag
e2
-0
.00
00
25
4*
**
-0
.00
00
74
3*
**
(0
.00
00
03
39
)
(0
.00
00
17
6)
Fi
rm
ag
e3
0.0
00
00
09
25
***
(0
.00
00
00
32
3)
Siz
e>
15
-0
.02
27
***
(0
.00
12
9)
Siz
e>
50
-0
.04
62
***
(0
.00
16
9)
Siz
e>
10
0
-0
.07
11
***
(0
.00
21
1)
Siz
e>
25
0
-0
.10
3*
**
(0
.00
28
9)
Siz
e>
50
0
-0
.12
2*
**
(0
.00
42
5)
Siz
e>
10
00
-0
.15
6*
**
(0
.01
29
)
Co
ns
ta
nt
0.0
92
6*
**
(0
.00
05
46
)
Fi
rm
FE
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
U
TS
-3
re
gio
n
FE
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
68
21
44
62
45
70
34
04
26
34
04
26
34
04
26
34
04
26
34
04
26
34
04
26
34
04
26
R2
0.0
01
0.3
41
0.3
97
0.3
99
0.4
31
0.6
49
0.6
49
0.6
49
0.6
47
N
ote
:F
irm
sw
hi
ch
,a
ta
ny
po
in
ti
n
tim
e,
ex
ce
ed
2t
im
es
th
e9
9p
er
ce
nt
ile
in
fir
m
siz
ea
re
ex
clu
de
d
fro
m
th
ea
na
lys
is.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
ec
lu
ste
re
d
at
th
ef
irm
lev
el.
Sig
ni
fic
an
ce
lev
els
ar
eg
ive
n
by
*<
0.
1,
**
<
0.
05
,a
nd
***
<
0.
01
.
157
3. Sourcing, Learning, and Matching in Labor Markets
Table3.A3:Firm
AgeandNum
berofSourceFirm
s–FullSam
ple
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
no.sourcefirm
s
Firm
age
0.0187***
-0.0246***
0.00636***
-0.0466***
-0.0217***
-0.0317***
-0.0592***
-0.0837***
-0.0293***
(0.00145)
(0.00137)
(0.00167)
(0.00160)
(0.00136)
(0.00199)
(0.00468)
(0.00872)
(0.00163)
Firm
growth
1.430***
0.994***
0.275***
0.162***
0.156***
0.153***
0.206***
(0.0176)
(0.0133)
(0.0103)
(0.0120)
(0.0120)
(0.0120)
(0.0115)
Firm
size
2.761***
1.373***
1.554***
1.598***
1.609***
(0.0473)
(0.0391)
(0.0490)
(0.0501)
(0.0505)
N
o.ofbeginners
3.106***
5.045***
5.035***
5.033***
4.971***
(0.0167)
(0.0348)
(0.0347)
(0.0347)
(0.0326)
G
iniN
U
TS-3reg.
0.281***
0.283***
0.282***
0.169***
(0.0153)
(0.0153)
(0.0153)
(0.0126)
G
ini4-digitind.
-1.091***
-1.096***
-1.095***
-1.224***
(0.0235)
(0.0235)
(0.0235)
(0.0225)
Firm
age 2
0.000802***
0.00255***
(0.000131)
(0.000571)
Firm
age 3
-0.0000331***
(0.0000108)
Size>
15
-0.155***
(0.0180)
Size>
50
0.275***
(0.0387)
Size>
100
1.999***
(0.0713)
Size>
250
6.519***
(0.187)
Size>
500
13.89***
(0.472)
Size>
1000
24.15***
(1.813)
Constant
2.913***
(0.0157)
Firm
FE
N
o
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
U
TS-3region
FE
N
o
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
O
bservations
1227652
1166554
577441
577441
577441
340426
340426
340426
340426
R
2
0.001
0.661
0.754
0.774
0.839
0.844
0.844
0.844
0.857
N
ote:Firm
swhich,atanypointin
tim
e,exceed2tim
esthe99percentilein
firm
sizeareexcludedfrom
theanalysis.Standarderrorsareclusteredatthefirm
level.Significancelevelsaregiven
by
*
<
0.1,**
<
0.05,and***
<
0.01.
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Chapter 4
Using theWeighted Bootstrap to Account for
Clustered Standard Errors
with Bernd Fitzenberger
4.1 Introduction
Many econometric applications involve data sets with clustered observations while the num-
ber of clusters is often limited by geographic and administrative reasons or budget consider-
ations. We examine the performance of bootstrap methods that explicitly allow for models
which include cluster-invariant binary variables in a small-sample context.
In cases with a small number of clusters, conventional adjustments of standard errors in
linear estimation models are biased. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) show that in case
of few clusters the use of bootstrap methods can provide asymptotic refinement on approxi-
mations from asymptotic theory. However, a variety of numerical problems arises with the
use of these methods. First, the most precise strategies are those that bootstrap studentized
statistics. As a drawback, they do not allow to estimate standard errors directly. Second and
at themain focus of this paper, with only few clusters conventional bootstrapmethods fail to
estimate models with cluster-invariant binary variables (see Cameron andMiller, 2015).1 This
extends to the use of non-linear models like probit. To address these problems we introduce
and evaluate the (more generalized) weighted bootstrap (Barbe and Bertail, 1995; Mason and
Newton, 1992) which generates resamples by repeatedly attaching random weights to each
cluster in the data set. We provide Monte Carlo evidence for small but persistent asymptotic
refinement of a uniformly weighted bootstrap algorithm over conventional bootstrap meth-
ods.
1Moreover, Mackinnon andWebb (2016) show that smallG-problems are amplified if cluster sizes are asym-
metric.
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4.2 Clustered Standard Errors
Assume a simple random effects model for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} individuals in g ∈ {1, . . . ,G(<
N)} clusters,
yig = x′igβ+ uig, (4.1)
where the error termuig = αg+εig is composed of a group component αg and an idiosyncratic
term εig. For simplicity assume balanced clusters, i.e., Ng = N¯g ∀g. Standard errors can be
consistently estimated by (square roots of diagonal entries of)
ÂvarCR(βˆ) = (X′X)−1
 G∑
g=1
Xgu˜gu˜′gX′g
 (X′X)−1. (4.2)
Inference in a linear regressionmodel with grouped data however relies on the crucial assump-
tion that G tends to infinity. Explicitly calculating the analytical standard errors in small
samples with complex dependence structures is a very complicated process and has no prac-
tical relevance. Using bootstrap methods therefore is an attractive approach to approximate
the unknown distribution of regression coefficients with only few clusters. Efron’s (1979)
classical bootstrap algorithm can be extended to the case of clustered data, a procedure of-
ten called the pairs block bootstrap. The dependence structure in each bootstrap resample
should mirror the original sample as closely as possible. Therefore, entire clusters are drawn
in each of B resamples to preserve the within-cluster correlation structure (Cameron et al.,
2008). The bootstrap estimator that approximates the finite sample cdf of some statistic TG,
FG(x) = Pr[TG ≤ x], is obtained from the empirical distribution function of the data, FˆG(x).
This ECDF in turn is approximated by
F̂G(x) = B−1
B∑
b=1
1{T∗G,b ≤ x}. (4.3)
whereT∗G,b denotes the statistic of interest calculated from resample b ∈ {1, . . . ,B}. Inmany
instances, however, the conventional scheme of random resampling with replacement leads
to numerical problems. In particular, caused by the use of cluster-invariant binary explana-
tory variables resamples with perfect collinearity of the regressors are likely to occur if the
number of groups is small.2 A weighted bootstrap algorithm avoids these problems by em-
ploying a more generalized resampling scheme. In particular, each cluster from the original
sample appears in each bootstrap resamplewhile the randomvariation in the procedure stems
from randomly generated weights that are attached to each cluster. The weighted bootstrap
2A similar problem arises for a standard pairwise bootstrap in a probit or logit model when the resample
accidentally contains only observations with the dependent variable being equal to zero (or one) for all obser-
vations in certain cells (Consequently, the probit would try to predict an exact zero [or an exact one] for such
observations).
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distribution thus becomes
F̂W,G(x) =
B∑
b=1
WG,b1{T∗G,b ≤ x}. (4.4)
where WG,b denotes cluster specific weights that are generated drawn from a distribution
WG.3 However, there are some conditions which have to be satisfied for consistency of the
weighted bootstrap due toMason andNewton (1992) and Barbe and Bertail (1995). In partic-
ular,
Wg,G ≥ 0, g = 1, . . . ,G, G ≥ 1, (4.5a)
G−1
G∑
g=1
Wg,G = 1, (4.5b)
G−1
G∑
g=1
(Wg,G − 1/G)2 p→ c as G→∞ for some c > 0, (4.5c)
andWG and theWg,G’s are independent of the sample. (4.5d)
Potential distributions for the weights include the exponential distribution with λ = 1 as
discussed in a related context by Chernozukov, Fernández-Val, and Kowalski (2015) as well as
the uniformdistribution on (1−a, 1+a). Importantly, the bootstrap estimate of the standard
error has to be adjusted for the variance of the weights V[WG].
The following scheme spells out in detail how the weighted bootstrap algorithm is con-
ducted (using the uniform distribution):
1. Do B iterations of this step. On the bth iteration:
(a) Randomly drawGweights from the Uniform(1− a, 1+ a) distribution.
(b) Form a resample ofG clusters {(y∗1 ,X∗1 ), . . . , (y∗G,X∗G)} by multiplying the orig-
inal sample with the square roots of the random weightsW1, . . . ,WG.
(c) Calculate the (weighted) OLS estimate βˆ∗j,b by regressing y∗ on X∗.
2. RejectH0 : βj = β
0
j at level α if and only if |w| > z1−α/2, where w = (βˆj − β0j )/sβˆj,B .
The bootstrap estimate of the standard error is adjusted for the variance of the weights
Var[WG] as follows:
sβˆj,B =
((
1
12(2a)
2
)−1 1
B− 1
B∑
b=1
(βˆ∗j,b − βˆ
∗
j )
2
)1/2
.
3Note that the pairs cluster bootstrap is a special case withWG = G−1Multinomial(G; 1/G, . . . , 1/G).
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Figure 4.1: Rejection Rates in the Homoscedastic Random EffectsModel
4.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations
Cameron et al. (2008) provide a comparison of various methods that account for cluster ef-
fects concentrating on bootstrap algorithms. Their main finding is that methods which boot-
strap studentized statistics (such as the t-statistic) provide an asymptotic refinement that im-
proves on convergences rates from asymptotic theory even with a small number of clusters.
However, these methods do not allow to compute standard errors directly. Moreover, as
spelled out in section 4.2 most methods work poorly if the model includes cluster-invariant
binary variables. Using the samemodel andmethodology as Cameron et al. (2008) we extend
their analysis by considering the weighted bootstrap algorithm presented above.
In particular, we use various data generating processes to generate the data in R = 1000
Monte-Carlo simulations and report the fraction of simulations that rejectsH0 : βj = β
0
j be-
causew falls outside the 90% confidence interval. The nominal rejection rate hence amounts
to α = 10%while the simulation error becomes sαˆ =
√
αˆ(1− αˆ)/(R− 1).
The main specification with homoscedastic errors reads
yig = β0 + β1xig + uig = β0 + β1(zg + zig) + (αg + εig), (4.6)
where zg, zig, εg, and εig each are independentdraws fromN (0, 0.1). The (true) coefficients are
β0 = 0 and β1 = 1.4 The analysis is conducted for various group sizes, G = 5, 10, 15, . . . , 50,
while (in the baseline configuration) the number of observations per group is held constant
atNg = 30. Our simulation results are summarized in figure 4.1 while detailed numbers can
be found in table 4.1. The results in panel (a) confirm the findings in Cameron et al. (2008).
In addition, theweighted cluster bootstrapbasedonuniformlydistributedweights achieves
rejection rates that are minimally but persistently smaller than the pairs cluster bootstrap.
Simple t-tests for dependent samples indicate that this difference is significant on the 5% con-
4As a result, the within-group correlations ρu = σ2α/(σ2α + σ2ε) and equivalently ρx both are equal to 0.5.
166
4.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations
Ta
bl
e4
.1:
Re
jec
tio
nR
at
es
fro
m
10
00
M
on
te
-C
ar
lo
Sim
ul
at
io
ns
of
th
eH
om
os
ce
da
st
ic
Ra
nd
om
Ef
fe
ct
sM
od
el
N
um
be
ro
fG
ro
up
sG
M
eth
od
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
clu
ste
rr
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
de
rro
rs
0.2
82
0.1
92
0.1
90
0.1
60
0.1
43
0.1
47
0.1
25
0.1
11
0.1
29
0.1
24
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
3)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
pa
irs
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
0.2
61
0.1
90
0.1
83
0.1
64
0.1
43
0.1
53
0.1
28
0.1
17
0.1
31
0.1
27
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
3)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
pa
irs
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
(T
G−
2)
0.1
05
0.1
42
0.1
54
0.1
41
0.1
32
0.1
39
0.1
15
0.1
05
0.1
23
0.1
18
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
un
ifo
rm
ly
we
igh
ted
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
0.2
46
0.1
80
0.1
76
0.1
48
0.1
41
0.1
44
0.1
20
0.1
12
0.1
20
0.1
23
(0
.01
3)
(0
.01
3)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
un
ifo
rm
ly
we
igh
ted
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
(T
G−
2)
0.1
12
0.1
30
0.1
47
0.1
32
0.1
27
0.1
29
0.1
13
0.0
98
0.1
12
0.1
16
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
ex
po
ne
nt
ial
ly
we
igh
ted
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
0.3
85
0.2
62
0.2
40
0.2
04
0.1
70
0.1
75
0.1
44
0.1
29
0.1
50
0.1
45
(0
.01
6)
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
ex
po
ne
nt
ial
ly
we
igh
ted
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
se
(T
G−
2)
0.2
14
0.2
08
0.2
11
0.1
79
0.1
54
0.1
64
0.1
36
0.1
20
0.1
40
0.1
37
(0
.01
6)
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
4)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
2)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
(0
.01
1)
pa
irs
clu
ste
rb
oo
tst
ra
p-
t
0.0
44
0.0
85
0.1
18
0.1
05
0.1
04
0.1
10
0.0
93
0.0
86
0.1
00
0.1
01
(0
.00
7)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.00
9)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.01
0)
(0
.00
9)
167
4. Using the Weighted Bootstrap to Account for Clustered Standard Errors
Table 4.2: Test Statistics for Comparison of Rejection Rates of UniformlyWeighted Cluster Bootstrap vs. Conventional
Methods - HomoscedasticModel
Number
of groupsG
Test statistics forH0:
unif. WCB≥
CRVE
pairs cluster
bootstrap-se
pairs cluster
bootstrap-se
(TG−2)
5 6.11∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ -1.22
10 3.01∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
15 3.52∗∗∗ 1.53 1.81∗
20 2.83∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗
25 0.63 0.58 1.29
30 0.83 2.19∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
35 1.39 2.53∗∗∗ 0.63
40 -0.38 1.39 1.81∗
45 2.72∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗
50 0.38 1.07 0.53
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote rejections on the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
fidence level for almost all cluster sizes (see test statistics in table 4.2). In panel (b), critical
values from the t-distribution with G − 2 degrees of freedom are used for the bootstrap-se
methods and lead to largely improved rejection rates.
Several weighting schemes different from the uniform distribution cannot reproduce the
favorable results of the uniformly weighted cluster bootstrap. Figure 4.2 shows that in our
setup using the exponential distribution as suggested by Chernozukov et al. (2015) leads to
much higher rejection rates for all cluster sizes with both sets of critical values.
Particular interest is in the performance of theweighted cluster bootstrap in amodel with a
binary regressor where conventional bootstrap methods have no bite. Therefore, we modify
the baseline specification to a variant with a cluster-invariant regressor, xig = xg = 1{g ≥
0.8G}, i.e., a model with an indicator function that equals one for 20% of the clusters. Since
there is no natural ordering of the clusters this can be interpreted as a random treatment
dummy variable on the cluster level with P(Xg = 1) = 0.2. Results are shown in figure
4.3 (and table 4.3).
The rejection rates for the pairs cluster bootstrap cannot be interpreted due to the fact that
(in particular for small G) many bootstrap replications sample only clusters with xg = 0 (or
1). In these replications, the statistical package estimates a perfect fit for the treatment indi-
cator and hence ”zero” coefficients. Since in (re-)samples with variation in xg the algorithm
consistently estimates the true β1 = 1 this vastly increases variation in βˆ
∗
j,b and hence artifi-
cially decreases the test statistic w. This mechanism generates under-rejection rendering the
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Figure 4.2: Rejection Rates in the Homoscedastic Random EffectsModel
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Figure 4.3: Rejection Rates in theModel with Binary Regressor
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Table4.3:RejectionRatesfrom
1000M
onte-CarloSim
ulationsoftheRandom
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odelwithBinaryRegressor
N
um
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M
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(0.010)
pairsclusterbootstrap-se
0.278
0.207
0.159
0.160
0.137
0.135
0.130
0.140
0.121
0.123
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
pairsclusterbootstrap-se(T
G−
2 )
0.160
0.167
0.136
0.136
0.126
0.124
0.120
0.133
0.116
0.111
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
uniform
lyweightedclusterbootstrap-se
0.255
0.194
0.154
0.162
0.135
0.136
0.130
0.139
0.117
0.125
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
uniform
lyweightedclusterbootstrap-se(T
G−
2 )
0.146
0.160
0.131
0.136
0.120
0.126
0.117
0.125
0.111
0.116
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
exponentiallyweightedclusterbootstrap-se
0.375
0.264
0.225
0.113
0.178
0.178
0.160
0.168
0.146
0.149
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
exponentiallyweightedclusterbootstrap-se(T
G−
2 )
0.244
0.220
0.193
0.186
0.160
0.157
0.146
0.160
0.137
0.137
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
pairsclusterbootstrap-t
0.000
0.059
0.063
0.82
0.065
0.092
0.093
0.094
0.096
0.089
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.009)
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4.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations
Table 4.4: Test Statistics for Comparison of Rejection Rates of UniformlyWeighted Cluster Bootstrap vs. Conventional
Methods -Model with Binary Regressor
Number
of groupsG
Test statistics forH0:
unif. WCB≥
CRVE
pairs cluster
bootstrap-se
pairs cluster
bootstrap-se
(TG−2)
5 3.22∗∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗
10 4.16∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 1.95∗
15 4.03∗∗∗ 1.29 1.15
20 2.83∗∗∗ -0.43 0
25 3.66∗∗∗ 0.53 1.61
30 3.18∗∗∗ -0.28 -0.58
35 2.51∗∗∗ 0.00 0.83
40 2.72∗∗∗ 0.25 2.14∗∗
45 3.63∗∗∗ 1.07 1.29
50 0.71 -0.47 -1.29
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote rejections on the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
results for the pairs cluster bootstrap-se misleading.5 The pairs cluster bootstrap-t displays
substantial underrejection for small G due to a different mechanism. Here, perfect fit of es-
timates induces zero standard errors in a resample and thus generates missing values for the
test statistic being bootstrapped. As laid out in Cameron andMiller (2015) and confirmed in
both panels of figure 4.3 this effect leads to underrejection. The weighted cluster bootstrap in
contrast is not subject to these limitations and delivers similar results as before. Comparison
to rejection rates from cluster-robust variance estimates (columnCRVE in table 4.4) indicates
a clear improvement particularly for small G while the other columns should be interpreted
with caution due to the problems of the pairs cluster bootstrap with binary data.
In addition, we perform multiple sensitivity checks varying the parameters of the model.
Theperformance of theweighted cluster bootstrapwithuniformweights is remarkably stable.
Introducing heteroscedasticity invalidates residual bootstraps but does not affect the relative
performance of the weighted cluster boostrap. If the estimatedmodel is misspecified because
a quadratic term of x2ig is omitted differences in favor of the uniformly weighted cluster boot-
strap become slightly larger.
5We cannot give formal evidence for the size of this effect. In the smallest configuration with 5 clusters,
however, the probability of drawing a resample that contains only zeros amounts to (4/5)5 = 0.32768 indicating
that this indeed leads to problemswith the interpretation of the results for the pairs cluster bootstrap-se in figure
4.3.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I provide ample evidence for the importance of jobmobility and network struc-
tures for the functioning of labor markets. Patterns of job mobility can be used to explain
the formation of separate labor markets within countries, to understand information trans-
mission between individuals, or to understandmechanisms ofmatching and hiring strategies.
Repeated interaction between individuals or firms can lead to the formation of stable net-
works and groups which are important factors in diminishing informational uncertainties. I
propose novel econometric methods that allow to explicitly incorporate interactions and de-
pendency structures using techniques from network analysis and machine learning.
The research in this thesis lays ground for a range of important follow-up questions that I
aim to answer in future projects. First, it is interesting to examine and understand the hierar-
chical structure that underlies many transitions between jobs. Individuals aim to advance to
better firms, occupations, or tasks. The network methodology proposed in this thesis allows
to empirically analyze the concept of job ladders and might be helpful in answering impor-
tant questions regarding the functioning of the labor market. Second, while the results in
this thesis indicate that job mobility is an important driver of information flow and labor
market efficiency, an open economic question pertains to the consequences of obstacles to
worker flows. In future research, I aim to study the consequences of particular historic events
that resulted in impediments to worker mobility. Two episodes of German history – policy
differences between occupation zones after World War II and the subsequent division of the
country in two parts – create unique natural experiments that can be exploited in order to
identify the consequences of impediments to mobility for economic growth, labor market
integration, and other socio-economic outcomes.
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